Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. WatchVault.sol was scanned from unknown provenance. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.
PDF artifact
Queued artifact pipeline · not blocking on the scan
No PDF artifact has been requested for this report yet. The HTML report and the Markdown export already carry the full disclaimer and limitations inline. PDF synthesis is a queued artifact, not part of the scan path.
Status endpoint
GET /report/solidity/VSS-20261004-6BJ83DI7/export.pdf
Solidity evidence report
6 audit findings
Severity distribution
Executive summary
- 6 findings surfaced (0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, 1 low, 2 informational).
- No critical or high severity findings; medium and low signals still require operator review before public promotion.
- Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.
- mediumAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
WatchVault.withdraw() (WatchVault.sol#29-37) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string)(tx.origin == owner,not owner) (WatchVault.sol#30)
Evidence
WatchVault.withdraw() (WatchVault.sol#29-37) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string)(tx.origin == owner,not owner) (WatchVault.sol#30)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- mediumAccess controlDetector: semgrep
Use of tx.origin for authorization
Evidence
Use of tx.origin for authorization. tx.origin can be tricked via phishing contracts. Prefer msg.sender.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- mediumUnchecked callDetector: semgrep
Low-level .call to an externally-controlled target
Evidence
Low-level .call to an externally-controlled target. Combined with reentrancy or unchecked return values, this is a common fund-draining pattern.
Exploitability notes
Analyzer did not report a confidence level; treat as unverified until reviewed.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in WatchVault.withdraw() (WatchVault.sol#29-37):
Evidence
Reentrancy in WatchVault.withdraw() (WatchVault.sol#29-37): External calls: - (sent,None) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}() (WatchVault.sol#34) Event emitted after the call(s): - Withdrawal(msg.sender,amount) (WatchVault.sol#36)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Version constraint ^0.8.20 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
Evidence
Version constraint ^0.8.20 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - VerbatimInvalidDeduplication - FullInlinerNonExpressionSplitArgumentEvaluationOrder - MissingSideEffectsOnSelectorAccess. It is used by: - ^0.8.20 (WatchVault.sol#2)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Low level call in WatchVault.withdraw() (WatchVault.sol#29-37):
Evidence
Low level call in WatchVault.withdraw() (WatchVault.sol#29-37): - (sent,None) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}() (WatchVault.sol#34)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
Exploit reasoning
Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence
- c5362d5b904892a6aa0b5779493a985e4ebdcbf157abfbcfe1d070c1d5a200a9 · access-controlmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
- Caller controls the path that reaches the function
Action
Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.
Impact
Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.
False-positive caveats
- The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
- Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.
Remediation checklist
- Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
- Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
- Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
- 333605c5df9ae2eb35f086e61c08966a54e2da091fe30101a4e1cd2d087c5e9c · access-controlmedium
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
- ca4dbea72c5f4079540983c6aae32f5def431344180d38a21ab264b4499fca57 · unchecked-callmedium
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Analyzer confidence or exploitability is unknown; the narrative would overclaim without operator review.
Audit pipeline
Audit cockpit
Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.
Audit intake
Passed320ms replay4:18 AMNormalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.
Source acquisition
Passed1.4s replay4:18 AMResolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.
Toolchain validation
Passed2.3s replay4:18 AMConfirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.
Static analysis
Passed6 findings8.8s replay4:18 AMRun static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.
Finding normalization
Passed6 findings1.1s replay4:18 AMDedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.
Exploitability review
Partial6 findings1.9s replay4:18 AMFrame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.
- Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
Remediation draft
Partial6 findings1.5s replay4:18 AMPrepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.
- Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
Operator review
Blocked0ms replay4:18 AMRecord whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.
- No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
- Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
Finalization
Partial6 findings620ms replay4:18 AMPublish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.
Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567
- Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.
How to read this report
Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.
Generated Oct 4, 2026, 4:18 AM · Solidity · WatchVault.sol
Score bands
0-19
AVOID-style triage
Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.
20-49
High caution
Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.
50-69
Watch
Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.
70-89
Clear surface (automated) · this report
No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
90-100
Strong surface (automated)
No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
- Score
- Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
- Confidence
- Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
- Ranking / percentile
- Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.
Private Review is separate
A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.