VegaSec / Solidity scan report

access-control-mycontract.sol

VSS-20261003-82EJXHMR · generated Oct 3, 2026, 8:07 PM

Partial coverage · watch4 findings1 highPartial analyzer coveragePasted source1 warning

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. access-control-mycontract.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

Partial coverage, not a clean-surface verdict. At least one required analyzer (slither, semgrep) did not complete this scan, so the score is capped at 50/100 and the verdict above can never be Strong/Clear surface. Cause: semgrep produced unparseable JSON (exit null).

Signature

signed

This report is signed. Anyone can verify that these exact bytes came from us, with no account, no wallet and no API key. The signature proves integrity and authorship. It does not prove the audited contract is safe: read the coverage status and the limitations above.

sha256
b11499a3adc55e6a...7f1e3f56
Signed by
Ed25519 key vsig-2026-09
Canonical version
vss-canonical-1
Bytes served
stored canonical text, byte for byte

PDF artifact

Queued artifact pipeline · not blocking on the scan

Not requested

No PDF artifact has been requested for this report yet. The HTML report and the Markdown export already carry the full disclaimer and limitations inline. PDF synthesis is a queued artifact, not part of the scan path.

Status endpoint

GET /report/solidity/VSS-20261003-82EJXHMR/export.pdf

Solidity evidence report

4 audit findings

critical: 0high: 1medium: 1low: 1informational: 1

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 4 findings surfaced (0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 1 low, 1 informational).
  • HIGH · MyContract.sendTo(address,uint256) (access-control-mycontract.sol#18-22) sends eth to arbitrary user (sendTo) — exploitability medium.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.

Warnings (1)

  • · semgrep produced unparseable JSON (exit null)
  • highAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    MyContract.sendTo(address,uint256) (access-control-mycontract.sol#18-22) sends eth to arbitrary user

    Affected location
    access-control-mycontract.sol:18-22 · sendTo
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:arbitrary-send-eth

    Evidence

    MyContract.sendTo(address,uint256) (access-control-mycontract.sol#18-22) sends eth to arbitrary user Dangerous calls: - receiver.transfer(amount) (access-control-mycontract.sol#21)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    MyContract.sendTo(address,uint256) (access-control-mycontract.sol#18-22) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool)(tx.origin == owner) (access-control-myc

    Affected location
    access-control-mycontract.sol:18-22 · sendTo
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:tx-origin

    Evidence

    MyContract.sendTo(address,uint256) (access-control-mycontract.sol#18-22) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool)(tx.origin == owner) (access-control-mycontract.sol#20)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    MyContract.sendTo(address,uint256).receiver (access-control-mycontract.sol#18) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    access-control-mycontract.sol:18 · receiver
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    MyContract.sendTo(address,uint256).receiver (access-control-mycontract.sol#18) lacks a zero-check on : - receiver.transfer(amount) (access-control-mycontract.sol#21)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Version constraint ^0.4.24 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)

    Affected location
    access-control-mycontract.sol:8 · ^0.4.24
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:solc-version

    Evidence

    Version constraint ^0.4.24 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - ABIDecodeTwoDimensionalArrayMemory - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden - SignedArrayStorageCopy - ABIEncoderV2StorageArrayWithMultiSlotElement - DynamicConstructorArgumentsClippedABIV2 - UninitializedFunctionPointerInConstructor_0.4.x - IncorrectEventSignatureInLibraries_0.4.x - ABIEncoderV2PackedStorage_0.4.x - ExpExponentCleanup - EventStructWrongData. It is used by: - ^0.4.24 (access-control-mycontract.sol#8)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a single sandboxed copy of the source. Multi-file dependency analysis beyond what slither resolves automatically is out of scope.
  • Analyzer coverage is PARTIAL: at least one required analyzer (slither, semgrep) did not complete. The trust score is capped at 50/100 and the verdict can never be a clean surface. Reasons: semgrep produced no structured output (exit n/a); semgrep produced unparseable JSON (exit null)
  • Some detectors emitted warnings (see `warnings`); their output was still ingested but should be read with extra care.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • ebc5edf1c3ea8af7a05f734fbce88b304e3c25784dee83ff4ac74f50e79b448b · access-controlhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
    • Caller controls the path that reaches the function

    Action

    Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.

    Impact

    Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.

    False-positive caveats

    • The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
    • Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
    • Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
    • Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
  • 390dd52ea483700b935e801fc709447c3777a88e21a65325b29cf504a3821b73 · access-controlmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
    • Caller controls the path that reaches the function

    Action

    Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.

    Impact

    Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.

    False-positive caveats

    • The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
    • Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
    • Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
    • Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 3Partial: 5Blocked: 1
  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay8:07 PM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay8:07 PM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Partial2.3s replay8:07 PM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  4. Static analysis

    Partial4 findings8.8s replay8:07 PM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  5. Finding normalization

    Passed4 findings1.1s replay8:07 PM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial4 findings1.9s replay8:07 PM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
  7. Remediation draft

    Partial4 findings1.5s replay8:07 PM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay8:07 PM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
  9. Finalization

    Partial4 findings620ms replay8:07 PM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

Report badges

Verified source

Badges describe the evidence carried by this report artifact, not financial value or future pricing. Operator-reviewed is never granted automatically.

How to read this report

Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Oct 3, 2026, 8:07 PM · Solidity · access-control-mycontract.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

    AVOID-style triage

    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

  • 20-49

    High caution

    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch · this report

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

Score
Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
Confidence
Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
Ranking / percentile
Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.

Private Review is separate

A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.

Export and share

  • · Shareable public URL: copy from the report actions panel.
  • · Markdown export: every export carries the report id, target, verdict, generated timestamp, and the public-data disclaimer.
  • · PDF export: not in this MVP. Tracked as a follow-up. The Markdown export contains the same content and prints cleanly to PDF from a browser today.

Source provenance

This report scanned a Solidity source provided directly by the submitter (paste). No on-chain address is associated.

Scanned source (527 chars)

/*
 * @source: https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/recommendations/#avoid-using-txorigin
 * @author: Consensys Diligence
 * @vulnerable_at_lines: 20
 * Modified by Gerhard Wagner
 */

pragma solidity ^0.4.24;

contract MyContract {

    address owner;

    function MyContract() public {
        owner = msg.sender;
    }

    function sendTo(address receiver, uint amount) public {
        // <yes> <report> ACCESS_CONTROL
        require(tx.origin == owner);
        receiver.transfer(amount);
    }

}

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.