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VegaSec / Solidity scan report

DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol

VSS-20260924-ENBE771Z · generated Sep 24, 2026, 5:22 AM

Trust score

85

Run another scanRequest Private Review (report id only)
Clear surface · automated4 findings1 highPasted sourcesemgrep 1.163.0

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

Signature

unsigned

This report has no signature. It was persisted before report signing shipped, so nobody can prove authorship for it, including us. The bytes can still be hashed to check that they did not change.

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PDF artifact

Queued artifact pipeline · not blocking on the scan

Not requested

No PDF artifact has been requested for this report yet. The HTML report and the Markdown export already carry the full disclaimer and limitations inline. PDF synthesis is a queued artifact, not part of the scan path.

Status endpoint

GET /report/solidity/VSS-20260924-ENBE771Z/export.pdf

Solidity evidence report

4 audit findings

high: 0medium: 0informational: 0

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 4 findings surfaced (0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low, 2 informational).
  • HIGH · Reentrancy in DelistProbeDBPROOF1.withdraw(uint256) (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#7-12): (withdraw) — exploitability medium.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.
semgrep 1.163.0
  • highReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in DelistProbeDBPROOF1.withdraw(uint256) (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#7-12):

    Affected location
    DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol:7-12 · withdraw
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-eth

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in DelistProbeDBPROOF1.withdraw(uint256) (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#7-12): External calls: - (ok,None) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}() (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#9) State variables written after the call(s): - balances[msg.sender] -= amount (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#11) DelistProbeDBPROOF1.balances (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#5) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - DelistProbeDBPROOF1.balances (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#5) - DelistProbeDBPROOF1.withdraw(uint256) (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#7-12)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
    Detector docs ↗
  • mediumUnchecked callConfidence: unknownExploitability: unknownDetector: semgrep

    Low-level .call to an externally-controlled target

    Affected location
    DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol:9
    Detector / source
    semgrep · semgrep:vegasec-low-level-call-untrusted

    Evidence

    Low-level .call to an externally-controlled target. Combined with reentrancy or unchecked return values, this is a common fund-draining pattern.

    Exploitability notes

    Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • Analyzer did not report confidence; fail closed and treat the finding as unverified.
    • Static analysis did not prove exploitability; do not present this as an exploit claim.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
    Detector docs ↗
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Version constraint 0.8.19 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)

    Affected location
    DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol:2 · 0.8.19
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:solc-version

    Evidence

    Version constraint 0.8.19 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - VerbatimInvalidDeduplication - FullInlinerNonExpressionSplitArgumentEvaluationOrder - MissingSideEffectsOnSelectorAccess. It is used by: - 0.8.19 (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#2)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
    Detector docs ↗
  • informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Low level call in DelistProbeDBPROOF1.withdraw(uint256) (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#7-12):

    Affected location
    DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol:7-12 · withdraw
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:low-level-calls

    Evidence

    Low level call in DelistProbeDBPROOF1.withdraw(uint256) (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#7-12): - (ok,None) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}() (DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol#9)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
    Detector docs ↗

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a single sandboxed copy of the source. Multi-file dependency analysis beyond what slither resolves automatically is out of scope.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • e8c358e4499cd5ebb564037953d669a433efe4216c1591e63fee3afdf563b0a9 · reentrancyhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
    • Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
    • No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function

    Action

    Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.

    Impact

    Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.

    False-positive caveats

    • The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
    • The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.

    Remediation checklist

    • Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
    • Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
    • Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
  • 403f4a2db221dbd54fd421b0a6fc833665e442241fb8d74f62aff560efdd64b4 · unchecked-callmedium

    Not determined

    Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?

    Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 5Partial: 3Blocked: 1

  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay5:22 AM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay5:22 AM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Passed2.3s replay5:22 AM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

  4. Static analysis

    Passed4 findings8.8s replay5:22 AM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

  5. Finding normalization

    Passed4 findings1.1s replay5:22 AM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial4 findings1.9s replay5:22 AM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.

  7. Remediation draft

    Partial4 findings1.5s replay5:22 AM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.

  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay5:22 AM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.

  9. Finalization

    Partial4 findings620ms replay5:22 AM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

Report badges

Verified source

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How to read this report

Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Sep 24, 2026, 5:22 AM · Solidity · DelistProbeDBPROOF1.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

    AVOID-style triage

    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

  • 20-49

    High caution

    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated) · this report

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

Score
Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
Confidence
Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
Ranking / percentile
Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.

Private Review is separate

A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.

Export and share

  • · Shareable public URL: copy from the report actions panel.
  • · Markdown export: every export carries the report id, target, verdict, generated timestamp, and the public-data disclaimer.
  • · PDF export: not in this MVP. Tracked as a follow-up. The Markdown export contains the same content and prints cleanly to PDF from a browser today.

Source provenance

This report scanned a Solidity source provided directly by the submitter (paste). No on-chain address is associated.

Scanned source (403 chars)

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.19;

contract DelistProbeDBPROOF1 {
    mapping(address => uint256) public balances;

    function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
        require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount, "insufficient DBPROOF1");
        (bool ok, ) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");
        require(ok, "send failed");
        balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
    }
}

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.