VegaSec / Solidity scan report

access-control-parity-wallet-bug-1.sol

VSS-20261003-SPW8AU52 · generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:52 PM

Partial coverage · watch1 finding1 criticalPartial analyzer coveragePasted source2 warningssemgrep 1.163.0

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. access-control-parity-wallet-bug-1.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

Partial coverage, not a clean-surface verdict. At least one required analyzer (slither, semgrep) did not complete this scan, so the score is capped at 50/100 and the verdict above can never be Strong/Clear surface. Cause: slither coverage degraded: no installed solc satisfies pragma "0.4.9" (installed: 0.4.26, 0.5.17, 0.6.12, 0.7.6, 0.8.19, 0.8.20, 0.8.28, 0.8.30). Install a matching solc via solc-select. (+1 more coverage note).

Signature

signed

This report is signed. Anyone can verify that these exact bytes came from us, with no account, no wallet and no API key. The signature proves integrity and authorship. It does not prove the audited contract is safe: read the coverage status and the limitations above.

sha256
ca1c01aa64544f24...bffd91a7
Signed by
Ed25519 key vsig-2026-09
Canonical version
vss-canonical-1
Bytes served
stored canonical text, byte for byte

PDF artifact

Queued artifact pipeline · not blocking on the scan

Not requested

No PDF artifact has been requested for this report yet. The HTML report and the Markdown export already carry the full disclaimer and limitations inline. PDF synthesis is a queued artifact, not part of the scan path.

Status endpoint

GET /report/solidity/VSS-20261003-SPW8AU52/export.pdf

Solidity evidence report

1 audit finding

critical: 1high: 0medium: 0low: 0informational: 0

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 1 finding surfaced (1 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 0 low, 0 informational).
  • CRITICAL · selfdestruct call — exploitability unknown.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.

Warnings (2)

  • · slither coverage degraded: no installed solc satisfies pragma "0.4.9" (installed: 0.4.26, 0.5.17, 0.6.12, 0.7.6, 0.8.19, 0.8.20, 0.8.28, 0.8.30). Install a matching solc via solc-select.
  • · slither exit 1:
semgrep 1.163.0
  • criticalCentralizationConfidence: unknownExploitability: unknownDetector: semgrep

    selfdestruct call

    Affected location
    access-control-parity-wallet-bug-1.sol:230
    Detector / source
    semgrep · semgrep:vegasec-selfdestruct

    Evidence

    selfdestruct call. Even with access control, selfdestruct introduces upgrade risk and historical state loss. Audit access control carefully or remove.

    Exploitability notes

    Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.

    Remediation

    Document the trust boundary, set up time-locked multisig ownership, and surface admin-only functions in the deployment runbook.

    Limitations

    • Analyzer did not report confidence; fail closed and treat the finding as unverified.
    • Static analysis did not prove exploitability; do not present this as an exploit claim.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a single sandboxed copy of the source. Multi-file dependency analysis beyond what slither resolves automatically is out of scope.
  • Analyzer coverage is PARTIAL: at least one required analyzer (slither, semgrep) did not complete. The trust score is capped at 50/100 and the verdict can never be a clean surface. Reasons: slither produced no structured output (exit 1); slither coverage degraded: no installed solc satisfies pragma "0.4.9" (installed: 0.4.26, 0.5.17, 0.6.12, 0.7.6, 0.8.19, 0.8.20, 0.8.28, 0.8.30). Install a matching solc via solc-select.; slither exit 1:
  • Some detectors emitted warnings (see `warnings`); their output was still ingested but should be read with extra care.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • fe0ba94efecdf222cb191c204b072642fb52bdbebd5f8626bafb379c1c41a7c3 · centralizationcritical

    Not determined

    Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?

    Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 3Partial: 5Blocked: 1
  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay7:52 PM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay7:52 PM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Partial2.3s replay7:52 PM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  4. Static analysis

    Partial1 finding8.8s replay7:52 PM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  5. Finding normalization

    Passed1 finding1.1s replay7:52 PM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial1 finding1.9s replay7:52 PM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
  7. Remediation draft

    Partial1 finding1.5s replay7:52 PM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay7:52 PM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
  9. Finalization

    Partial1 finding620ms replay7:52 PM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

Report badges

Verified source

Badges describe the evidence carried by this report artifact, not financial value or future pricing. Operator-reviewed is never granted automatically.

How to read this report

Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:52 PM · Solidity · access-control-parity-wallet-bug-1.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

    AVOID-style triage

    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

  • 20-49

    High caution

    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch · this report

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

Score
Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
Confidence
Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
Ranking / percentile
Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.

Private Review is separate

A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.

Export and share

  • · Shareable public URL: copy from the report actions panel.
  • · Markdown export: every export carries the report id, target, verdict, generated timestamp, and the public-data disclaimer.
  • · PDF export: not in this MVP. Tracked as a follow-up. The Markdown export contains the same content and prints cleanly to PDF from a browser today.

Source provenance

This report scanned a Solidity source provided directly by the submitter (paste). No on-chain address is associated.

Scanned source (16,509 chars)

/*
 * @source: https://github.com/paritytech/parity-ethereum/blob/4d08e7b0aec46443bf26547b17d10cb302672835/js/src/contracts/snippets/enhanced-wallet.sol#L216
 * @author: parity
 * @vulnerable_at_lines: 223,437
 */

//sol Wallet
// Multi-sig, daily-limited account proxy/wallet.
// @authors:
// Gav Wood <g@ethdev.com>
// inheritable "property" contract that enables methods to be protected by requiring the acquiescence of either a
// single, or, crucially, each of a number of, designated owners.
// usage:
// use modifiers onlyowner (just own owned) or onlymanyowners(hash), whereby the same hash must be provided by
// some number (specified in constructor) of the set of owners (specified in the constructor, modifiable) before the
// interior is executed.

pragma solidity 0.4.9; /* originally ^0.4.9, but doesn't compile with ^0.4.11 */

contract WalletEvents {
  // EVENTS

  // this contract only has six types of events: it can accept a confirmation, in which case
  // we record owner and operation (hash) alongside it.
  event Confirmation(address owner, bytes32 operation);
  event Revoke(address owner, bytes32 operation);

  // some others are in the case of an owner changing.
  event OwnerChanged(address oldOwner, address newOwner);
  event OwnerAdded(address newOwner);
  event OwnerRemoved(address oldOwner);

  // the last one is emitted if the required signatures change
  event RequirementChanged(uint newRequirement);

  // Funds has arrived into the wallet (record how much).
  event Deposit(address _from, uint value);
  // Single transaction going out of the wallet (record who signed for it, how much, and to whom it's going).
  event SingleTransact(address owner, uint value, address to, bytes data, address created);
  // Multi-sig transaction going out of the wallet (record who signed for it last, the operation hash, how much, and to whom it's going).
  event MultiTransact(address owner, bytes32 operation, uint value, address to, bytes data, address created);
  // Confirmation still needed for a transaction.
  event ConfirmationNeeded(bytes32 operation, address initiator, uint value, address to, bytes data);
}

contract WalletAbi {
  // Revokes a prior confirmation of the given operation
  function revoke(bytes32 _operation) external;

  // Replaces an owner `_from` with another `_to`.
  function changeOwner(address _from, address _to) external;

  function addOwner(address _owner) external;

  function removeOwner(address _owner) external;

  function changeRequirement(uint _newRequired) external;

  function isOwner(address _addr) constant returns (bool);

  function hasConfirmed(bytes32 _operation, address _owner) external constant returns (bool);

  // (re)sets the daily limit. needs many of the owners to confirm. doesn't alter the amount already spent today.
  function setDailyLimit(uint _newLimit) external;

  function execute(address _to, uint _value, bytes _data) external returns (bytes32 o_hash);
  function confirm(bytes32 _h) returns (bool o_success);
}

contract WalletLibrary is WalletEvents {
  // TYPES

  // struct for the status of a pending operation.
  struct PendingState {
    uint yetNeeded;
    uint ownersDone;
    uint index;
  }

  // Transaction structure to remember details of transaction lest it need be saved for a later call.
  struct Transaction {
    address to;
    uint value;
    bytes data;
  }

  // MODIFIERS

  // simple single-sig function modifier.
  modifier onlyowner {
    if (isOwner(msg.sender))
      _;
  }
  // multi-sig function modifier: the operation must have an intrinsic hash in order
  // that later attempts can be realised as the same underlying operation and
  // thus count as confirmations.
  modifier onlymanyowners(bytes32 _operation) {
    if (confirmAndCheck(_operation))
      _;
  }

  // METHODS

  // gets called when no other function matches
  function() payable {
    // just being sent some cash?
    if (msg.value > 0)
      Deposit(msg.sender, msg.value);
  }

  // constructor is given number of sigs required to do protected "onlymanyowners" transactions
  // as well as the selection of addresses capable of confirming them.
  function initMultiowned(address[] _owners, uint _required) {
    m_numOwners = _owners.length + 1;
    m_owners[1] = uint(msg.sender);
    m_ownerIndex[uint(msg.sender)] = 1;
    for (uint i = 0; i < _owners.length; ++i)
    {
      m_owners[2 + i] = uint(_owners[i]);
      m_ownerIndex[uint(_owners[i])] = 2 + i;
    }
    m_required = _required;
  }

  // Revokes a prior confirmation of the given operation
  function revoke(bytes32 _operation) external {
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(msg.sender)];
    // make sure they're an owner
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;
    uint ownerIndexBit = 2**ownerIndex;
    var pending = m_pending[_operation];
    if (pending.ownersDone & ownerIndexBit > 0) {
      pending.yetNeeded++;
      pending.ownersDone -= ownerIndexBit;
      Revoke(msg.sender, _operation);
    }
  }

  // Replaces an owner `_from` with another `_to`.
  function changeOwner(address _from, address _to) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    if (isOwner(_to)) return;
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(_from)];
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;

    clearPending();
    m_owners[ownerIndex] = uint(_to);
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_from)] = 0;
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_to)] = ownerIndex;
    OwnerChanged(_from, _to);
  }

  function addOwner(address _owner) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    if (isOwner(_owner)) return;

    clearPending();
    if (m_numOwners >= c_maxOwners)
      reorganizeOwners();
    if (m_numOwners >= c_maxOwners)
      return;
    m_numOwners++;
    m_owners[m_numOwners] = uint(_owner);
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)] = m_numOwners;
    OwnerAdded(_owner);
  }

  function removeOwner(address _owner) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)];
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;
    if (m_required > m_numOwners - 1) return;

    m_owners[ownerIndex] = 0;
    m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)] = 0;
    clearPending();
    reorganizeOwners(); //make sure m_numOwner is equal to the number of owners and always points to the optimal free slot
    OwnerRemoved(_owner);
  }

  function changeRequirement(uint _newRequired) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    if (_newRequired > m_numOwners) return;
    m_required = _newRequired;
    clearPending();
    RequirementChanged(_newRequired);
  }

  // Gets an owner by 0-indexed position (using numOwners as the count)
  function getOwner(uint ownerIndex) external constant returns (address) {
    return address(m_owners[ownerIndex + 1]);
  }

  function isOwner(address _addr) constant returns (bool) {
    return m_ownerIndex[uint(_addr)] > 0;
  }

  function hasConfirmed(bytes32 _operation, address _owner) external constant returns (bool) {
    var pending = m_pending[_operation];
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(_owner)];

    // make sure they're an owner
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return false;

    // determine the bit to set for this owner.
    uint ownerIndexBit = 2**ownerIndex;
    return !(pending.ownersDone & ownerIndexBit == 0);
  }

  // constructor - stores initial daily limit and records the present day's index.
  function initDaylimit(uint _limit) {
    m_dailyLimit = _limit;
    m_lastDay = today();
  }
  // (re)sets the daily limit. needs many of the owners to confirm. doesn't alter the amount already spent today.
  function setDailyLimit(uint _newLimit) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    m_dailyLimit = _newLimit;
  }
  // resets the amount already spent today. needs many of the owners to confirm.
  function resetSpentToday() onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    m_spentToday = 0;
  }

  // constructor - just pass on the owner array to the multiowned and
  // the limit to daylimit
  // <yes> <report> ACCESS_CONTROL
  function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit) {
    initDaylimit(_daylimit);
    initMultiowned(_owners, _required);
  }

  // kills the contract sending everything to `_to`.
  function kill(address _to) onlymanyowners(sha3(msg.data)) external {
    suicide(_to);
  }

  // Outside-visible transact entry point. Executes transaction immediately if below daily spend limit.
  // If not, goes into multisig process. We provide a hash on return to allow the sender to provide
  // shortcuts for the other confirmations (allowing them to avoid replicating the _to, _value
  // and _data arguments). They still get the option of using them if they want, anyways.
  function execute(address _to, uint _value, bytes _data) external onlyowner returns (bytes32 o_hash) {
    // first, take the opportunity to check that we're under the daily limit.
    if ((_data.length == 0 && underLimit(_value)) || m_required == 1) {
      // yes - just execute the call.
      address created;
      if (_to == 0) {
        created = create(_value, _data);
      } else {
        if (!_to.call.value(_value)(_data))
          throw;
      }
      SingleTransact(msg.sender, _value, _to, _data, created);
    } else {
      // determine our operation hash.
      o_hash = sha3(msg.data, block.number);
      // store if it's new
      if (m_txs[o_hash].to == 0 && m_txs[o_hash].value == 0 && m_txs[o_hash].data.length == 0) {
        m_txs[o_hash].to = _to;
        m_txs[o_hash].value = _value;
        m_txs[o_hash].data = _data;
      }
      if (!confirm(o_hash)) {
        ConfirmationNeeded(o_hash, msg.sender, _value, _to, _data);
      }
    }
  }

  function create(uint _value, bytes _code) internal returns (address o_addr) {
    assembly {
      o_addr := create(_value, add(_code, 0x20), mload(_code))
      jumpi(invalidJumpLabel, iszero(extcodesize(o_addr)))
    }
  }

  // confirm a transaction through just the hash. we use the previous transactions map, m_txs, in order
  // to determine the body of the transaction from the hash provided.
  function confirm(bytes32 _h) onlymanyowners(_h) returns (bool o_success) {
    if (m_txs[_h].to != 0 || m_txs[_h].value != 0 || m_txs[_h].data.length != 0) {
      address created;
      if (m_txs[_h].to == 0) {
        created = create(m_txs[_h].value, m_txs[_h].data);
      } else {
        if (!m_txs[_h].to.call.value(m_txs[_h].value)(m_txs[_h].data))
          throw;
      }

      MultiTransact(msg.sender, _h, m_txs[_h].value, m_txs[_h].to, m_txs[_h].data, created);
      delete m_txs[_h];
      return true;
    }
  }

  // INTERNAL METHODS

  function confirmAndCheck(bytes32 _operation) internal returns (bool) {
    // determine what index the present sender is:
    uint ownerIndex = m_ownerIndex[uint(msg.sender)];
    // make sure they're an owner
    if (ownerIndex == 0) return;

    var pending = m_pending[_operation];
    // if we're not yet working on this operation, switch over and reset the confirmation status.
    if (pending.yetNeeded == 0) {
      // reset count of confirmations needed.
      pending.yetNeeded = m_required;
      // reset which owners have confirmed (none) - set our bitmap to 0.
      pending.ownersDone = 0;
      pending.index = m_pendingIndex.length++;
      m_pendingIndex[pending.index] = _operation;
    }
    // determine the bit to set for this owner.
    uint ownerIndexBit = 2**ownerIndex;
    // make sure we (the message sender) haven't confirmed this operation previously.
    if (pending.ownersDone & ownerIndexBit == 0) {
      Confirmation(msg.sender, _operation);
      // ok - check if count is enough to go ahead.
      if (pending.yetNeeded <= 1) {
        // enough confirmations: reset and run interior.
        delete m_pendingIndex[m_pending[_operation].index];
        delete m_pending[_operation];
        return true;
      }
      else
      {
        // not enough: record that this owner in particular confirmed.
        pending.yetNeeded--;
        pending.ownersDone |= ownerIndexBit;
      }
    }
  }

  function reorganizeOwners() private {
    uint free = 1;
    while (free < m_numOwners)
    {
      while (free < m_numOwners && m_owners[free] != 0) free++;
      while (m_numOwners > 1 && m_owners[m_numOwners] == 0) m_numOwners--;
      if (free < m_numOwners && m_owners[m_numOwners] != 0 && m_owners[free] == 0)
      {
        m_owners[free] = m_owners[m_numOwners];
        m_ownerIndex[m_owners[free]] = free;
        m_owners[m_numOwners] = 0;
      }
    }
  }

  // checks to see if there is at least `_value` left from the daily limit today. if there is, subtracts it and
  // returns true. otherwise just returns false.
  function underLimit(uint _value) internal onlyowner returns (bool) {
    // reset the spend limit if we're on a different day to last time.
    if (today() > m_lastDay) {
      m_spentToday = 0;
      m_lastDay = today();
    }
    // check to see if there's enough left - if so, subtract and return true.
    // overflow protection                    // dailyLimit check
    if (m_spentToday + _value >= m_spentToday && m_spentToday + _value <= m_dailyLimit) {
      m_spentToday += _value;
      return true;
    }
    return false;
  }

  // determines today's index.
  function today() private constant returns (uint) { return now / 1 days; }

  function clearPending() internal {
    uint length = m_pendingIndex.length;

    for (uint i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
      delete m_txs[m_pendingIndex[i]];

      if (m_pendingIndex[i] != 0)
        delete m_pending[m_pendingIndex[i]];
    }

    delete m_pendingIndex;
  }

  // FIELDS
  address constant _walletLibrary = 0xcafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafe;

  // the number of owners that must confirm the same operation before it is run.
  uint public m_required;
  // pointer used to find a free slot in m_owners
  uint public m_numOwners;

  uint public m_dailyLimit;
  uint public m_spentToday;
  uint public m_lastDay;

  // list of owners
  uint[256] m_owners;

  uint constant c_maxOwners = 250;
  // index on the list of owners to allow reverse lookup
  mapping(uint => uint) m_ownerIndex;
  // the ongoing operations.
  mapping(bytes32 => PendingState) m_pending;
  bytes32[] m_pendingIndex;

  // pending transactions we have at present.
  mapping (bytes32 => Transaction) m_txs;
}

contract Wallet is WalletEvents {

  // WALLET CONSTRUCTOR
  //   calls the `initWallet` method of the Library in this context
  function Wallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit) {
    // Signature of the Wallet Library's init function
    bytes4 sig = bytes4(sha3("initWallet(address[],uint256,uint256)"));
    address target = _walletLibrary;

    // Compute the size of the call data : arrays has 2
    // 32bytes for offset and length, plus 32bytes per element ;
    // plus 2 32bytes for each uint
    uint argarraysize = (2 + _owners.length);
    uint argsize = (2 + argarraysize) * 32;

    assembly {
      // Add the signature first to memory
      mstore(0x0, sig)
      // Add the call data, which is at the end of the
      // code
      codecopy(0x4,  sub(codesize, argsize), argsize)
      // Delegate call to the library
      delegatecall(sub(gas, 10000), target, 0x0, add(argsize, 0x4), 0x0, 0x0)
    }
  }

  // METHODS

  // gets called when no other function matches
  function() payable {
    // just being sent some cash?
    if (msg.value > 0)
      Deposit(msg.sender, msg.value);
    else if (msg.data.length > 0)
     // <yes> <report> ACCESS_CONTROL
      _walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data); //it should have whitelisted specific methods that the user is allowed to call
  }

  // Gets an owner by 0-indexed position (using numOwners as the count)
  function getOwner(uint ownerIndex) constant returns (address) {
    return address(m_owners[ownerIndex + 1]);
  }

  // As return statement unavailable in fallback, explicit the method here

  function hasConfirmed(bytes32 _operation, address _owner) external constant returns (bool) {
    return _walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data);
  }

  function isOwner(address _addr) constant returns (bool) {
    return _walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data);
  }

  // FIELDS
  address constant _walletLibrary = 0xcafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafecafe;

  // the number of owners that must confirm the same operation before it is run.
  uint public m_required;
  // pointer used to find a free slot in m_owners
  uint public m_numOwners;

  uint public m_dailyLimit;
  uint public m_spentToday;
  uint public m_lastDay;

  // list of owners
  uint[256] m_owners;
}

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.