Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. Unitroller.sol was scanned from etherscan verified. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.
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Solidity evidence report
138 audit findings
Severity distribution
Executive summary
- 138 findings surfaced (0 critical, 2 high, 22 medium, 10 low, 104 informational).
- HIGH · Upgradeable-style initialize function is public/external without an initializer guard — exploitability medium.
- HIGH · Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id (fallback) — exploitability medium.
- Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.
Warnings (5)
- · Unmapped detector slither:erc20-interface — classified as 'other'
- · Unmapped detector slither:events-maths — classified as 'other'
- · Unmapped detector slither:dead-code — classified as 'other'
- · Unmapped detector slither:unimplemented-functions — classified as 'other'
- · Unmapped detector slither:unindexed-event-address — classified as 'other'
- highAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: semgrep
Upgradeable-style initialize function is public/external without an initializer guard
Evidence
Upgradeable-style initialize function is public/external without an initializer guard. Attackers can initialize an unprotected implementation or proxy and seize privileged state. Add an initializer modifier and disable implementation initializers.
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- highAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id
Evidence
Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id - (success,None) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#137)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),setting comptroller failed) (contracts/CToken.sol#41)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#135-137) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#135-137) uses a dangerous strict equality: - transferTokens(msg.sender,msg.sender,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/CToken.sol#136)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality: - transferTokens(msg.sender,src,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/CToken.sol#147)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(mErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,balance could not be calculated) (contracts/CToken.sol#193)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowBalanceStored: borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed) (contracts/CToken.sol#273)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.exchangeRateStored() (contracts/CToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.exchangeRateStored() (contracts/CToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,exchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failed) (contracts/CToken.sol#330)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality: - _totalSupply == 0 (contracts/CToken.sol#341)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#384-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#384-462) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,could not calculate block delta) (contracts/CToken.sol#406)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/CToken.sol#547)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#509) is a local variable never initialized
Evidence
CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#509) is a local variable never initialized
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.
- mediumReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707):
Evidence
Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this),redeemer,vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#653) State variables written after the call(s): - totalSupply = vars.totalSupplyNew (contracts/CToken.sol#696) CTokenStorage.totalSupply (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#91) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) - CTokenStorage.totalSupply (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#91)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#616) is a local variable never initialized
Evidence
CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#616) is a local variable never initialized
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.
- mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#753) is a local variable never initialized
Evidence
CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#753) is a local variable never initialized
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/CToken.sol#902)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#862) is a local variable never initialized
Evidence
CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#862) is a local variable never initialized
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.
- mediumReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941):
Evidence
Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941): External calls: - error = cTokenCollateral.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#933) - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,cTokenCollateral) (contracts/CToken.sol#940) - allowed = comptroller.seizeAllowed(address(this),seizerToken,liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1047) - allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this),payer,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#852) - allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#954) - comptroller.seizeVerify(address(this),seizerToken,liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1088) - comptroller.repayBorrowVerify(address(this),payer,borrower,vars.actualRepayAmount,vars.borrowerIndex) (contracts/CToken.sol#913) - seizeError = cTokenCollateral.seize(liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1007) - comptroller.liquidateBorrowVerify(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,actualRepayAmount,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1017) State variables written after the call(s): - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,cTokenCollateral) (contracts/CToken.sol#940) - totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew (contracts/CToken.sol#907) CTokenStorage.totalBorrows (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#81) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - CToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#384-462) - CToken.borrowRatePerBlock() (contracts/CToken.sol#235-237) - CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) - CToken.supplyRatePerBlock() (contracts/CToken.sol#243-245) - CTokenStorage.totalBorrows (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#81)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(amountSeizeError == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED) (contracts/CToken.sol#997)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256).actualAddAmount (contracts/CToken.sol#1241) is a local variable never initialized
Evidence
CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256).actualAddAmount (contracts/CToken.sol#1241) is a local variable never initialized
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CarefulMath.mulUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-36) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CarefulMath.mulUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-36) uses a dangerous strict equality: - a == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#25)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CarefulMath.divUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
CarefulMath.divUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality: - b == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#42)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- mediumOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,a
Evidence
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#48)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) uses a dangerous strict equality:
Evidence
Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) uses a dangerous strict equality: - assert(bool)(err2 == MathError.NO_ERROR) (contracts/Exponential.sol#163)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) should emit an event for:
Evidence
CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) should emit an event for: - initialExchangeRateMantissa = initialExchangeRateMantissa_ (contracts/CToken.sol#36)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561):
Evidence
Reentrancy in CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.mintAllowed(address(this),minter,mintAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#499) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.MINT_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#501) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.MINT_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#513) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.MINT_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#506) - Mint(minter,vars.actualMintAmount,vars.mintTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#554) - Transfer(address(this),minter,vars.mintTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#555)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707):
Evidence
Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this),redeemer,vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#653) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.REDEEM_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (contracts/CToken.sol#660) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#675) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#670) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.REDEEM_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (contracts/CToken.sol#655) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,FailureInfo.REDEEM_TRANSFER_OUT_NOT_POSSIBLE) (contracts/CToken.sol#680) - Redeem(redeemer,vars.redeemAmount,vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#701) - Transfer(redeemer,address(this),vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#700)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799):
Evidence
Reentrancy in CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.borrowAllowed(address(this),borrower,borrowAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#738) Event emitted after the call(s): - Borrow(borrower,borrowAmount,vars.accountBorrowsNew,vars.totalBorrowsNew) (contracts/CToken.sol#793) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#762) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (contracts/CToken.sol#745) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#767) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,FailureInfo.BORROW_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE) (contracts/CToken.sol#750) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (contracts/CToken.sol#740) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#772)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916):
Evidence
Reentrancy in CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this),payer,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#852) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#859) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#854) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#870) - RepayBorrow(payer,borrower,vars.actualRepayAmount,vars.accountBorrowsNew,vars.totalBorrowsNew) (contracts/CToken.sol#910)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020):
Evidence
Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#954) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COLLATERAL_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#966) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#956) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#971) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#961) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_ZERO),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#976) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_UINT_MAX),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#981)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
CToken._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/CToken.sol#1102) lacks a zero-check on :
Evidence
CToken._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/CToken.sol#1102) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin (contracts/CToken.sol#1112)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- lowLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp).fraction (contracts/Exponential.sol#135) shadows:
Evidence
Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp).fraction (contracts/Exponential.sol#135) shadows: - Exponential.fraction(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#347-349) (function)
Exploitability notes
Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address).newPendingImplementation (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38) lacks a zero-check on :
Evidence
Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address).newPendingImplementation (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingComptrollerImplementation = newPendingImplementation (contracts/Unitroller.sol#46)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither
Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85) lacks a zero-check on :
Evidence
Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin (contracts/Unitroller.sol#95)
Exploitability notes
Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.
Remediation
Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Version constraint ^0.5.16 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
Evidence
Version constraint ^0.5.16 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - AbiReencodingHeadOverflowWithStaticArrayCleanup - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - NestedCalldataArrayAbiReencodingSizeValidation - ABIDecodeTwoDimensionalArrayMemory - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - MissingEscapingInFormatting - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden. It is used by: - ^0.5.16 (contracts/CToken.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/ComptrollerInterface.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/EIP20Interface.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/Exponential.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/InterestRateModel.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/PriceOracle.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/Unitroller.sol#1)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken (contracts/CToken.sol#16-1428) does not implement functions:
Evidence
CToken (contracts/CToken.sol#16-1428) does not implement functions: - CToken.doTransferIn(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1407) - CToken.doTransferOut(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1414) - CToken.getCashPrior() (contracts/CToken.sol#1401)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) should be declared external:
Evidence
initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) should be declared external: - CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) Moreover, the following function parameters should change its data location: name_ location should be calldata symbol_ location should be calldata
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.mintInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#470-478) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.mintInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#470-478) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.redeemInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#569-577) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.redeemInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#569-577) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#585-593) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#585-593) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.borrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#714-722) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.borrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#714-722) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.repayBorrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#806-814) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.repayBorrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#806-814) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#822-830) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#822-830) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CToken._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#1102-1118) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CToken._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#1102-1118) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CToken._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CToken.sol#1125-1145) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CToken._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CToken.sol#1125-1145) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CToken._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#1152-1169) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CToken._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#1152-1169) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CToken._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1176-1184) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CToken._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1176-1184) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken._addReservesInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1220-1230) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken._addReservesInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1220-1230) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1238-1275) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1238-1275) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CToken._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1283-1291) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CToken._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1283-1291) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CToken._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CToken.sol#1348-1356) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CToken._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CToken.sol#1348-1356) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant CTokenStorage.borrowRateMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#31) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant CTokenStorage.borrowRateMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#31) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant CTokenStorage.reserveFactorMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#36) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant CTokenStorage.reserveFactorMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#36) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.Mint(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#136) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.Mint(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#136) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.Redeem(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#141) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.Redeem(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#141) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.Borrow(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#146) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.Borrow(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#146) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.RepayBorrow(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#151) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.RepayBorrow(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#151) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.LiquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,address,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#156) has address parameters but no indexed parame
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.LiquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,address,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#156) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#164) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#164) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#169) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#169) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.ReservesAdded(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#189) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.ReservesAdded(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#189) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CTokenInterface.ReservesReduced(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#194) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CTokenInterface.ReservesReduced(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#194) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CTokenInterface._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#235) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CTokenInterface._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#235) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CTokenInterface._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#236) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CTokenInterface._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#236) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CTokenInterface._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#237) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CTokenInterface._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#237) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CTokenInterface._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#238) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CTokenInterface._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#238) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CTokenInterface._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#239) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CTokenInterface._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#239) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CTokenInterface._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#240) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CTokenInterface._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#240) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CErc20Interface._addReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#265) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CErc20Interface._addReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#265) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event CDelegatorInterface.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#279) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event CDelegatorInterface.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#279) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
_setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) should be declared external:
Evidence
_setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) should be declared external: - CDelegatorInterface._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#287) Moreover, the following function parameters should change its data location: becomeImplementationData location should be calldata
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CDelegatorInterface._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#287) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CDelegatorInterface._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#287) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
_becomeImplementation(bytes) should be declared external:
Evidence
_becomeImplementation(bytes) should be declared external: - CDelegateInterface._becomeImplementation(bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#296) Moreover, the following function parameters should change its data location: data location should be calldata
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CDelegateInterface._becomeImplementation(bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#296) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CDelegateInterface._becomeImplementation(bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#296) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function CDelegateInterface._resignImplementation() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#301) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function CDelegateInterface._resignImplementation() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#301) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._mintGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#89) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._mintGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#89) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._borrowGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#90) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._borrowGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#90) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
ComptrollerErrorReporter.failOpaque(ComptrollerErrorReporter.Error,ComptrollerErrorReporter.FailureInfo,uint256) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#66-70) is never us
Evidence
ComptrollerErrorReporter.failOpaque(ComptrollerErrorReporter.Error,ComptrollerErrorReporter.FailureInfo,uint256) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#66-70) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant Exponential.expScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#13) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant Exponential.expScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#13) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant Exponential.doubleScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#14) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant Exponential.doubleScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#14) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant Exponential.halfExpScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#15) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant Exponential.halfExpScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#15) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Constant Exponential.mantissaOne (contracts/Exponential.sol#16) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Evidence
Constant Exponential.mantissaOne (contracts/Exponential.sol#16) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.addExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#48-52) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.addExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#48-52) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.subExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#57-61) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.subExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#57-61) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.divScalar(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#102-109) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.divScalar(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#102-109) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.divScalarByExp(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#114-129) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.divScalarByExp(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#114-129) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#134-141) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#134-141) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mulExp(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#171-173) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mulExp(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#171-173) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mulExp3(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#178-184) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mulExp3(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#178-184) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.divExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#191-193) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.divExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#191-193) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.lessThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#207-209) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.lessThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#207-209) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.lessThanOrEqualExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#214-216) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.lessThanOrEqualExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#214-216) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.greaterThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#221-223) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.greaterThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#221-223) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.isZeroExp(Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#228-230) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.isZeroExp(Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#228-230) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.safe224(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#232-235) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.safe224(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#232-235) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.safe32(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#237-240) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.safe32(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#237-240) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.add_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#242-244) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.add_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#242-244) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.add_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#246-248) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.add_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#246-248) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#250-252) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#250-252) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#254-258) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#254-258) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#260-262) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#260-262) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#264-266) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#264-266) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#268-270) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#268-270) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#272-275) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#272-275) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#277-279) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#277-279) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#281-283) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#281-283) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#285-287) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#285-287) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#289-291) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#289-291) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#293-295) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#293-295) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#297-299) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#297-299) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#301-303) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#301-303) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#305-312) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#305-312) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#314-316) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#314-316) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#318-320) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#318-320) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#322-324) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#322-324) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#326-328) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#326-328) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#330-332) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#330-332) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#334-336) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#334-336) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#338-340) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#338-340) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#342-345) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#342-345) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Exponential.fraction(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#347-349) is never used and should be removed
Evidence
Exponential.fraction(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#347-349) is never used and should be removed
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event Unitroller.NewPendingImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#15) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event Unitroller.NewPendingImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#15) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event Unitroller.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#20) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event Unitroller.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#20) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event Unitroller.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event Unitroller.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Event Unitroller.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Evidence
Event Unitroller.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38-51) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38-51) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function Unitroller._acceptImplementation() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#58-76) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function Unitroller._acceptImplementation() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#58-76) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85-101) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85-101) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Function Unitroller._acceptAdmin() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#108-128) is not in mixedCase
Evidence
Function Unitroller._acceptAdmin() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#108-128) is not in mixedCase
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses assembly
Evidence
Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses assembly - INLINE ASM (contracts/Unitroller.sol#139-146)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.
- informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither
Low level call in Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147):
Evidence
Low level call in Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147): - (success,None) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#137)
Exploitability notes
Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.
Remediation
Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.
Exploit reasoning
Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence
- bb2c961c9c9d1b6448b2804c958897c006e740eb93dd14fdb1ad50053419d81f · access-controlhighConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
- Caller controls the path that reaches the function
Action
Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.
Impact
Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.
False-positive caveats
- The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
- Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.
Remediation checklist
- Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
- Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
- Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
- eb6c57e1e188c687c63e29c4dd1dd20d0eae40125804e1f0b240b00b4d4ad02a · access-controlhighConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
- Caller controls the path that reaches the function
Action
Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.
Impact
Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.
False-positive caveats
- The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
- Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.
Remediation checklist
- Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
- Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
- Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
- 0d3146c14839ccb8114c87f482e9e653c786719f4f21cf0358d3e54d471aad43 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- f4527cbed1e6c1b931c3f1d9175778dca89316f22ae4482b2b1ceb882e3465be · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 5a432213e3cb2747bcc4c1fbf86b7baf25caa21748d0aa918602782bda17b737 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 870697755c61f816e458ef420e2b3ea2cc0196fa89114186b44c041455e7b104 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 398ba9b8020c3299eac346ac6eef5f03b70bedeca2e1cc06fb5ad80a0d973bfc · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 3ff4e0c464039b081cb51c234917ed594c0fb22088dbb66490099621772dc121 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 51a20f76f745c7c25696d020bf1905d9a9a24c7b87928f6b2f583c166bd4c442 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 75cbc91abe3537809c4b216f9f35903de74e1ba34b58ce62303696e4838f03a0 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 29c42f2ea4fb5e66fe91d80ba4cb6ba904533f92a764ebcc9072a9f3aed484e5 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 5aa49507ce252bdf2e518a43ba1ec0903ffcc22ec9a90ee9e05783f0b41fb2f2 · uninitializedmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
- Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called
Action
Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.
Impact
Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.
False-positive caveats
- The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
- Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.
Remediation checklist
- Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
- Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
- Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
- 8c934683f765f5702deb311f7010a00abdaffce387655e88f777f3bb514e98cb · reentrancymediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
- Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
- No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function
Action
Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.
Impact
Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.
False-positive caveats
- The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
- The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.
Remediation checklist
- Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
- Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
- Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
- 0e6013ae9f6b6aff463d84aa42918c7e5bdea7ca10adb933399a5c0e1e594918 · uninitializedmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
- Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called
Action
Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.
Impact
Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.
False-positive caveats
- The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
- Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.
Remediation checklist
- Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
- Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
- Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
- dfaba343324115e9f2167fca3e0f76ff12f0cbcd64908e7e12f014eb7eee39a3 · uninitializedmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
- Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called
Action
Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.
Impact
Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.
False-positive caveats
- The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
- Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.
Remediation checklist
- Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
- Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
- Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
- 27b57976ff5fe0d1db4969cd413b07e605ae5fa2bf4c72a1f0d1a3d0b90008ad · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- e71d79a6f3c49afd6c2f7ac29fb029ab8711b3280728ee65b2bd9cf38595ddf2 · uninitializedmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
- Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called
Action
Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.
Impact
Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.
False-positive caveats
- The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
- Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.
Remediation checklist
- Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
- Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
- Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
- ef7c5e62aae596190d8dff09462d6b246f27aeed30f6e333664dd34e858fa714 · reentrancymediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
- Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
- No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function
Action
Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.
Impact
Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.
False-positive caveats
- The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
- The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.
Remediation checklist
- Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
- Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
- Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
- ebd5fc044b515eb41fe7b61e095d586da3a6cace9818c7b0aa1a384e4ca84a8c · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- a3b7a9871cb69a6262a39d7e7e550bc920393e3b5a1ec7b8558a5b6c49a8696f · uninitializedmediumConfidence: low
Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.
Preconditions
- Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
- Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called
Action
Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.
Impact
Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.
False-positive caveats
- The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
- Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.
Remediation checklist
- Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
- Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
- Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
- 92fed269aaa4f989bc7c621f7c6a01326b87b526ff6f32728517e1c50632d387 · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- d056a368715d01c8f74c8dcd0ef7935c464fe64e455f2f9899ca3a221ac5ac8a · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
- 470160b8998b07d1718bb884be18143453560a4112acfbe54e7b9d91375c4801 · othermedium
Not determined
Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?
Reason: Finding class is 'other'; no deterministic narrative is safe without operator review.
- 983f28dc2d09d18bf23418af64b5d57e45028e07a6303e20dfe4f410ec7cb8ed · logicmediumConfidence: low
Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.
Preconditions
- Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated
Action
Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.
Impact
Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.
False-positive caveats
- Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
- The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.
Remediation checklist
- Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
- Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
Audit pipeline
Audit cockpit
Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.
Audit intake
Passed320ms replay12:36 AMNormalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.
Source acquisition
Passed1.4s replay12:36 AMResolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.
Toolchain validation
Partial2.3s replay12:36 AMConfirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Static analysis
Partial138 findings8.8s replay12:36 AMRun static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.
- One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
Finding normalization
Passed138 findings1.1s replay12:36 AMDedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.
Exploitability review
Partial138 findings1.9s replay12:36 AMFrame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.
- Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
Remediation draft
Partial138 findings1.5s replay12:36 AMPrepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.
- Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
Operator review
Blocked0ms replay12:36 AMRecord whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.
- No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
- Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
Finalization
Partial138 findings620ms replay12:36 AMPublish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.
Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567
- Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.
How to read this report
Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.
Generated Oct 4, 2026, 12:36 AM · Solidity · Unitroller.sol
Score bands
0-19
AVOID-style triage · this report
Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.
20-49
High caution
Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.
50-69
Watch
Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.
70-89
Clear surface (automated)
No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
90-100
Strong surface (automated)
No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.
- Score
- Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
- Confidence
- Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
- Ranking / percentile
- Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.
Private Review is separate
A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.
Source provenance
Verified source via Etherscan
- Chain
- ETHEREUM
- Address
- 0x3d5b…9258
- Contract name
- Unitroller
- Compiler
- v0.5.17+commit.d19bba13
- License
- None
- EVM version
- Default
- Optimization
- On · 200 runs
- File count
- 12
- Proxy implementation
- 0x7aa3…53ba
Provenance is the public-explorer metadata captured at scan time. It is not a re-verification of compilation; the analyzer ran against the source string as returned by the explorer.