Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. Contract.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.
PDF artifact
Queued artifact pipeline · not blocking on the scan
No PDF artifact has been requested for this report yet. The HTML report and the Markdown export already carry the full disclaimer and limitations inline. PDF synthesis is a queued artifact, not part of the scan path.
Status endpoint
GET /report/solidity/VSS-20260928-877BMGCO/export.pdf
Solidity evidence report
66 audit findings
Severity distribution
Executive summary
- 66 findings surfaced (1 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 5 low, 56 informational).
- CRITICAL · selfdestruct call — exploitability unknown.
- HIGH · WalletLibrary.kill(address) (Contract.sol#233-235) allows anyone to destruct the contract (kill) — exploitability high.
- HIGH · Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): (confirm) — exploitability medium.
- Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.
Warnings (3)
- · Unmapped detector slither:missing-inheritance — classified as 'other'
- · Unmapped detector slither:unindexed-event-address — classified as 'other'
- · Unmapped detector slither:unused-state — classified as 'other'
- criticalCentralizationDetector: semgrep
selfdestruct call
Evidence
selfdestruct call. Even with access control, selfdestruct introduces upgrade risk and historical state loss. Audit access control carefully or remove.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Document the trust boundary, set up time-locked multisig ownership, and surface admin-only functions in the deployment runbook.
- highAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: highDetector: slither
WalletLibrary.kill(address) (Contract.sol#233-235) allows anyone to destruct the contract
Evidence
WalletLibrary.kill(address) (Contract.sol#233-235) allows anyone to destruct the contract
Exploitability notes
High-confidence detection of a severe pattern; treat as exploitable until disproven by manual review.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- highReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293):
Evidence
Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): External calls: - ! m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data) (Contract.sol#285) State variables written after the call(s): - delete m_txs[_h] (Contract.sol#290) WalletLibrary.m_txs (Contract.sol#405) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - WalletLibrary.clearPending() (Contract.sol#369-380) - WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293) - WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes).created (Contract.sol#245) is a local variable never initialized
Evidence
WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes).created (Contract.sol#245) is a local variable never initialized
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.
- mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32).created (Contract.sol#281) is a local variable never initialized
Evidence
WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32).created (Contract.sol#281) is a local variable never initialized
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Modifier WalletLibrary.onlyowner() (Contract.sol#90-93) does not always execute _; or revert
Evidence
Modifier WalletLibrary.onlyowner() (Contract.sol#90-93) does not always execute _; or revert
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Modifier WalletLibrary.onlymanyowners(bytes32) (Contract.sol#97-100) does not always execute _; or revert
Evidence
Modifier WalletLibrary.onlymanyowners(bytes32) (Contract.sol#97-100) does not always execute _; or revert
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266):
Evidence
Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266): External calls: - ! _to.call.value(_value)(_data) (Contract.sol#249) Event emitted after the call(s): - SingleTransact(msg.sender,_value,_to,_data,created) (Contract.sol#252)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293):
Evidence
Reentrancy in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): External calls: - ! m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data) (Contract.sol#285) Event emitted after the call(s): - MultiTransact(msg.sender,_h,m_txs[_h].value,m_txs[_h].to,m_txs[_h].data,created) (Contract.sol#289)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- lowTimestamp dependenceConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256) (Contract.sol#351-364) uses timestamp for comparisons
Evidence
WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256) (Contract.sol#351-364) uses timestamp for comparisons Dangerous comparisons: - today() > m_lastDay (Contract.sol#353)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Treat block.timestamp as a coarse value with miner influence; prefer block-number windows for short-term invariants and add tolerance bands.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Version constraint ^0.4.9 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
Evidence
Version constraint ^0.4.9 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden - SignedArrayStorageCopy - UninitializedFunctionPointerInConstructor_0.4.x - IncorrectEventSignatureInLibraries_0.4.x - ExpExponentCleanup - NestedArrayFunctionCallDecoder - ZeroFunctionSelector - DelegateCallReturnValue - ECRecoverMalformedInput - SkipEmptyStringLiteral - ConstantOptimizerSubtraction. It is used by: - ^0.4.9 (Contract.sol#18)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.Confirmation(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.Confirmation(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.Revoke(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#26) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.Revoke(address,bytes32) (Contract.sol#26) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.OwnerChanged(address,address) (Contract.sol#29) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.OwnerChanged(address,address) (Contract.sol#29) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.OwnerAdded(address) (Contract.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.OwnerAdded(address) (Contract.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.OwnerRemoved(address) (Contract.sol#31) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.OwnerRemoved(address) (Contract.sol#31) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.Deposit(address,uint256) (Contract.sol#37) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.Deposit(address,uint256) (Contract.sol#37) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.SingleTransact(address,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#39) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.SingleTransact(address,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#39) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.MultiTransact(address,bytes32,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#41) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.MultiTransact(address,bytes32,uint256,address,bytes,address) (Contract.sol#41) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event WalletEvents.ConfirmationNeeded(bytes32,address,uint256,address,bytes) (Contract.sol#43) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event WalletEvents.ConfirmationNeeded(bytes32,address,uint256,address,bytes) (Contract.sol#43) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406) should inherit from WalletAbi (Contract.sol#46-68)
Evidence
WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406) should inherit from WalletAbi (Contract.sol#46-68)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.initMultiowned(address[],uint256)._required (Contract.sol#113) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.initMultiowned(address[],uint256)._required (Contract.sol#113) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.revoke(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#126) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.revoke(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#126) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#140):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#140): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.changeOwner(address,address)._to (Contract.sol#140) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.changeOwner(address,address)._to (Contract.sol#140) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#152):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#152): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.addOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#152) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.addOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#152) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#166):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#166): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.removeOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#166) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.removeOwner(address)._owner (Contract.sol#166) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#178):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#178): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.changeRequirement(uint256)._newRequired (Contract.sol#178) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.changeRequirement(uint256)._newRequired (Contract.sol#178) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.isOwner(address)._addr (Contract.sol#190) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.isOwner(address)._addr (Contract.sol#190) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.hasConfirmed(bytes32,address)._owner (Contract.sol#194) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.hasConfirmed(bytes32,address)._owner (Contract.sol#194) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.initDaylimit(uint256)._limit (Contract.sol#207) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.initDaylimit(uint256)._limit (Contract.sol#207) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#212):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#212): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.setDailyLimit(uint256)._newLimit (Contract.sol#212) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.setDailyLimit(uint256)._newLimit (Contract.sol#212) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#216):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#216): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#221):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#221): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Modifier WalletLibrary.only_uninitialized() (Contract.sol#221) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Modifier WalletLibrary.only_uninitialized() (Contract.sol#221) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256) should be declared external:
Evidence
initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256) should be declared external: - WalletLibrary.initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256) (Contract.sol#226-229)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256)._required (Contract.sol#226) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256)._required (Contract.sol#226) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#233):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected onlymanyowners(sha3()(msg.data)) (Contract.sol#233): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.kill(address)._to (Contract.sol#233) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.kill(address)._to (Contract.sol#233) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected suicide(address)(_to) (Contract.sol#234):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected suicide(address)(_to) (Contract.sol#234): - Usage of "suicide()" should be replaced with "selfdestruct()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Low level call in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266):
Evidence
Low level call in WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes) (Contract.sol#241-266): - ! _to.call.value(_value)(_data) (Contract.sol#249)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes)._data (Contract.sol#241) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.execute(address,uint256,bytes)._data (Contract.sol#241) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#250):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#250): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected o_hash = sha3()(msg.data,block.number) (Contract.sol#255):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected o_hash = sha3()(msg.data,block.number) (Contract.sol#255): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Low level call in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293):
Evidence
Low level call in WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32) (Contract.sol#279-293): - ! m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data) (Contract.sol#285)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32)._h (Contract.sol#279) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.confirm(bytes32)._h (Contract.sol#279) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#286):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (Contract.sol#286): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.confirmAndCheck(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#297) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.confirmAndCheck(bytes32)._operation (Contract.sol#297) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256)._value (Contract.sol#351) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter WalletLibrary.underLimit(uint256)._value (Contract.sol#351) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is never used in WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406)
Evidence
WalletLibrary._walletLibrary (Contract.sol#383) is never used in WalletLibrary (Contract.sol#70-406)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_required (Contract.sol#386) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_required (Contract.sol#386) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_numOwners (Contract.sol#388) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_numOwners (Contract.sol#388) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_dailyLimit (Contract.sol#390) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_dailyLimit (Contract.sol#390) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_spentToday (Contract.sol#391) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_spentToday (Contract.sol#391) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_lastDay (Contract.sol#392) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_lastDay (Contract.sol#392) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_owners (Contract.sol#395) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_owners (Contract.sol#395) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant WalletLibrary.c_maxOwners (Contract.sol#397) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant WalletLibrary.c_maxOwners (Contract.sol#397) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_ownerIndex (Contract.sol#399) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_ownerIndex (Contract.sol#399) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_pending (Contract.sol#401) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_pending (Contract.sol#401) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_pendingIndex (Contract.sol#402) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_pendingIndex (Contract.sol#402) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable WalletLibrary.m_txs (Contract.sol#405) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable WalletLibrary.m_txs (Contract.sol#405) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
Exploit reasoning
Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence
- 41b43b01f6b0b10669fe02958d8f7502bd6e821c716676b9129161b29f4d56e4 · centralizationcritical
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
- e146efa96f7ab727401a37eb17e8fd93f389c386d4112334b28020eebdf23b3f · access-controlhighConfidence: high
Conditions for the exploit are met by the analyzer evidence; treat as likely until disproven by operator review.
Preconditions
- Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
- Caller controls the path that reaches the function
Action
Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.
Impact
Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.
False-positive caveats
- The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
- Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.
Remediation checklist
- Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
- Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
- Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
- b3dc8bf7d8b4a3326576f20cf7c8f33377e2e2546a161abe4304f2412e25a580 · reentrancyhighConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
- Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
- No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function
Action
Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.
Impact
Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.
False-positive caveats
- The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
- The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.
Remediation checklist
- Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
- Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
- Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
- d4b1da18e0193f3fbc2aedb5b53bcc8869d8735bd7045539f958d57045ffdfae · uninitializedmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
- Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called
Action
Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.
Impact
Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.
False-positive caveats
- The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
- Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.
Remediation checklist
- Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
- Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
- Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
- 944371537fe22b61230ffbf6545d329a2bcf2075aea2d372b4263a829a93ea89 · uninitializedmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
- Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called
Action
Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.
Impact
Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.
False-positive caveats
- The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
- Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.
Remediation checklist
- Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
- Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
- Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
Audit pipeline
Audit cockpit
Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.
Audit intake
Passed320ms replay5:13 AMNormalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.
Source acquisition
Passed1.4s replay5:13 AMResolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.
Toolchain validation
Partial2.3s replay5:13 AMConfirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Static analysis
Partial66 findings8.8s replay5:13 AMRun static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Finding normalization
Passed66 findings1.1s replay5:13 AMDedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.
Exploitability review
Partial66 findings1.9s replay5:13 AMFrame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.
- Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
Remediation draft
Partial66 findings1.5s replay5:13 AMPrepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.
- Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
Operator review
Blocked0ms replay5:13 AMRecord whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.
- No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
- Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
Finalization
Partial66 findings620ms replay5:13 AMPublish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.
Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567
- Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.
How to read this report
Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.
Generated Sep 28, 2026, 5:13 AM · Solidity · Contract.sol
Score bands
0-19
AVOID-style triage
Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.
20-49
High caution · this report
Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.
50-69
Watch
Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.
70-89
Clear surface (automated)
No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
90-100
Strong surface (automated)
No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
- Score
- Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
- Confidence
- Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
- Ranking / percentile
- Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.
Private Review is separate
A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.