VegaSec / Solidity scan report

time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol

VSS-20261003-GA3J1GNL · generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:53 PM

Clear surface · automated7 findings2 highPasted sourcesemgrep 1.163.0

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

Signature

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sha256
147d16284a98d1c5...9c639e7b
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Ed25519 key vsig-2026-09
Canonical version
vss-canonical-1
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PDF artifact

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Status endpoint

GET /report/solidity/VSS-20261003-GA3J1GNL/export.pdf

Solidity evidence report

7 audit findings

critical: 0high: 2medium: 1low: 1informational: 3

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 7 findings surfaced (0 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 1 low, 3 informational).
  • HIGH · EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) sends eth to arbitrary user (play) — exploitability medium.
  • HIGH · EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) uses a weak PRNG: "random = uint256(sha3()(block.timestamp)) % 2 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol# (play) — exploitability medium.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.
semgrep 1.163.0
  • highAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) sends eth to arbitrary user

    Affected location
    time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol:33-57 · play
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:arbitrary-send-eth

    Evidence

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) sends eth to arbitrary user Dangerous calls: - bank.transfer(FEE_AMOUNT) (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#49)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • highOracle manipulationConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) uses a weak PRNG: "random = uint256(sha3()(block.timestamp)) % 2 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#

    Affected location
    time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol:33-57 · play
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:weak-prng

    Evidence

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) uses a weak PRNG: "random = uint256(sha3()(block.timestamp)) % 2 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#43)"

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Use multi-source price feeds (e.g. Chainlink + TWAPs) and validate freshness/deviation before consuming oracle data on-chain.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol:33-57 · play
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) uses a dangerous strict equality: - random == 0 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#46)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowTimestamp dependenceConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) uses timestamp for comparisons

    Affected location
    time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol:33-57 · play
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:timestamp

    Evidence

    EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57) uses timestamp for comparisons Dangerous comparisons: - random == 0 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#46)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Treat block.timestamp as a coarse value with miner influence; prefer block-number windows for short-term invariants and add tolerance bands.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Version constraint ^0.4.15 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)

    Affected location
    time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol:8 · ^0.4.15
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:solc-version

    Evidence

    Version constraint ^0.4.15 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden - SignedArrayStorageCopy - UninitializedFunctionPointerInConstructor_0.4.x - IncorrectEventSignatureInLibraries_0.4.x - ExpExponentCleanup - NestedArrayFunctionCallDecoder - ZeroFunctionSelector. It is used by: - ^0.4.15 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#8)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57):

    Affected location
    time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol:33-57 · play
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-unlimited-gas

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in EtherLotto.play() (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#33-57): External calls: - bank.transfer(FEE_AMOUNT) (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#49) - msg.sender.transfer(pot - FEE_AMOUNT) (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#52) State variables written after the call(s): - pot = 0 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#55)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected random = uint256(sha3()(block.timestamp)) % 2 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#43):

    Affected location
    time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol:43 · random = uint256(sha3()(block.timestamp)) % 2
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected random = uint256(sha3()(block.timestamp)) % 2 (time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol#43): - Usage of "sha3()" should be replaced with "keccak256()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a single sandboxed copy of the source. Multi-file dependency analysis beyond what slither resolves automatically is out of scope.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • c629ac5de3f1c3592e7741a7258c1c068a22f680147b99096d30d3277cc44ffc · access-controlhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
    • Caller controls the path that reaches the function

    Action

    Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.

    Impact

    Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.

    False-positive caveats

    • The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
    • Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
    • Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
    • Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
  • 43fbd92bca62d552359163cb8d2da908850af12168c134ffe9157a782c5229bd · oracle-manipulationhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Price or rate read from an on-chain source that can be moved in the same block by the caller
    • Decisions (mint amount, collateral check) derived from the manipulable price

    Action

    Attacker uses a flash loan or large swap to move the oracle price in the same block, triggers the price-dependent action, then reverts the price.

    Impact

    Mint of more shares than collateral warrants, undercollateralized borrow, or theft of liquidity by exploiting the manipulated rate.

    False-positive caveats

    • The oracle may be a time-weighted aggregator that resists single-block movement.
    • The function may compare against a snapshot taken on a separate block.

    Remediation checklist

    • Use a TWAP (time-weighted average price) over multiple blocks.
    • Cross-check at least two independent oracle sources before acting.
    • Reject prices that diverge from a recent average by more than a documented threshold.
  • f9a7bd04d9f1975175210e202fe233599640a4395c8e17ae5e108c1c5c9db28a · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 5Partial: 3Blocked: 1
  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay7:53 PM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay7:53 PM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Passed2.3s replay7:53 PM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

  4. Static analysis

    Passed7 findings8.8s replay7:53 PM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

  5. Finding normalization

    Passed7 findings1.1s replay7:53 PM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial7 findings1.9s replay7:53 PM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
  7. Remediation draft

    Partial7 findings1.5s replay7:53 PM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay7:53 PM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
  9. Finalization

    Partial7 findings620ms replay7:53 PM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

Report badges

Verified source

Badges describe the evidence carried by this report artifact, not financial value or future pricing. Operator-reviewed is never granted automatically.

How to read this report

Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:53 PM · Solidity · time-manipulation-ether-lotto.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

    AVOID-style triage

    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

  • 20-49

    High caution

    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated) · this report

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

Score
Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
Confidence
Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
Ranking / percentile
Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.

Private Review is separate

A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.

Export and share

  • · Shareable public URL: copy from the report actions panel.
  • · Markdown export: every export carries the report id, target, verdict, generated timestamp, and the public-data disclaimer.
  • · PDF export: not in this MVP. Tracked as a follow-up. The Markdown export contains the same content and prints cleanly to PDF from a browser today.

Source provenance

This report scanned a Solidity source provided directly by the submitter (paste). No on-chain address is associated.

Scanned source (1,684 chars)

/*
 * @article: https://blog.positive.com/predicting-random-numbers-in-ethereum-smart-contracts-e5358c6b8620
 * @source: https://etherscan.io/address/0xa11e4ed59dc94e69612f3111942626ed513cb172#code
 * @vulnerable_at_lines: 43
 * @author: -
 */

 pragma solidity ^0.4.15;

/// @title Ethereum Lottery Game.

contract EtherLotto {

    // Amount of ether needed for participating in the lottery.
    uint constant TICKET_AMOUNT = 10;

    // Fixed amount fee for each lottery game.
    uint constant FEE_AMOUNT = 1;

    // Address where fee is sent.
    address public bank;

    // Public jackpot that each participant can win (minus fee).
    uint public pot;

    // Lottery constructor sets bank account from the smart-contract owner.
    function EtherLotto() {
        bank = msg.sender;
    }

    // Public function for playing lottery. Each time this function
    // is invoked, the sender has an oportunity for winning pot.
    function play() payable {

        // Participants must spend some fixed ether before playing lottery.
        assert(msg.value == TICKET_AMOUNT);

        // Increase pot for each participant.
        pot += msg.value;

        // Compute some *almost random* value for selecting winner from current transaction.
        // <yes> <report> TIME_MANIPULATION
        var random = uint(sha3(block.timestamp)) % 2;

        // Distribution: 50% of participants will be winners.
        if (random == 0) {

            // Send fee to bank account.
            bank.transfer(FEE_AMOUNT);

            // Send jackpot to winner.
            msg.sender.transfer(pot - FEE_AMOUNT);

            // Restart jackpot.
            pot = 0;
        }
    }

}

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.