VegaSec / Solidity scan report

Contract.sol

VSS-20260928-1NUUA8BB · generated Sep 28, 2026, 5:14 AM

High caution66 findings1 critical2 highPasted source3 warningssemgrep 1.163.0

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. Contract.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

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Solidity evidence report

66 audit findings

critical: 1high: 2medium: 2low: 5informational: 56

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 66 findings surfaced (1 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 5 low, 56 informational).
  • CRITICAL · selfdestruct call — exploitability unknown.
  • HIGH · WalletLibrary.kill(address) (Contract.sol#233-235) allows anyone to destruct the contract (kill) — exploitability high.
  • HIGH · Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): (confirm) — exploitability medium.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.

Warnings (3)

  • · Unmapped detector slither:missing-inheritance — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:unindexed-event-address — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:unused-state — classified as 'other'
semgrep 1.163.0
  • criticalCentralizationConfidence: unknownExploitability: unknownDetector: semgrep

    selfdestruct call

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:234
    Detector / source
    semgrep · semgrep:vegasec-selfdestruct

    Evidence

    selfdestruct call. Even with access control, selfdestruct introduces upgrade risk and historical state loss. Audit access control carefully or remove.

    Exploitability notes

    Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.

    Remediation

    Document the trust boundary, set up time-locked multisig ownership, and surface admin-only functions in the deployment runbook.

    Limitations

    • Analyzer did not report confidence; fail closed and treat the finding as unverified.
    • Static analysis did not prove exploitability; do not present this as an exploit claim.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • highAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: highDetector: slither

    WalletLibrary.kill(address) (Contract.sol#233-235) allows anyone to destruct the contract

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:233-235 · kill
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:suicidal

    Evidence

    WalletLibrary.kill(address) (Contract.sol#233-235) allows anyone to destruct the contract

    Exploitability notes

    High-confidence detection of a severe pattern; treat as exploitable until disproven by manual review.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Exploitability is inferred from a severe high-confidence static signal, not from a live exploit proof.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • highReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:279-293 · confirm
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-eth

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): External calls: - ! m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data) (Contract.sol#285) State variables written after the call(s): - delete m_txs[_h] (Contract.sol#290) WalletLibrary.m_txs (Contract.sol#405) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - WalletLibrary.clearPending() (Contract.sol#369-380) - WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293) - WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes).created (Contract.sol#245) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:245 · created
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes).created (Contract.sol#245) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32).created (Contract.sol#281) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:281 · created
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32).created (Contract.sol#281) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Modifier WalletLibrary.onlyowner() (Contract.sol#90-93) does not always execute _; or revert

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:90-93 · onlyowner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-modifier

    Evidence

    Modifier WalletLibrary.onlyowner() (Contract.sol#90-93) does not always execute _; or revert

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Modifier WalletLibrary.onlymanyowners(bytes32) (Contract.sol#97-100) does not always execute _; or revert

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:97-100 · onlymanyowners
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-modifier

    Evidence

    Modifier WalletLibrary.onlymanyowners(bytes32) (Contract.sol#97-100) does not always execute _; or revert

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:241-266 · execute
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266): External calls: - ! _to.call.value(_value)(_data) (Contract.sol#249) Event emitted after the call(s): - SingleTransact(msg.sender,_value,_to,_data,created) (Contract.sol#252)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:279-293 · confirm
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): External calls: - ! m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data) (Contract.sol#285) Event emitted after the call(s): - MultiTransact(msg.sender,_h,m_txs[_h].value,m_txs[_h].to,m_txs[_h].data,created) (Contract.sol#289)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowTimestamp dependenceConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256) (Contract.sol#351-364) uses timestamp for comparisons

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:351-364 · underLimit
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:timestamp

    Evidence

    WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256) (Contract.sol#351-364) uses timestamp for comparisons Dangerous comparisons: - today() > m_lastDay (Contract.sol#353)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Treat block.timestamp as a coarse value with miner influence; prefer block-number windows for short-term invariants and add tolerance bands.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Version constraint ^0.4.9 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:18 · ^0.4.9
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:solc-version

    Evidence

    Version constraint ^0.4.9 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden - SignedArrayStorageCopy - UninitializedFunctionPointerInConstructor_0.4.x - IncorrectEventSignatureInLibraries_0.4.x - ExpExponentCleanup - NestedArrayFunctionCallDecoder - ZeroFunctionSelector - DelegateCallReturnValue - ECRecoverMalformedInput - SkipEmptyStringLiteral - ConstantOptimizerSubtraction. It is used by: - ^0.4.9 (Contract.sol#18)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.Confirmation(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:25 · Confirmation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.Confirmation(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.Revoke(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#26) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:26 · Revoke
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.Revoke(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#26) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.OwnerChanged(address,address) (Contract.sol#29) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:29 · OwnerChanged
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.OwnerChanged(address,address) (Contract.sol#29) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.OwnerAdded(address) (Contract.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:30 · OwnerAdded
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.OwnerAdded(address) (Contract.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.OwnerRemoved(address) (Contract.sol#31) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:31 · OwnerRemoved
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.OwnerRemoved(address) (Contract.sol#31) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.Deposit(address,uint256) (Contract.sol#37) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:37 · Deposit
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.Deposit(address,uint256) (Contract.sol#37) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.SingleTransact(address,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#39) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:39 · SingleTransact
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.SingleTransact(address,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#39) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.MultiTransact(address,bytes32,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#41) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:41 · MultiTransact
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.MultiTransact(address,bytes32,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#41) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event WalletEvents.ConfirmationNeeded(bytes32,address,uint256,address,bytes) (Contract.sol#43) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:43 · ConfirmationNeeded
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event WalletEvents.ConfirmationNeeded(bytes32,address,uint256,address,bytes) (Contract.sol#43) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406) should inherit from WalletAbi (Contract.sol#46-68)

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:70-406 · WalletLibrary
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-inheritance

    Evidence

    WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406) should inherit from WalletAbi (Contract.sol#46-68)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.initMultiowned(address[],uint256)._required (Contract.sol#113) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:113 · _required
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.initMultiowned(address[],uint256)._required (Contract.sol#113) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.revoke(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#126) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:126 · _operation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.revoke(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#126) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#140):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:140 · onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data))
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#140): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.changeOwner(address,address)._to (Contract.sol#140) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:140 · _to
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.changeOwner(address,address)._to (Contract.sol#140) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#152):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:152 · onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data))
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#152): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.addOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#152) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:152 · _owner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.addOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#152) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#166):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:166 · onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data))
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#166): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.removeOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#166) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:166 · _owner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.removeOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#166) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#178):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:178 · onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data))
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#178): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.changeRequirement(uint256)._newRequired (Contract.sol#178) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:178 · _newRequired
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.changeRequirement(uint256)._newRequired (Contract.sol#178) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.isOwner(address)._addr (Contract.sol#190) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:190 · _addr
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.isOwner(address)._addr (Contract.sol#190) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.hasConfirmed(bytes32,address)._owner (Contract.sol#194) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:194 · _owner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.hasConfirmed(bytes32,address)._owner (Contract.sol#194) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.initDaylimit(uint256)._limit (Contract.sol#207) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:207 · _limit
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.initDaylimit(uint256)._limit (Contract.sol#207) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#212):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:212 · onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data))
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#212): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.setDailyLimit(uint256)._newLimit (Contract.sol#212) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:212 · _newLimit
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.setDailyLimit(uint256)._newLimit (Contract.sol#212) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#216):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:216 · onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data))
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#216): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#221):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:221
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#221): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Modifier WalletLibrary.only_uninitialized() (Contract.sol#221) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:221 · only_uninitialized
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Modifier WalletLibrary.only_uninitialized() (Contract.sol#221) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256) should be declared external:

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:226-229 · initWallet
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:external-function

    Evidence

    initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256) should be declared external: - WalletLibrary.initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256) (Contract.sol#226-229)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256)._required (Contract.sol#226) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:226 · _required
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256)._required (Contract.sol#226) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#233):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:233 · onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data))
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#233): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.kill(address)._to (Contract.sol#233) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:233 · _to
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.kill(address)._to (Contract.sol#233) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected suicide(address)(_to) (Contract.sol#234):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:234 · suicide(address)(_to)
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected suicide(address)(_to) (Contract.sol#234): - Usage of "suicide()" should be replaced with "selfdestruct()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Low level call in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:241-266 · execute
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:low-level-calls

    Evidence

    Low level call in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266): - ! _to.call.value(_value)(_data) (Contract.sol#249)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes)._data (Contract.sol#241) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:241 · _data
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes)._data (Contract.sol#241) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#250):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:250
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#250): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected o_hash = sha3()(msg.data,block.number) (Contract.sol#255):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:255 · o_hash = sha3()(msg.data,block.number)
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected o_hash = sha3()(msg.data,block.number) (Contract.sol#255): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Low level call in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:279-293 · confirm
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:low-level-calls

    Evidence

    Low level call in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): - ! m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data) (Contract.sol#285)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32)._h (Contract.sol#279) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:279 · _h
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32)._h (Contract.sol#279) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#286):

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:286
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#286): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.confirmAndCheck(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#297) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:297 · _operation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.confirmAndCheck(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#297) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256)._value (Contract.sol#351) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:351 · _value
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256)._value (Contract.sol#351) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:383 · _walletLibrary
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is never used in WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406)

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:383 · _walletLibrary
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unused-state

    Evidence

    WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is never used in WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_required (Contract.sol#386) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:386 · m_required
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_required (Contract.sol#386) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_numOwners (Contract.sol#388) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:388 · m_numOwners
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_numOwners (Contract.sol#388) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_dailyLimit (Contract.sol#390) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:390 · m_dailyLimit
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_dailyLimit (Contract.sol#390) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_spentToday (Contract.sol#391) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:391 · m_spentToday
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_spentToday (Contract.sol#391) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_lastDay (Contract.sol#392) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:392 · m_lastDay
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_lastDay (Contract.sol#392) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_owners (Contract.sol#395) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:395 · m_owners
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_owners (Contract.sol#395) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant WalletLibrary.c_maxOwners (Contract.sol#397) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:397 · c_maxOwners
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant WalletLibrary.c_maxOwners (Contract.sol#397) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_ownerIndex (Contract.sol#399) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:399 · m_ownerIndex
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_ownerIndex (Contract.sol#399) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_pending (Contract.sol#401) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:401 · m_pending
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_pending (Contract.sol#401) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_pendingIndex (Contract.sol#402) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:402 · m_pendingIndex
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_pendingIndex (Contract.sol#402) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_txs (Contract.sol#405) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Contract.sol:405 · m_txs
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable WalletLibrary.m_txs (Contract.sol#405) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a single sandboxed copy of the source. Multi-file dependency analysis beyond what slither resolves automatically is out of scope.
  • Some detectors emitted warnings (see `warnings`); their output was still ingested but should be read with extra care.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • 41b43b01f6b0b10669fe02958d8f7502bd6e821c716676b9129161b29f4d56e4 · centralizationcritical

    Not determined

    Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?

    Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.

  • e146efa96f7ab727401a37eb17e8fd93f389c386d4112334b28020eebdf23b3f · access-controlhigh
    Confidence: high

    Conditions for the exploit are met by the analyzer evidence; treat as likely until disproven by operator review.

    Preconditions

    • Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
    • Caller controls the path that reaches the function

    Action

    Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.

    Impact

    Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.

    False-positive caveats

    • The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
    • Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
    • Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
    • Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
  • b3dc8bf7d8b4a3326576f20cf7c8f33377e2e2546a161abe4304f2412e25a580 · reentrancyhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
    • Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
    • No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function

    Action

    Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.

    Impact

    Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.

    False-positive caveats

    • The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
    • The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.

    Remediation checklist

    • Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
    • Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
    • Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
  • d4b1da18e0193f3fbc2aedb5b53bcc8869d8735bd7045539f958d57045ffdfae · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • 944371537fe22b61230ffbf6545d329a2bcf2075aea2d372b4263a829a93ea89 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 3Partial: 5Blocked: 1
  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay5:14 AM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay5:14 AM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Partial2.3s replay5:14 AM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  4. Static analysis

    Partial66 findings8.8s replay5:14 AM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  5. Finding normalization

    Passed66 findings1.1s replay5:14 AM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial66 findings1.9s replay5:14 AM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
  7. Remediation draft

    Partial66 findings1.5s replay5:14 AM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay5:14 AM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
  9. Finalization

    Partial66 findings620ms replay5:14 AM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

Report badges

Verified source

Badges describe the evidence carried by this report artifact, not financial value or future pricing. Operator-reviewed is never granted automatically.

How to read this report

Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Sep 28, 2026, 5:14 AM · Solidity · Contract.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

    AVOID-style triage

    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

  • 20-49

    High caution · this report

    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

Score
Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
Confidence
Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
Ranking / percentile
Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.

Private Review is separate

A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.

Export and share

  • · Shareable public URL: copy from the report actions panel.
  • · Markdown export: every export carries the report id, target, verdict, generated timestamp, and the public-data disclaimer.
  • · PDF export: not in this MVP. Tracked as a follow-up. The Markdown export contains the same content and prints cleanly to PDF from a browser today.

Source provenance

This report scanned a Solidity source provided directly by the submitter (paste). No on-chain address is associated.

Scanned source (14,356 chars)

/*
 * @source: https://smartcontractsecurity.github.io/SWC-registry/docs/SWC-106#walletlibrarysol
 * @author: -
 * @vulnerable_at_lines: 226,233
 */

//sol Wallet
// Multi-sig, daily-limited account proxy/wallet.
// @authors:
// Gav Wood <g@ethdev.com>
// inheritable "property" contract that enables methods to be protected by requiring the acquiescence of either a
// single, or, crucially, each of a number of, designated owners.
// usage:
// use modifiers onlyowner (just own owned) or onlymanyowners(hash), whereby the same hash must be provided by
// some number (specified in constructor) of the set of owners (specified in the constructor, modifiable) before the
// interior is executed.

pragma solidity ^0.4.9;

contract WalletEvents {
  // EVENTS

  // this contract only has six types of events: it can accept a confirmation, in which case
  // we record owner and operation (hash) alongside it.
  event Confirmation(address owner, bytes32 operation);
  event Revoke(address owner, bytes32 operation);

  // some others are in the case of an owner changing.
  event OwnerChanged(address oldOwner, address newOwner);
  event OwnerAdded(address newOwner);
  event OwnerRemoved(address oldOwner);

  // the last one is emitted if the required signatures change
  event RequirementChanged(uint newRequirement);

  // Funds has arrived into the wallet (record how much).
  event Deposit(address _from, uint value);
  // Single transaction going out of the wallet (record who signed for it, how much, and to whom it's going).
  event SingleTransact(address owner, uint value, address to, bytes data, address created);
  // Multi-sig transaction going out of the wallet (record who signed for it last, the operation hash, how much, and to whom it's going).
  event MultiTransact(address owner, bytes32 operation, uint value, address to, bytes data, address created);
  // Confirmation still needed for a transaction.
  event ConfirmationNeeded(bytes32 operation, address initiator, uint value, address to, bytes data);
}

contract WalletAbi {
  // Revokes a prior confirmation of the given operation
  function revoke(bytes32 _operation) external;

  // Replaces an owner `_from` with another `_to`.
  function changeOwner(address _from, address _to) external;

  function addOwner(address _owner) external;

  function removeOwner(address _owner) external;

  function changeRequirement(uint _newRequired) external;

  function isOwner(address _addr) constant returns (bool);

  function hasConfirmed(bytes32 _operation, address _owner) external constant returns (bool);

  // (re)sets the daily limit. needs many of the owners to confirm. doesn't alter the amount already spent today.
  function setDailyLimit(uint _newLimit) external;

  function execute(address _to, uint _value, bytes _data) external returns (bytes32 o_hash);
  function confirm(bytes32 _h) returns (bool o_success);
}

contract WalletLibrary is WalletEvents {
  // TYPES

  // struct for the status of a pending operation.
  struct PendingState {
    uint yetNeeded;
    uint ownersDone;
    uint index;
  }

  // Transaction structure to remember details of transaction lest it need be saved for a later call.
  struct Transaction {
    address to;
    uint value;
    bytes data;
  }

  // MODIFIERS

  // simple single-sig function modifier.
  modifier onlyowner {
    if (isOwner(msg.sender))
      _;
  }
  // multi-sig function modifier: the operation must have an intrinsic hash in order
  // that later attempts can be realised as the same underlying operation and
  // thus count as confirmations.
  modifier onlymanyowners(bytes32 _operation) {
    if (confirmAndCheck(_operation))
      _;
  }

  // METHODS

  // gets called when no other function matches
  function() payable {
    // just being sent some cash?
    if (msg.value > 0)
      Deposit(msg.sender, msg.value);
  }

  // constructor is given number of sigs required to do protected "onlymanyowners" transactions
  // as well as the selection of addresses capable of confirming them.
  function initMultiowned(address[] _owners, uint _required) only_uninitialized {
    m_numOwners = _owners.length + 1;
    m_owners[1] = uint(msg.sender);
    m_ownerIndex[uint(msg.sender)] = 1;
    for (uint i = 0; i < _owners.length; ++i)
    {
      m_owners[2 + i] = uint(_owners[i]);
      m_ownerIndex[uint(_owners[i])] = 2 + i;
    }
    m_required = _required;
  }

  // Revokes a prior confirmation of the given operation
  function revoke(bytes32 _operation) external {
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(msg.sender)];
    // make sure they're an owner
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;
    uint ownerIndexBit = 2**ownerIndex;
    var pending = m_pending[_operation];
    if (pending.ownersDone & ownerIndexBit > 0) {
      pending.yetNeeded++;
      pending.ownersDone -= ownerIndexBit;
      Revoke(msg.sender, _operation);
    }
  }

  // Replaces an owner `_from` with another `_to`.
  function changeOwner(address _from, address _to) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    if (isOwner(_to)) return;
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(_from)];
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;

    clearPending();
    m_owners[ownerIndex] = uint(_to);
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_from)] = 0;
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_to)] = ownerIndex;
    OwnerChanged(_from, _to);
  }

  function addOwner(address _owner) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    if (isOwner(_owner)) return;

    clearPending();
    if (m_numOwners >= c_maxOwners)
      reorganizeOwners();
    if (m_numOwners >= c_maxOwners)
      return;
    m_numOwners++;
    m_owners[m_numOwners] = uint(_owner);
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)] = m_numOwners;
    OwnerAdded(_owner);
  }

  function removeOwner(address _owner) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)];
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;
    if (m_required > m_numOwners - 1) return;

    m_owners[ownerIndex] = 0;
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)] = 0;
    clearPending();
    reorganizeOwners(); //make sure m_numOwner is equal to the number of owners and always points to the optimal free slot
    OwnerRemoved(_owner);
  }

  function changeRequirement(uint _newRequired) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    if (_newRequired > m_numOwners) return;
    m_required = _newRequired;
    clearPending();
    RequirementChanged(_newRequired);
  }

  // Gets an owner by 0-indexed position (using numOwners as the count)
  function getOwner(uint ownerIndex) external constant returns (address) {
    return address(m_owners[ownerIndex + 1]);
  }

  function isOwner(address _addr) constant returns (bool) {
    return m_ownerIndex[uint(_addr)] > 0;
  }

  function hasConfirmed(bytes32 _operation, address _owner) external constant returns (bool) {
    var pending = m_pending[_operation];
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)];

    // make sure they're an owner
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return false;

    // determine the bit to set for this owner.
    uint ownerIndexBit = 2**ownerIndex;
    return !(pending.ownersDone & ownerIndexBit == 0);
  }

  // constructor - stores initial daily limit and records the present day's index.
  function initDaylimit(uint _limit) only_uninitialized {
    m_dailyLimit = _limit;
    m_lastDay = today();
  }
  // (re)sets the daily limit. needs many of the owners to confirm. doesn't alter the amount already spent today.
  function setDailyLimit(uint _newLimit) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    m_dailyLimit = _newLimit;
  }
  // resets the amount already spent today. needs many of the owners to confirm.
  function resetSpentToday() onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    m_spentToday = 0;
  }

  // throw unless the contract is not yet initialized.
  modifier only_uninitialized { if (m_numOwners > 0) throw; _; }

  // constructor - just pass on the owner array to the multiowned and
  // the limit to daylimit
  // <yes> <report> ACCESS_CONTROL
  function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit) only_uninitialized {
    initDaylimit(_daylimit);
    initMultiowned(_owners, _required);
  }

  // kills the contract sending everything to `_to`.
  // <yes> <report> ACCESS_CONTROL
  function kill(address _to) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    suicide(_to);
  }

  // Outside-visible transact entry point. Executes transaction immediately if below daily spend limit.
  // If not, goes into multisig process. We provide a hash on return to allow the sender to provide
  // shortcuts for the other confirmations (allowing them to avoid replicating the _to, _value
  // and _data arguments). They still get the option of using them if they want, anyways.
  function execute(address _to, uint _value, bytes _data) external onlyowner returns (bytes32 o_hash) {
    // first, take the opportunity to check that we're under the daily limit.
    if ((_data.length == 0 && underLimit(_value)) || m_required == 1) {
      // yes - just execute the call.
      address created;
      if (_to == 0) {
        created = create(_value, _data);
      } else {
        if (!_to.call.value(_value)(_data))
          throw;
      }
      SingleTransact(msg.sender, _value, _to, _data, created);
    } else {
      // determine our operation hash.
      o_hash = sha3(msg.data, block.number);
      // store if it's new
      if (m_txs[o_hash].to == 0 && m_txs[o_hash].value == 0 && m_txs[o_hash].data.length == 0) {
        m_txs[o_hash].to = _to;
        m_txs[o_hash].value = _value;
        m_txs[o_hash].data = _data;
      }
      if (!confirm(o_hash)) {
        ConfirmationNeeded(o_hash, msg.sender, _value, _to, _data);
      }
    }
  }

  function create(uint _value, bytes _code) internal returns (address o_addr) {
    /*
    assembly {
      o_addr := create(_value, add(_code, 0x20), mload(_code))
      jumpi(invalidJumpLabel, iszero(extcodesize(o_addr)))
    }
    */
  }

  // confirm a transaction through just the hash. we use the previous transactions map, m_txs, in order
  // to determine the body of the transaction from the hash provided.
  function confirm(bytes32 _h) onlymanyowners(_h) returns (bool o_success) {
    if (m_txs[_h].to != 0 || m_txs[_h].value != 0 || m_txs[_h].data.length != 0) {
      address created;
      if (m_txs[_h].to == 0) {
        created = create(m_txs[_h].value, m_txs[_h].data);
      } else {
        if (!m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data))
          throw;
      }

      MultiTransact(msg.sender, _h, m_txs[_h].value, m_txs[_h].to, m_txs[_h].data, created);
      delete m_txs[_h];
      return true;
    }
  }

  // INTERNAL METHODS

  function confirmAndCheck(bytes32 _operation) internal returns (bool) {
    // determine what index the present sender is:
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(msg.sender)];
    // make sure they're an owner
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;

    var pending = m_pending[_operation];
    // if we're not yet working on this operation, switch over and reset the confirmation status.
    if (pending.yetNeeded == 0) {
      // reset count of confirmations needed.
      pending.yetNeeded = m_required;
      // reset which owners have confirmed (none) - set our bitmap to 0.
      pending.ownersDone = 0;
      pending.index = m_pendingIndex.length++;
      m_pendingIndex[pending.index] = _operation;
    }
    // determine the bit to set for this owner.
    uint ownerIndexBit = 2**ownerIndex;
    // make sure we (the message sender) haven't confirmed this operation previously.
    if (pending.ownersDone & ownerIndexBit == 0) {
      Confirmation(msg.sender, _operation);
      // ok - check if count is enough to go ahead.
      if (pending.yetNeeded <= 1) {
        // enough confirmations: reset and run interior.
        delete m_pendingIndex[m_pending[_operation].index];
        delete m_pending[_operation];
        return true;
      }
      else
      {
        // not enough: record that this owner in particular confirmed.
        pending.yetNeeded--;
        pending.ownersDone |= ownerIndexBit;
      }
    }
  }

  function reorganizeOwners() private {
    uint free = 1;
    while (free < m_numOwners)
    {
      while (free < m_numOwners && m_owners[free] != 0) free++;
      while (m_numOwners > 1 && m_owners[m_numOwners] == 0) m_numOwners--;
      if (free < m_numOwners && m_owners[m_numOwners] != 0 && m_owners[free] == 0)
      {
        m_owners[free] = m_owners[m_numOwners];
        m_ownerIndex[m_owners[free]] = free;
        m_owners[m_numOwners] = 0;
      }
    }
  }

  // checks to see if there is at least `_value` left from the daily limit today. if there is, subtracts it and
  // returns true. otherwise just returns false.
  function underLimit(uint _value) internal onlyowner returns (bool) {
    // reset the spend limit if we're on a different day to last time.
    if (today() > m_lastDay) {
      m_spentToday = 0;
      m_lastDay = today();
    }
    // check to see if there's enough left - if so, subtract and return true.
    // overflow protection                    // dailyLimit check
    if (m_spentToday + _value >= m_spentToday && m_spentToday + _value <= m_dailyLimit) {
      m_spentToday += _value;
      return true;
    }
    return false;
  }

  // determines today's index.
  function today() private constant returns (uint) { return now / 1 days; }

  function clearPending() internal {
    uint length = m_pendingIndex.length;

    for (uint i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
      delete m_txs[m_pendingIndex[i]];

      if (m_pendingIndex[i] != 0)
        delete m_pending[m_pendingIndex[i]];
    }

    delete m_pendingIndex;
  }

  // FIELDS
  address constant _walletLibrary = 0xcafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafe;

  // the number of owners that must confirm the same operation before it is run.
  uint public m_required;
  // pointer used to find a free slot in m_owners
  uint public m_numOwners;

  uint public m_dailyLimit;
  uint public m_spentToday;
  uint public m_lastDay;

  // list of owners
  uint[256] m_owners;

  uint constant c_maxOwners = 250;
  // index on the list of owners to allow reverse lookup
  mapping(uint => uint) m_ownerIndex;
  // the ongoing operations.
  mapping(bytes32 => PendingState) m_pending;
  bytes32[] m_pendingIndex;

  // pending transactions we have at present.
  mapping (bytes32 => Transaction) m_txs;
}

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.