VegaTokenVulnerable.sol
VSS-20260924-61NL6Q44 · generated Sep 24, 2026, 4:42 PM
Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. VegaTokenVulnerable.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.
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Solidity evidence report
14 audit findings
Severity distribution
Executive summary
- 14 findings surfaced (1 critical, 3 high, 6 medium, 1 low, 3 informational).
- CRITICAL · selfdestruct call — exploitability unknown.
- HIGH · VegaTokenVulnerable.unsafeReviewerLottery(address[]) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#28-34) uses a weak PRNG: "picked = reviewers[block.timestamp % reviewers.length] ( (unsafeReviewerLottery) — exploitability medium.
- HIGH · Reentrancy in VegaTokenVulnerable.withdrawReviewCredit(uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#36-42): (withdrawReviewCredit) — exploitability medium.
- Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.
Warnings (1)
- · Unmapped detector slither:immutable-states — classified as 'other'
- criticalCentralizationDetector: semgrep
selfdestruct call
Evidence
selfdestruct call. Even with access control, selfdestruct introduces upgrade risk and historical state loss. Audit access control carefully or remove.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Document the trust boundary, set up time-locked multisig ownership, and surface admin-only functions in the deployment runbook.
- highOracle manipulationConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
VegaTokenVulnerable.unsafeReviewerLottery(address[]) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#28-34) uses a weak PRNG: "picked = reviewers[block.timestamp % reviewers.length] (
Evidence
VegaTokenVulnerable.unsafeReviewerLottery(address[]) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#28-34) uses a weak PRNG: "picked = reviewers[block.timestamp % reviewers.length] (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#31)"
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Use multi-source price feeds (e.g. Chainlink + TWAPs) and validate freshness/deviation before consuming oracle data on-chain.
- highReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in VegaTokenVulnerable.withdrawReviewCredit(uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#36-42):
Evidence
Reentrancy in VegaTokenVulnerable.withdrawReviewCredit(uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#36-42): External calls: - (ok,None) = address(msg.sender).call{value: amount}() (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#39) State variables written after the call(s): - balances[msg.sender] -= amount (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#41) VegaTokenVulnerable.balances (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#10) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - VegaTokenVulnerable.balances (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#10) - VegaTokenVulnerable.constructor() (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#15-18) - VegaTokenVulnerable.mintForReview(address,uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#22-26) - VegaTokenVulnerable.withdrawReviewCredit(uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#36-42)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- highAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: highDetector: slither
VegaTokenVulnerable.retireFixture() (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#44-48) allows anyone to destruct the contract
Evidence
VegaTokenVulnerable.retireFixture() (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#44-48) allows anyone to destruct the contract
Exploitability notes
High-confidence detection of a severe pattern; treat as exploitable until disproven by manual review.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- mediumAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
VegaTokenVulnerable.mintForReview(address,uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#22-26) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string)(tx.origin == owner,ori
Evidence
VegaTokenVulnerable.mintForReview(address,uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#22-26) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string)(tx.origin == owner,origin owner only) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#24)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- mediumAccess controlDetector: semgrep
Use of tx.origin for authorization
Evidence
Use of tx.origin for authorization. tx.origin can be tricked via phishing contracts. Prefer msg.sender.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- mediumTimestamp dependenceDetector: semgrep
block.timestamp used in a value computation
Evidence
block.timestamp used in a value computation. Miners can adjust block.timestamp within ~15s; do not use it for randomness or time-critical comparisons.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Treat block.timestamp as a coarse value with miner influence; prefer block-number windows for short-term invariants and add tolerance bands.
- mediumUnchecked callDetector: semgrep
Low-level .call to an externally-controlled target
Evidence
Low-level .call to an externally-controlled target. Combined with reentrancy or unchecked return values, this is a common fund-draining pattern.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- mediumAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
VegaTokenVulnerable.retireFixture() (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#44-48) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string)(tx.origin == owner,origin owner only)
Evidence
VegaTokenVulnerable.retireFixture() (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#44-48) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string)(tx.origin == owner,origin owner only) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#46)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- mediumAccess controlDetector: semgrep
Use of tx.origin for authorization
Evidence
Use of tx.origin for authorization. tx.origin can be tricked via phishing contracts. Prefer msg.sender.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
VegaTokenVulnerable.unsafeReviewerLottery(address[]).picked (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#28) lacks a zero-check on :
Evidence
VegaTokenVulnerable.unsafeReviewerLottery(address[]).picked (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#28) lacks a zero-check on : - reviewer = picked (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#32)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Version constraint ^0.8.20 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
Evidence
Version constraint ^0.8.20 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - VerbatimInvalidDeduplication - FullInlinerNonExpressionSplitArgumentEvaluationOrder - MissingSideEffectsOnSelectorAccess. It is used by: - ^0.8.20 (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#2)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
VegaTokenVulnerable.owner (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#11) should be immutable
Evidence
VegaTokenVulnerable.owner (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#11) should be immutable
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Low level call in VegaTokenVulnerable.withdrawReviewCredit(uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#36-42):
Evidence
Low level call in VegaTokenVulnerable.withdrawReviewCredit(uint256) (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#36-42): - (ok,None) = address(msg.sender).call{value: amount}() (VegaTokenVulnerable.sol#39)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
Exploit reasoning
Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence
- 025d746d5dc01028d99ab6f083342b2f9b382eca5b913ce3121b6ef8656c9c07 · centralizationcritical
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
- 9e9cc0e9cfc74f54891b411b93c7449f2e172aa1da0a998e8e7b976ae04def6b · oracle-manipulationhighConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Price or rate read from an on-chain source that can be moved in the same block by the caller
- Decisions (mint amount, collateral check) derived from the manipulable price
Action
Attacker uses a flash loan or large swap to move the oracle price in the same block, triggers the price-dependent action, then reverts the price.
Impact
Mint of more shares than collateral warrants, undercollateralized borrow, or theft of liquidity by exploiting the manipulated rate.
False-positive caveats
- The oracle may be a time-weighted aggregator that resists single-block movement.
- The function may compare against a snapshot taken on a separate block.
Remediation checklist
- Use a TWAP (time-weighted average price) over multiple blocks.
- Cross-check at least two independent oracle sources before acting.
- Reject prices that diverge from a recent average by more than a documented threshold.
- e3c81b2bb05292a33bb195f5efdac2095dcb7378274eb86ee20c848b965cd13e · reentrancyhighConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
- Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
- No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function
Action
Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.
Impact
Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.
False-positive caveats
- The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
- The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.
Remediation checklist
- Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
- Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
- Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
- 7d9b78b620334b47ab494454ec49b378daf245c24264ec5ee94fd81ae25ca8a0 · access-controlhighConfidence: high
Conditions for the exploit are met by the analyzer evidence; treat as likely until disproven by operator review.
Preconditions
- Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
- Caller controls the path that reaches the function
Action
Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.
Impact
Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.
False-positive caveats
- The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
- Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.
Remediation checklist
- Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
- Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
- Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
- 8d94c22f92bfff04d2cec20f538c96db7e75d788478a91bc7ffd1cceea98d7a0 · access-controlmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
- Caller controls the path that reaches the function
Action
Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.
Impact
Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.
False-positive caveats
- The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
- Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.
Remediation checklist
- Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
- Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
- Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
- d3a46569a601f7bdcf08c52c1ce6a464f24ea0d6035d39fa18437b6c940bbc00 · access-controlmedium
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
- 4bf225cdc0c238c3ce62538e80d89916562e5eb0b7ed3c988eaf7bb73b29c755 · timestamp-dependencemedium
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
- 24612734790f3f6ca717a5032967841c609ae6046549b32eb41f771d29f905a2 · unchecked-callmedium
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
- b85d4c6b14a005cc536ebad1f32253f03512ff61c8e9c49a7cbf0952e914f482 · access-controlmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
- Caller controls the path that reaches the function
Action
Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.
Impact
Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.
False-positive caveats
- The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
- Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.
Remediation checklist
- Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
- Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
- Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
- 2b383bb32009d69610ac628adccd9eee4b96f1e5449289991c5149e18497756b · access-controlmedium
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
Judgment
Triage of the findings, in reading order
The ranking, the explanations and the remediation order below were produced by a language model from the findings this report already carries (model deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash) generated Sep 27, 2026, 3:59 AM. It is a triage layer, not a detection layer: every finding comes from the analyzers above.
Reviewed by a VegaSec operator on Sep 27, 2026, 3:59 AM. The review covers exactly the content shown here.
Ranking
- #1 · 7d9b78b620334b47ab494454ec49b378daf245c24264ec5ee94fd81ae25ca8a0 · access-controlhigh
High confidence, concrete: retireFixture() selfdestructs the contract and is gated only by tx.origin, which a phishing contract can satisfy on the owner's behalf.
- #2 · 025d746d5dc01028d99ab6f083342b2f9b382eca5b913ce3121b6ef8656c9c07 · centralizationcritical
Critical selfdestruct on the same line 47 as the suicidal finding; separate rule id, so read together with it rather than as a second path.
- #3 · e3c81b2bb05292a33bb195f5efdac2095dcb7378274eb86ee20c848b965cd13e · reentrancyhigh
External value call to msg.sender before the balance decrement in withdrawReviewCredit, so the caller can re-enter and drain credited balances.
- #4 · 9e9cc0e9cfc74f54891b411b93c7449f2e172aa1da0a998e8e7b976ae04def6b · oracle-manipulationhigh
unsafeReviewerLottery selects the reviewer from block.timestamp, which the block producer influences, making the stored reviewer predictable.
- #5 · 8d94c22f92bfff04d2cec20f538c96db7e75d788478a91bc7ffd1cceea98d7a0 · access-controlmedium
mintForReview authorizes by tx.origin, so any contract the owner calls can mint to an arbitrary account.
- #6 · b85d4c6b14a005cc536ebad1f32253f03512ff61c8e9c49a7cbf0952e914f482 · access-controlmedium
Second tx.origin gate, inside retireFixture; it is the authorization half of the destruction path and must be fixed with it.
- #7 · d3a46569a601f7bdcf08c52c1ce6a464f24ea0d6035d39fa18437b6c940bbc00 · access-controlmedium
Semgrep duplicate of the tx.origin check at line 24; no new information beyond 8d94c22f.
- #8 · 2b383bb32009d69610ac628adccd9eee4b96f1e5449289991c5149e18497756b · access-controlmedium
Semgrep duplicate of the tx.origin check at line 46 in retireFixture; same site as b85d4c6b.
- #9 · 4bf225cdc0c238c3ce62538e80d89916562e5eb0b7ed3c988eaf7bb73b29c755 · timestamp-dependencemedium
Timestamp-as-randomness at line 31, duplicate of the weak-PRNG finding; keep as corroboration of the same defect.
- #10 · 24612734790f3f6ca717a5032967841c609ae6046549b32eb41f771d29f905a2 · unchecked-callmedium
Flags the payout call target at line 39 as externally controlled; it is the mechanism behind the withdrawReviewCredit reentrancy.
- #11 · c95e896eba0879481c44b2f622b6ae140a700984244981b4404ff41210f6c2d3 · unchecked-callinformational
Informational restatement of the same low-level call site already covered by e3c81b2b and 24612734.
- #12 · 0e297411d10f1e4a0ee9692c268471424d3d570524701f41a065fe7ac3d700e9 · access-controllow
Low-severity zero-check note on the named return of unsafeReviewerLottery; the function does require non-empty input, so impact is limited.
- #13 · 5000022c8e54141e1f7c204b377ec3cddd18eb4f224def2ddcfff5238884b60b · logicinformational
Informational compiler-range note on pragma ^0.8.20; no exploit path in this contract but worth pinning at build time.
- #14 · a2093d5f0250fce2f6c8bbc1c6c8c09b8ac4c01d16989600d7b91a130bb8aded · otherinformational
Informational gas/style note that owner could be immutable; unrelated to the fund-loss and destruction paths above.
Why it matters
7d9b78b620334b47ab494454ec49b378daf245c24264ec5ee94fd81ae25ca8a0
retireFixture() destroys the contract and forwards the balance to owner. The only gate is tx.origin == owner, so a contract the owner interacts with can call retireFixture() while the owner's transaction is in flight; tx.origin still equals owner and the call succeeds. That ends the token contract and its state in one transaction, which no later fix can undo.
Cited line · VegaTokenVulnerable.sol:47
selfdestruct(payable(owner));025d746d5dc01028d99ab6f083342b2f9b382eca5b913ce3121b6ef8656c9c07
Same line as the suicidal finding: the selfdestruct in retireFixture(). Reported as critical centralization because the destruction capability is tied to a single owner-controlled gate rather than a reviewable shutdown procedure. Whatever the intended lifecycle, once this call executes the deployed address is dead and balances at that address are no longer accessible through normal calls.
Cited line · VegaTokenVulnerable.sol:47
selfdestruct(payable(owner));e3c81b2bb05292a33bb195f5efdac2095dcb7378274eb86ee20c848b965cd13e
withdrawReviewCredit checks balances[msg.sender] >= amount, then sends value to msg.sender with a low-level call, and only afterwards subtracts from balances. During the call the caller's balance is still whole, so a receiving contract can call withdrawReviewCredit again and be paid repeatedly until the contract's ether is gone. The subtraction at line 41 happens after control returns.
Cited line · VegaTokenVulnerable.sol:39
(bool ok,) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: amount}("");9e9cc0e9cfc74f54891b411b93c7449f2e172aa1da0a998e8e7b976ae04def6b
unsafeReviewerLottery picks a reviewer with block.timestamp modulo the array length. The block producer chooses that timestamp within its allowed drift, so the selected reviewer and the reviewer state variable written at line 32 are predictable and steerable. Anything that later trusts reviewer as an impartial selection inherits that manipulation.
Cited line · VegaTokenVulnerable.sol:31
picked = reviewers[block.timestamp % reviewers.length];8d94c22f92bfff04d2cec20f538c96db7e75d788478a91bc7ffd1cceea98d7a0
mintForReview credits arbitrary balances after checking tx.origin == owner. Any contract the owner transacts with can invoke mintForReview during that transaction, because tx.origin remains the owner while msg.sender is the attacker's contract. The minted amount and recipient are both caller-supplied, so the caller chooses who gets credited.
Cited line · VegaTokenVulnerable.sol:24
require(tx.origin == owner, "origin owner only");
Remediation order
- Delete the selfdestruct from retireFixture and from the contract. If shutdown must exist, replace it with a pausable or withdraw-and-freeze path gated on msg.sender and reviewed before deployment.7d9b78b620334b47ab494454ec49b378daf245c24264ec5ee94fd81ae25ca8a0
- Close out the same line: confirm no other function reaches selfdestruct and re-scan after removal, since this rule and the suicidal rule both point at line 47.025d746d5dc01028d99ab6f083342b2f9b382eca5b913ce3121b6ef8656c9c07
- Replace tx.origin == owner with msg.sender == owner (or a role check) in retireFixture; if the function is removed, drop the check with it.b85d4c6b14a005cc536ebad1f32253f03512ff61c8e9c49a7cbf0952e914f482
- Same site as priority 3: after the gate is changed to msg.sender, re-run semgrep so the line-46 tx.origin hit clears as well.2b383bb32009d69610ac628adccd9eee4b96f1e5449289991c5149e18497756b
- Change mintForReview to authorize on msg.sender, or better to an explicit minter role, so a phishing contract cannot mint on the owner's behalf.8d94c22f92bfff04d2cec20f538c96db7e75d788478a91bc7ffd1cceea98d7a0
- Duplicate of priority 5 at line 24; verify the semgrep hit clears once msg.sender authorization is in place.d3a46569a601f7bdcf08c52c1ce6a464f24ea0d6035d39fa18437b6c940bbc00
- In withdrawReviewCredit, subtract balances[msg.sender] -= amount before the external call, or add a reentrancy guard, then keep the call and the ok check after effects.e3c81b2bb05292a33bb195f5efdac2095dcb7378274eb86ee20c848b965cd13e
- After the ordering fix, consider replacing the raw call with a pull-payment pattern or a limited-gas send so the recipient cannot re-enter on this path.24612734790f3f6ca717a5032967841c609ae6046549b32eb41f771d29f905a2
- Replace block.timestamp selection in unsafeReviewerLottery with a commit-reveal scheme or an external randomness beacon; storing a producer-influenced pick is not sufficient.9e9cc0e9cfc74f54891b411b93c7449f2e172aa1da0a998e8e7b976ae04def6b
- Same line 31 as priority 9; confirm the timestamp use is gone before re-scanning.4bf225cdc0c238c3ce62538e80d89916562e5eb0b7ed3c988eaf7bb73b29c755
- While editing unsafeReviewerLottery, add an explicit check on the chosen reviewer address before assigning it to reviewer.0e297411d10f1e4a0ee9692c268471424d3d570524701f41a065fe7ac3d700e9
- Pin the pragma to a specific compiler release and re-review against the linked known-issues list before deployment.5000022c8e54141e1f7c204b377ec3cddd18eb4f224def2ddcfff5238884b60b
- If owner is set once in the constructor, mark it immutable; otherwise leave as is and document why it is mutable.a2093d5f0250fce2f6c8bbc1c6c8c09b8ac4c01d16989600d7b91a130bb8aded
Uncertain
- 025d746d5dc01028d99ab6f083342b2f9b382eca5b913ce3121b6ef8656c9c07
- 8d94c22f92bfff04d2cec20f538c96db7e75d788478a91bc7ffd1cceea98d7a0
- 9e9cc0e9cfc74f54891b411b93c7449f2e172aa1da0a998e8e7b976ae04def6b
- 0e297411d10f1e4a0ee9692c268471424d3d570524701f41a065fe7ac3d700e9
Citation check
36 of 36 produced items were kept; 5quoted line(s) were checked against the report's own source; nothing was discarded.
What this section does not claim
- It does not detect anything: the finding set is the input, never an output.
- It is not a human review. A machine triage is not an audit, and this section is not evidence that the contract is free of defects.
- An empty or short triage is not evidence of anything either: no finding set here means the analyzers raised nothing on this source.
- Ordering is one reading of the report, not a verdict on exploitability.
Audit pipeline
Audit cockpit
Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.
Audit intake
Passed320ms replay4:42 PMNormalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.
Source acquisition
Passed1.4s replay4:42 PMResolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.
Toolchain validation
Partial2.3s replay4:42 PMConfirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Static analysis
Partial14 findings8.8s replay4:42 PMRun static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Finding normalization
Passed14 findings1.1s replay4:42 PMDedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.
Exploitability review
Partial14 findings1.9s replay4:42 PMFrame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.
- Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
Remediation draft
Partial14 findings1.5s replay4:42 PMPrepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.
- Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
Operator review
Blocked0ms replay4:42 PMRecord whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.
- No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
- Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
Finalization
Partial14 findings620ms replay4:42 PMPublish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.
Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567
- Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.
How to read this report
Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.
Generated Sep 24, 2026, 4:42 PM · Solidity · VegaTokenVulnerable.sol
Score bands
0-19
AVOID-style triage · this report
Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.
20-49
High caution
Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.
50-69
Watch
Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.
70-89
Clear surface (automated)
No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
90-100
Strong surface (automated)
No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
- Score
- Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
- Confidence
- Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
- Ranking / percentile
- Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.
Private Review is separate
A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.