access-control-rubixi.sol
VSS-20261003-PM6I0SIP · generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:53 PM
Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. access-control-rubixi.sol was scanned from pasted source. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.
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Solidity evidence report
31 audit findings
Severity distribution
Executive summary
- 31 findings surfaced (0 critical, 1 high, 5 medium, 8 low, 17 informational).
- HIGH · Rubixi (access-control-rubixi.sol#10-162) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value: (Rubixi) — exploitability medium.
- Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.
Warnings (2)
- · Unmapped detector slither:events-access — classified as 'other'
- · Unmapped detector slither:events-maths — classified as 'other'
- highGas / DoSConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi (access-control-rubixi.sol#10-162) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value:
Evidence
Rubixi (access-control-rubixi.sol#10-162) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value: - participants.push(Participant(msg.sender,(msg.value * pyramidMultiplier) / 100)) (access-control-rubixi.sol#61)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Cap loop bounds, paginate iteration, and ensure no user can grow a state structure the contract must traverse to make progress.
- mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) ignores return value by participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-ru
Evidence
Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) ignores return value by participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-rubixi.sol#74)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87) ignores return value by creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85)
Evidence
Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87) ignores return value by creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) ignores return value by creator.send(_amt) (access-control-rubixi.sol#95)
Evidence
Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) ignores return value by creator.send(_amt) (access-control-rubixi.sol#95)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- mediumMath / overflowConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
Evidence
Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) performs a multiplication on the result of a division: - feesToCollect = collectedFees / 100 * _pcent (access-control-rubixi.sol#102)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Confirm the solc version uses checked arithmetic (>=0.8) or wrap mutations in OpenZeppelin SafeMath. Avoid unchecked blocks unless explicitly justified.
- mediumUnchecked callConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) ignores return value by creator.send(feesToCollect) (access-control-rubixi.sol#103)
Evidence
Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) ignores return value by creator.send(feesToCollect) (access-control-rubixi.sol#103)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Modifier Rubixi.onlyowner() (access-control-rubixi.sol#27-29) does not always execute _; or revert
Evidence
Modifier Rubixi.onlyowner() (access-control-rubixi.sol#27-29) does not always execute _; or revert
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- lowGas / DoSConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) has external calls inside a loop: participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-
Evidence
Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79) has external calls inside a loop: participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-rubixi.sol#74) Calls stack containing the loop: Rubixi.fallback() Rubixi.init()
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Cap loop bounds, paginate iteration, and ensure no user can grow a state structure the contract must traverse to make progress.
- lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) should emit an event for:
Evidence
Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97) should emit an event for: - collectedFees -= _amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#96)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) should emit an event for:
Evidence
Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105) should emit an event for: - collectedFees -= feesToCollect (access-control-rubixi.sol#104)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.changeOwner(address) (access-control-rubixi.sol#108-110) should emit an event for:
Evidence
Rubixi.changeOwner(address) (access-control-rubixi.sol#108-110) should emit an event for: - creator = _owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#109)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) lacks a zero-check on :
Evidence
Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) lacks a zero-check on : - creator = _owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#109)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#112-116) should emit an event for:
Evidence
Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#112-116) should emit an event for: - pyramidMultiplier = _mult (access-control-rubixi.sol#115)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#118-122) should emit an event for:
Evidence
Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#118-122) should emit an event for: - feePercent = _fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#121)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Version constraint ^0.4.15 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
Evidence
Version constraint ^0.4.15 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden - SignedArrayStorageCopy - UninitializedFunctionPointerInConstructor_0.4.x - IncorrectEventSignatureInLibraries_0.4.x - ExpExponentCleanup - NestedArrayFunctionCallDecoder - ZeroFunctionSelector. It is used by: - ^0.4.15 (access-control-rubixi.sol#8)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function Rubixi.DynamicPyramid() (access-control-rubixi.sol#23-25) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function Rubixi.DynamicPyramid() (access-control-rubixi.sol#23-25) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter Rubixi.addPayout(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#59) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter Rubixi.addPayout(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#59) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Reentrancy in Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79):
Evidence
Reentrancy in Rubixi.addPayout(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#59-79): External calls: - participants[payoutOrder].etherAddress.send(payoutToSend) (access-control-rubixi.sol#74) State variables written after the call(s): - balance -= participants[payoutOrder].payout (access-control-rubixi.sol#76) - payoutOrder += 1 (access-control-rubixi.sol#77)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87):
Evidence
Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#82-87): External calls: - creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85) State variables written after the call(s): - collectedFees = 0 (access-control-rubixi.sol#86)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#83):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#83): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256)._amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#89) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256)._amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#89) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97):
Evidence
Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectFeesInEther(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#89-97): External calls: - collectAllFees() (access-control-rubixi.sol#91) - creator.send(collectedFees) (access-control-rubixi.sol#85) - creator.send(_amt) (access-control-rubixi.sol#95) State variables written after the call(s): - collectedFees -= _amt (access-control-rubixi.sol#96)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#93):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#93): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256)._pcent (access-control-rubixi.sol#99) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256)._pcent (access-control-rubixi.sol#99) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105):
Evidence
Reentrancy in Rubixi.collectPercentOfFees(uint256) (access-control-rubixi.sol#99-105): External calls: - creator.send(feesToCollect) (access-control-rubixi.sol#103) State variables written after the call(s): - collectedFees -= feesToCollect (access-control-rubixi.sol#104)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#100):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#100): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter Rubixi.changeOwner(address)._owner (access-control-rubixi.sol#108) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256)._mult (access-control-rubixi.sol#112) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter Rubixi.changeMultiplier(uint256)._mult (access-control-rubixi.sol#112) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#113):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#113): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Parameter Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#118) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Parameter Rubixi.changeFeePercentage(uint256)._fee (access-control-rubixi.sol#118) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#119):
Evidence
Deprecated standard detected THROW (access-control-rubixi.sol#119): - Usage of "throw" should be replaced with "revert()"
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
Exploit reasoning
Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence
- 8515b6eb078b58d166a2f19e47982c700683ceb756ef2f4a54570bde074de5c8 · gas-doshighConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Loop over an unbounded data structure controlled by external input
- Single attacker-controlled entry that grows the data structure
Action
Attacker grows the data structure until the loop consumes more gas than the block can hold, blocking the function for everyone.
Impact
Permanent denial of service on critical functions (withdrawals, claim, settle).
False-positive caveats
- The loop may be bounded by other invariants the analyzer cannot prove.
- Pagination or pull-based design may mitigate the issue at a higher layer.
Remediation checklist
- Replace the unbounded loop with a pull-based or paginated pattern.
- Cap the data structure growth at the entry point with a documented limit.
- Add a stress test asserting the loop terminates under adversarial input.
- e6037aa8fdd3f4dd6bb8bd8e5ecfdc9755d9cbd23c08dadfd9657adfd3cfc3c9 · unchecked-callmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
- Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded
Action
Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.
Impact
Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.
False-positive caveats
- Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
- Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.
Remediation checklist
- Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
- Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
- Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.
- 6c606926f33b91fda15de836f5782c8b33f33a5c8a1feeca59db0d6abb70261b · unchecked-callmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
- Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded
Action
Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.
Impact
Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.
False-positive caveats
- Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
- Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.
Remediation checklist
- Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
- Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
- Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.
- aad9d61bd879d9fecc8e791f9d628f001c11d2a70eae42a48b3b7d7a2580da6a · unchecked-callmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
- Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded
Action
Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.
Impact
Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.
False-positive caveats
- Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
- Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.
Remediation checklist
- Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
- Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
- Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.
- f334fb297ca2bd7931c10c78bae68cac8a7fedeafa311723ffa8ec1d6bb0f835 · math-overflowmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Arithmetic outside Solidity 0.8+ overflow checks (assembly, unchecked block, or compiler < 0.8)
- Caller-controlled inputs reach the arithmetic without bounds checks
Action
Attacker passes inputs that wrap a balance or counter past its boundary, producing values that pass downstream checks.
Impact
Inflated balances, bypass of cap checks, or denial-of-service when iteration counters wrap.
False-positive caveats
- Unchecked blocks are sometimes intentional (gas optimization on values bounded by other invariants).
- Compiler ≥ 0.8.0 reverts on overflow unless the code explicitly opts out.
Remediation checklist
- Move arithmetic out of the unchecked block.
- Bound caller inputs with explicit require() before arithmetic.
- Upgrade compiler to ≥ 0.8.0 when feasible and remove SafeMath wrappers.
- 1e67d297ca4569544173684981ecef7eb2918e4bf5bd8035ce8235676883866b · unchecked-callmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Low-level call (`.call`, `.delegatecall`, `.send`) whose return value is ignored
- Subsequent logic assumes the call succeeded
Action
Attacker forces the called contract to fail (out of gas, revert) so the outer function keeps accounting for state the call never wrote.
Impact
Funds marked as transferred that never moved; balances debited without the corresponding credit.
False-positive caveats
- Some unchecked sends are intentional (best-effort fee distribution).
- Return value may be checked indirectly via reentrancy guards or balance assertions.
Remediation checklist
- Require the return value of `.call()` / `.send()` and revert on failure.
- Prefer `.transfer()` only for low-gas pure transfers; otherwise use OpenZeppelin Address.functionCall.
- Add tests covering recipient-revert paths.
Audit pipeline
Audit cockpit
Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.
Audit intake
Passed320ms replay7:53 PMNormalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.
Source acquisition
Passed1.4s replay7:53 PMResolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.
Toolchain validation
Partial2.3s replay7:53 PMConfirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Static analysis
Partial31 findings8.8s replay7:53 PMRun static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Finding normalization
Passed31 findings1.1s replay7:53 PMDedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.
Exploitability review
Partial31 findings1.9s replay7:53 PMFrame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.
- Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
Remediation draft
Partial31 findings1.5s replay7:53 PMPrepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.
- Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
Operator review
Blocked0ms replay7:53 PMRecord whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.
- No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
- Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
Finalization
Partial31 findings620ms replay7:53 PMPublish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.
Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567
- Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.
How to read this report
Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.
Generated Oct 3, 2026, 7:53 PM · Solidity · access-control-rubixi.sol
Score bands
0-19
AVOID-style triage
Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.
20-49
High caution · this report
Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.
50-69
Watch
Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.
70-89
Clear surface (automated)
No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
90-100
Strong surface (automated)
No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
- Score
- Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
- Confidence
- Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
- Ranking / percentile
- Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.
Private Review is separate
A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.