VegaSec / Solidity scan report

access-control-rubixi.sol

VSS-20261003-PM6I0SIP · generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:53 PM

High caution31 findings1 highPasted source2 warningssemgrep 1.163.0

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. access-control-rubixi.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

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Solidity evidence report

31 audit findings

critical: 0high: 1medium: 5low: 8informational: 17

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 31 findings surfaced (0 critical, 1 high, 5 medium, 8 low, 17 informational).
  • HIGH · Rubixi (access-control-rubixi.sol#10-162) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value: (Rubixi) — exploitability medium.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.

Warnings (2)

  • · Unmapped detector slither:events-access — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:events-maths — classified as 'other'
semgrep 1.163.0
  • highGas / DoSConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi (access-control-rubixi.sol#10-162) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value:

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:10-162 · Rubixi
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:controlled-array-length

    Evidence

    Rubixi (access-control-rubixi.sol#10-162) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value: - participants.push(Participant(msg.sender,(msg.value * pyramidMultiplier) / 100)) (access-control-rubixi.sol#61)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Cap loop bounds, paginate iteration, and ensure no user can grow a state structure the contract must traverse to make progress.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) ignores return value by participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-ru

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:59-79 · addPayout
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unchecked-send

    Evidence

    Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) ignores return value by participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-rubixi.sol#74)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87) ignores return value by creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85)

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:82-87 · collectAllFees
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unchecked-send

    Evidence

    Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87) ignores return value by creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) ignores return value by creator.send(_amt) (access-control-rubixi.sol#95)

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:89-97 · collectFeesInEther
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unchecked-send

    Evidence

    Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) ignores return value by creator.send(_amt) (access-control-rubixi.sol#95)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumMath / overflowConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:99-105 · collectPercentOfFees
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:divide-before-multiply

    Evidence

    Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) performs a multiplication on the result of a division: - feesToCollect = collectedFees / 100 * _pcent (access-control-rubixi.sol#102)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Confirm the solc version uses checked arithmetic (>=0.8) or wrap mutations in OpenZeppelin SafeMath. Avoid unchecked blocks unless explicitly justified.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) ignores return value by creator.send(feesToCollect) (access-control-rubixi.sol#103)

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:99-105 · collectPercentOfFees
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unchecked-send

    Evidence

    Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) ignores return value by creator.send(feesToCollect) (access-control-rubixi.sol#103)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Modifier Rubixi.onlyowner() (access-control-rubixi.sol#27-29) does not always execute _; or revert

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:27-29 · onlyowner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-modifier

    Evidence

    Modifier Rubixi.onlyowner() (access-control-rubixi.sol#27-29) does not always execute _; or revert

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowGas / DoSConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) has external calls inside a loop: participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:59-79 · addPayout
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:calls-loop

    Evidence

    Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) has external calls inside a loop: participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-rubixi.sol#74) Calls stack containing the loop: Rubixi.fallback() Rubixi.init()

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Cap loop bounds, paginate iteration, and ensure no user can grow a state structure the contract must traverse to make progress.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) should emit an event for:

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:89-97 · collectFeesInEther
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:events-maths

    Evidence

    Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) should emit an event for: - collectedFees -= _amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#96)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) should emit an event for:

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:99-105 · collectPercentOfFees
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:events-maths

    Evidence

    Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) should emit an event for: - collectedFees -= feesToCollect (access-control-rubixi.sol#104)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.changeOwner(address) (access-control-rubixi.sol#108-110) should emit an event for:

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:108-110 · changeOwner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:events-access

    Evidence

    Rubixi.changeOwner(address) (access-control-rubixi.sol#108-110) should emit an event for: - creator = _owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#109)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:108 · _owner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) lacks a zero-check on : - creator = _owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#109)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#112-116) should emit an event for:

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:112-116 · changeMultiplier
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:events-maths

    Evidence

    Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#112-116) should emit an event for: - pyramidMultiplier = _mult (access-control-rubixi.sol#115)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#118-122) should emit an event for:

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:118-122 · changeFeePercentage
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:events-maths

    Evidence

    Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#118-122) should emit an event for: - feePercent = _fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#121)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Version constraint ^0.4.15 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:8 · ^0.4.15
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:solc-version

    Evidence

    Version constraint ^0.4.15 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden - SignedArrayStorageCopy - UninitializedFunctionPointerInConstructor_0.4.x - IncorrectEventSignatureInLibraries_0.4.x - ExpExponentCleanup - NestedArrayFunctionCallDecoder - ZeroFunctionSelector. It is used by: - ^0.4.15 (access-control-rubixi.sol#8)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Rubixi.DynamicPyramid() (access-control-rubixi.sol#23-25) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:23-25 · DynamicPyramid
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Rubixi.DynamicPyramid() (access-control-rubixi.sol#23-25) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter Rubixi.addPayout(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#59) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:59 · _fee
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter Rubixi.addPayout(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#59) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:59-79 · addPayout
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-unlimited-gas

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79): External calls: - participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-rubixi.sol#74) State variables written after the call(s): - balance -= participants[payoutOrder].payout (access-control-rubixi.sol#76) - payoutOrder += 1 (access-control-rubixi.sol#77)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:82-87 · collectAllFees
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-unlimited-gas

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87): External calls: - creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85) State variables written after the call(s): - collectedFees = 0 (access-control-rubixi.sol#86)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#83):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:83
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#83): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256)._amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#89) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:89 · _amt
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256)._amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#89) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:89-97 · collectFeesInEther
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-unlimited-gas

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97): External calls: - collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#91) - creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85) - creator.send(_amt) (access-control-rubixi.sol#95) State variables written after the call(s): - collectedFees -= _amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#96)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#93):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:93
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#93): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256)._pcent (access-control-rubixi.sol#99) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:99 · _pcent
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256)._pcent (access-control-rubixi.sol#99) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:99-105 · collectPercentOfFees
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-unlimited-gas

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105): External calls: - creator.send(feesToCollect) (access-control-rubixi.sol#103) State variables written after the call(s): - collectedFees -= feesToCollect (access-control-rubixi.sol#104)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#100):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:100
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#100): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:108 · _owner
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256)._mult (access-control-rubixi.sol#112) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:112 · _mult
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256)._mult (access-control-rubixi.sol#112) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#113):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:113
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#113): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Parameter Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#118) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:118 · _fee
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Parameter Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#118) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#119):

    Affected location
    access-control-rubixi.sol:119
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:deprecated-standards

    Evidence

    Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#119): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a single sandboxed copy of the source. Multi-file dependency analysis beyond what slither resolves automatically is out of scope.
  • Some detectors emitted warnings (see `warnings`); their output was still ingested but should be read with extra care.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • 8515b6eb078b58d166a2f19e47982c700683ceb756ef2f4a54570bde074de5c8 · gas-doshigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Loop over an unbounded data structure controlled by external input
    • Single attacker-controlled entry that grows the data structure

    Action

    Attacker grows the data structure until the loop consumes more gas than the block can hold, blocking the function for everyone.

    Impact

    Permanent denial of service on critical functions (withdrawals, claim, settle).

    False-positive caveats

    • The loop may be bounded by other invariants the analyzer cannot prove.
    • Pagination or pull-based design may mitigate the issue at a higher layer.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace the unbounded loop with a pull-based or paginated pattern.
    • Cap the data structure growth at the entry point with a documented limit.
    • Add a stress test asserting the loop terminates under adversarial input.
  • e6037aa8fdd3f4dd6bb8bd8e5ecfdc9755d9cbd23c08dadfd9657adfd3cfc3c9 · unchecked-callmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
    • Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded

    Action

    Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.

    Impact

    Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.

    False-positive caveats

    • Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
    • Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
    • Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
    • Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.
  • 6c606926f33b91fda15de836f5782c8b33f33a5c8a1feeca59db0d6abb70261b · unchecked-callmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
    • Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded

    Action

    Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.

    Impact

    Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.

    False-positive caveats

    • Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
    • Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
    • Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
    • Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.
  • aad9d61bd879d9fecc8e791f9d628f001c11d2a70eae42a48b3b7d7a2580da6a · unchecked-callmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
    • Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded

    Action

    Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.

    Impact

    Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.

    False-positive caveats

    • Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
    • Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
    • Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
    • Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.
  • f334fb297ca2bd7931c10c78bae68cac8a7fedeafa311723ffa8ec1d6bb0f835 · math-overflowmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Arithmetic outside Solidity 0.8+ overflow checks (assembly, unchecked block, or compiler < 0.8)
    • Caller-controlled inputs reach the arithmetic without bounds checks

    Action

    Attacker passes inputs that wrap a balance or counter past its boundary, producing values that pass downstream checks.

    Impact

    Inflated balances, bypass of cap checks, or denial-of-service when iteration counters wrap.

    False-positive caveats

    • Unchecked blocks are sometimes intentional (gas optimization on values bounded by other invariants).
    • Compiler ≥ 0.8.0 reverts on overflow unless the code explicitly opts out.

    Remediation checklist

    • Move arithmetic out of the unchecked block.
    • Bound caller inputs with explicit require() before arithmetic.
    • Upgrade compiler to ≥ 0.8.0 when feasible and remove SafeMath wrappers.
  • 1e67d297ca4569544173684981ecef7eb2918e4bf5bd8035ce8235676883866b · unchecked-callmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
    • Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded

    Action

    Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.

    Impact

    Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.

    False-positive caveats

    • Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
    • Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
    • Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
    • Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 3Partial: 5Blocked: 1
  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay7:53 PM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay7:53 PM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Partial2.3s replay7:53 PM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  4. Static analysis

    Partial31 findings8.8s replay7:53 PM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  5. Finding normalization

    Passed31 findings1.1s replay7:53 PM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial31 findings1.9s replay7:53 PM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
  7. Remediation draft

    Partial31 findings1.5s replay7:53 PM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay7:53 PM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
  9. Finalization

    Partial31 findings620ms replay7:53 PM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

Report badges

Verified source

Badges describe the evidence carried by this report artifact, not financial value or future pricing. Operator-reviewed is never granted automatically.

How to read this report

Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:53 PM · Solidity · access-control-rubixi.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

    AVOID-style triage

    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

  • 20-49

    High caution · this report

    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

Score
Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
Confidence
Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
Ranking / percentile
Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.

Private Review is separate

A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.

Export and share

  • · Shareable public URL: copy from the report actions panel.
  • · Markdown export: every export carries the report id, target, verdict, generated timestamp, and the public-data disclaimer.
  • · PDF export: not in this MVP. Tracked as a follow-up. The Markdown export contains the same content and prints cleanly to PDF from a browser today.

Source provenance

This report scanned a Solidity source provided directly by the submitter (paste). No on-chain address is associated.

Scanned source (6,374 chars)

/*
 * @source: https://github.com/trailofbits/not-so-smart-contracts/blob/master/wrong_constructor_name/Rubixi_source_code/Rubixi.sol
 * @author: -
* @vulnerable_at_lines: 23,24
 */

 // 0xe82719202e5965Cf5D9B6673B7503a3b92DE20be#code
 pragma solidity ^0.4.15;

 contract Rubixi {

         //Declare variables for storage critical to contract
         uint private balance = 0;
         uint private collectedFees = 0;
         uint private feePercent = 10;
         uint private pyramidMultiplier = 300;
         uint private payoutOrder = 0;

         address private creator;

         //Sets creator
         // <yes> <report> ACCESS_CONTROL
         function DynamicPyramid() {
                 creator = msg.sender; //anyone can call this
         }

         modifier onlyowner {
                 if (msg.sender == creator) _;
         }

         struct Participant {
                 address etherAddress;
                 uint payout;
         }

         Participant[] private participants;

         //Fallback function
         function() {
                 init();
         }

         //init function run on fallback
         function init() private {
                 //Ensures only tx with value of 1 ether or greater are processed and added to pyramid
                 if (msg.value < 1 ether) {
                         collectedFees += msg.value;
                         return;
                 }

                 uint _fee = feePercent;
                 //50% fee rebate on any ether value of 50 or greater
                 if (msg.value >= 50 ether) _fee /= 2;

                 addPayout(_fee);
         }

         //Function called for valid tx to the contract
         function addPayout(uint _fee) private {
                 //Adds new address to participant array
                 participants.push(Participant(msg.sender, (msg.value * pyramidMultiplier) / 100));

                 //These statements ensure a quicker payout system to later pyramid entrants, so the pyramid has a longer lifespan
                 if (participants.length == 10) pyramidMultiplier = 200;
                 else if (participants.length == 25) pyramidMultiplier = 150;

                 // collect fees and update contract balance
                 balance += (msg.value * (100 - _fee)) / 100;
                 collectedFees += (msg.value * _fee) / 100;

                 //Pays earlier participiants if balance sufficient
                 while (balance > participants[payoutOrder].payout) {
                         uint payoutToSend = participants[payoutOrder].payout;
                         participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend);

                         balance -= participants[payoutOrder].payout;
                         payoutOrder += 1;
                 }
         }

         //Fee functions for creator
         function collectAllFees() onlyowner {
                 if (collectedFees == 0) throw;

                 creator.send(collectedFees);
                 collectedFees = 0;
         }

         function collectFeesInEther(uint _amt) onlyowner {
                 _amt *= 1 ether;
                 if (_amt > collectedFees) collectAllFees();

                 if (collectedFees == 0) throw;

                 creator.send(_amt);
                 collectedFees -= _amt;
         }

         function collectPercentOfFees(uint _pcent) onlyowner {
                 if (collectedFees == 0 || _pcent > 100) throw;

                 uint feesToCollect = collectedFees / 100 * _pcent;
                 creator.send(feesToCollect);
                 collectedFees -= feesToCollect;
         }

         //Functions for changing variables related to the contract
         function changeOwner(address _owner) onlyowner {
                 creator = _owner;
         }

         function changeMultiplier(uint _mult) onlyowner {
                 if (_mult > 300 || _mult < 120) throw;

                 pyramidMultiplier = _mult;
         }

         function changeFeePercentage(uint _fee) onlyowner {
                 if (_fee > 10) throw;

                 feePercent = _fee;
         }

         //Functions to provide information to end-user using JSON interface or other interfaces
         function currentMultiplier() constant returns(uint multiplier, string info) {
                 multiplier = pyramidMultiplier;
                 info = 'This multiplier applies to you as soon as transaction is received, may be lowered to hasten payouts or increased if payouts are fast enough. Due to no float or decimals, multiplier is x100 for a fractional multiplier e.g. 250 is actually a 2.5x multiplier. Capped at 3x max and 1.2x min.';
         }

         function currentFeePercentage() constant returns(uint fee, string info) {
                 fee = feePercent;
                 info = 'Shown in % form. Fee is halved(50%) for amounts equal or greater than 50 ethers. (Fee may change, but is capped to a maximum of 10%)';
         }

         function currentPyramidBalanceApproximately() constant returns(uint pyramidBalance, string info) {
                 pyramidBalance = balance / 1 ether;
                 info = 'All balance values are measured in Ethers, note that due to no decimal placing, these values show up as integers only, within the contract itself you will get the exact decimal value you are supposed to';
         }

         function nextPayoutWhenPyramidBalanceTotalsApproximately() constant returns(uint balancePayout) {
                 balancePayout = participants[payoutOrder].payout / 1 ether;
         }

         function feesSeperateFromBalanceApproximately() constant returns(uint fees) {
                 fees = collectedFees / 1 ether;
         }

         function totalParticipants() constant returns(uint count) {
                 count = participants.length;
         }

         function numberOfParticipantsWaitingForPayout() constant returns(uint count) {
                 count = participants.length - payoutOrder;
         }

         function participantDetails(uint orderInPyramid) constant returns(address Address, uint Payout) {
                 if (orderInPyramid <= participants.length) {
                         Address = participants[orderInPyramid].etherAddress;
                         Payout = participants[orderInPyramid].payout / 1 ether;
                 }
         }
 }

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.