VegaSec / Solidity scan report

Unitroller.sol

VSS-20261004-S7XEDXZJ · generated Oct 4, 2026, 12:36 AM

AVOID-style triage138 findings2 highEtherscan verified5 warningssemgrep 1.163.0

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. Unitroller.sol was scanned from etherscan verified. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

Signature

signed

This report is signed. Anyone can verify that these exact bytes came from us, with no account, no wallet and no API key. The signature proves integrity and authorship. It does not prove the audited contract is safe: read the coverage status and the limitations above.

sha256
4264f889f300c308...d23da9b3
Signed by
Ed25519 key vsig-2026-09
Canonical version
vss-canonical-1
Bytes served
stored canonical text, byte for byte

PDF artifact

Queued artifact pipeline · not blocking on the scan

Not requested

No PDF artifact has been requested for this report yet. The HTML report and the Markdown export already carry the full disclaimer and limitations inline. PDF synthesis is a queued artifact, not part of the scan path.

Status endpoint

GET /report/solidity/VSS-20261004-S7XEDXZJ/export.pdf

Solidity evidence report

138 audit findings

critical: 0high: 2medium: 22low: 10informational: 104

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 138 findings surfaced (0 critical, 2 high, 22 medium, 10 low, 104 informational).
  • HIGH · Upgradeable-style initialize function is public/external without an initializer guard — exploitability medium.
  • HIGH · Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id (fallback) — exploitability medium.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.

Warnings (5)

  • · Unmapped detector slither:erc20-interface — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:events-maths — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:dead-code — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:unimplemented-functions — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:unindexed-event-address — classified as 'other'
semgrep 1.163.0solc 0.5.17
  • highAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: semgrep

    Upgradeable-style initialize function is public/external without an initializer guard

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:26-31
    Detector / source
    semgrep · semgrep:vegasec-unprotected-initializer

    Evidence

    Upgradeable-style initialize function is public/external without an initializer guard. Attackers can initialize an unprotected implementation or proxy and seize privileged state. Add an initializer modifier and disable implementation initializers.

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • highAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:135-147 · fallback
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:controlled-delegatecall

    Evidence

    Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id - (success,None) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#137)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:26-57 · initialize
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),setting comptroller failed) (contracts/CToken.sol#41)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#135-137) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:135-137 · transfer
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#135-137) uses a dangerous strict equality: - transferTokens(msg.sender,msg.sender,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/CToken.sol#136)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:146-148 · transferFrom
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality: - transferTokens(msg.sender,src,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/CToken.sol#147)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:190-195 · balanceOfUnderlying
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(mErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,balance could not be calculated) (contracts/CToken.sol#193)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:271-275 · borrowBalanceStored
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowBalanceStored: borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed) (contracts/CToken.sol#273)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.exchangeRateStored() (contracts/CToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:328-332 · exchangeRateStored
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.exchangeRateStored() (contracts/CToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,exchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failed) (contracts/CToken.sol#330)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:339-369 · exchangeRateStoredInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality: - _totalSupply == 0 (contracts/CToken.sol#341)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#384-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:384-462 · accrueInterest
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#384-462) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,could not calculate block delta) (contracts/CToken.sol#406)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:497-561 · mintFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/CToken.sol#547)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#509) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:509 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#509) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707):

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:613-707 · redeemFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-no-eth

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this),redeemer,vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#653) State variables written after the call(s): - totalSupply = vars.totalSupplyNew (contracts/CToken.sol#696) CTokenStorage.totalSupply (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#91) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) - CTokenStorage.totalSupply (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#91)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#616) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:616 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#616) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#753) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:753 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#753) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:850-916 · repayBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/CToken.sol#902)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#862) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:862 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256).vars (contracts/CToken.sol#862) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941):

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:926-941 · liquidateBorrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-no-eth

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941): External calls: - error = cTokenCollateral.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#933) - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,cTokenCollateral) (contracts/CToken.sol#940) - allowed = comptroller.seizeAllowed(address(this),seizerToken,liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1047) - allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this),payer,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#852) - allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#954) - comptroller.seizeVerify(address(this),seizerToken,liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1088) - comptroller.repayBorrowVerify(address(this),payer,borrower,vars.actualRepayAmount,vars.borrowerIndex) (contracts/CToken.sol#913) - seizeError = cTokenCollateral.seize(liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1007) - comptroller.liquidateBorrowVerify(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,actualRepayAmount,seizeTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#1017) State variables written after the call(s): - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,cTokenCollateral) (contracts/CToken.sol#940) - totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew (contracts/CToken.sol#907) CTokenStorage.totalBorrows (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#81) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - CToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/CToken.sol#384-462) - CToken.borrowRatePerBlock() (contracts/CToken.sol#235-237) - CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/CToken.sol#339-369) - CToken.supplyRatePerBlock() (contracts/CToken.sol#243-245) - CTokenStorage.totalBorrows (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#81)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:952-1020 · liquidateBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(amountSeizeError == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED) (contracts/CToken.sol#997)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256).actualAddAmount (contracts/CToken.sol#1241) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1241 · actualAddAmount
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256).actualAddAmount (contracts/CToken.sol#1241) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CarefulMath.mulUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-36) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CarefulMath.sol:24-36 · mulUInt
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CarefulMath.mulUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-36) uses a dangerous strict equality: - a == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#25)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CarefulMath.divUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/CarefulMath.sol:41-47 · divUInt
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CarefulMath.divUInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality: - b == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#42)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,a

    Affected location
    contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol:8-70 · EIP20NonStandardInterface
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:erc20-interface

    Evidence

    EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#48)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:146-166 · mulExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) uses a dangerous strict equality: - assert(bool)(err2 == MathError.NO_ERROR) (contracts/Exponential.sol#163)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) should emit an event for:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:26-57 · initialize
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:events-maths

    Evidence

    CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) should emit an event for: - initialExchangeRateMantissa = initialExchangeRateMantissa_ (contracts/CToken.sol#36)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561):

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:497-561 · mintFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.mintAllowed(address(this),minter,mintAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#499) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.MINT_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#501) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.MINT_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#513) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.MINT_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#506) - Mint(minter,vars.actualMintAmount,vars.mintTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#554) - Transfer(address(this),minter,vars.mintTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#555)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707):

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:613-707 · redeemFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this),redeemer,vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#653) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.REDEEM_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (contracts/CToken.sol#660) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#675) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#670) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.REDEEM_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (contracts/CToken.sol#655) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,FailureInfo.REDEEM_TRANSFER_OUT_NOT_POSSIBLE) (contracts/CToken.sol#680) - Redeem(redeemer,vars.redeemAmount,vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#701) - Transfer(redeemer,address(this),vars.redeemTokens) (contracts/CToken.sol#700)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799):

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:736-799 · borrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.borrowAllowed(address(this),borrower,borrowAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#738) Event emitted after the call(s): - Borrow(borrower,borrowAmount,vars.accountBorrowsNew,vars.totalBorrowsNew) (contracts/CToken.sol#793) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#762) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (contracts/CToken.sol#745) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#767) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,FailureInfo.BORROW_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE) (contracts/CToken.sol#750) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (contracts/CToken.sol#740) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (contracts/CToken.sol#772)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916):

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:850-916 · repayBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this),payer,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#852) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#859) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#854) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#870) - RepayBorrow(payer,borrower,vars.actualRepayAmount,vars.accountBorrowsNew,vars.totalBorrowsNew) (contracts/CToken.sol#910)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020):

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:952-1020 · liquidateBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,repayAmount) (contracts/CToken.sol#954) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COLLATERAL_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#966) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#203) - (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#956) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#971) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_FRESHNESS_CHECK),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#961) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_ZERO),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#976) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#194) - (fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED,FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_UINT_MAX),0) (contracts/CToken.sol#981)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/CToken.sol#1102) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1102 · newPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    CToken._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/CToken.sol#1102) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin (contracts/CToken.sol#1112)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp).fraction (contracts/Exponential.sol#135) shadows:

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:135 · fraction
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:shadowing-local

    Evidence

    Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp).fraction (contracts/Exponential.sol#135) shadows: - Exponential.fraction(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#347-349) (function)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address).newPendingImplementation (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:38 · newPendingImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address).newPendingImplementation (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingComptrollerImplementation = newPendingImplementation (contracts/Unitroller.sol#46)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:85 · newPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin (contracts/Unitroller.sol#95)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Version constraint ^0.5.16 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1 · ^0.5.16
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:solc-version

    Evidence

    Version constraint ^0.5.16 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - AbiReencodingHeadOverflowWithStaticArrayCleanup - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - NestedCalldataArrayAbiReencodingSizeValidation - ABIDecodeTwoDimensionalArrayMemory - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - MissingEscapingInFormatting - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden. It is used by: - ^0.5.16 (contracts/CToken.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/ComptrollerInterface.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/EIP20Interface.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/Exponential.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/InterestRateModel.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/PriceOracle.sol#1) - ^0.5.16 (contracts/Unitroller.sol#1)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken (contracts/CToken.sol#16-1428) does not implement functions:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:16-1428 · CToken
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unimplemented-functions

    Evidence

    CToken (contracts/CToken.sol#16-1428) does not implement functions: - CToken.doTransferIn(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1407) - CToken.doTransferOut(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1414) - CToken.getCashPrior() (contracts/CToken.sol#1401)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) should be declared external:

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:26-57 · initialize
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:external-function

    Evidence

    initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) should be declared external: - CToken.initialize(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/CToken.sol#26-57) Moreover, the following function parameters should change its data location: name_ location should be calldata symbol_ location should be calldata

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.mintInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#470-478) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:470-478 · mintInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.mintInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#470-478) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:497-561 · mintFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#497-561) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#569-577) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:569-577 · redeemInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#569-577) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#585-593) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:585-593 · redeemUnderlyingInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#585-593) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:613-707 · redeemFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#613-707) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#714-722) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:714-722 · borrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#714-722) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:736-799 · borrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#736-799) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#806-814) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:806-814 · repayBorrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#806-814) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#822-830) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:822-830 · repayBorrowBehalfInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#822-830) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:850-916 · repayBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#850-916) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:926-941 · liquidateBorrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#926-941) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:952-1020 · liquidateBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CTokenInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#952-1020) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#1102-1118) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1102-1118 · _setPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CToken.sol#1102-1118) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CToken.sol#1125-1145) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1125-1145 · _acceptAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CToken.sol#1125-1145) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#1152-1169) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1152-1169 · _setComptroller
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CToken.sol#1152-1169) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1176-1184) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1176-1184 · _setReserveFactor
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1176-1184) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken._addReservesInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1220-1230) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1220-1230 · _addReservesInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken._addReservesInternal(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1220-1230) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1238-1275) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1238-1275 · _addReservesFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken._addReservesFresh(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1238-1275) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1283-1291) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1283-1291 · _reduceReserves
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CToken.sol#1283-1291) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CToken.sol#1348-1356) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CToken.sol:1348-1356 · _setInterestRateModel
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CToken.sol#1348-1356) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant CTokenStorage.borrowRateMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#31) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:31 · borrowRateMaxMantissa
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant CTokenStorage.borrowRateMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#31) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant CTokenStorage.reserveFactorMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#36) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:36 · reserveFactorMaxMantissa
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant CTokenStorage.reserveFactorMaxMantissa (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#36) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.Mint(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#136) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:136 · Mint
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.Mint(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#136) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.Redeem(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#141) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:141 · Redeem
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.Redeem(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#141) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.Borrow(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#146) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:146 · Borrow
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.Borrow(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#146) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.RepayBorrow(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#151) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:151 · RepayBorrow
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.RepayBorrow(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#151) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.LiquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,address,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#156) has address parameters but no indexed parame

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:156 · LiquidateBorrow
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.LiquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,address,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#156) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#164) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:164 · NewPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#164) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#169) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:169 · NewAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#169) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.ReservesAdded(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#189) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:189 · ReservesAdded
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.ReservesAdded(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#189) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CTokenInterface.ReservesReduced(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#194) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:194 · ReservesReduced
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CTokenInterface.ReservesReduced(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#194) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CTokenInterface._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#235) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:235 · _setPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CTokenInterface._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#235) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CTokenInterface._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#236) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:236 · _acceptAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CTokenInterface._acceptAdmin() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#236) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CTokenInterface._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#237) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:237 · _setComptroller
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CTokenInterface._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#237) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CTokenInterface._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#238) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:238 · _setReserveFactor
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CTokenInterface._setReserveFactor(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#238) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CTokenInterface._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#239) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:239 · _reduceReserves
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CTokenInterface._reduceReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#239) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CTokenInterface._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#240) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:240 · _setInterestRateModel
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CTokenInterface._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#240) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CErc20Interface._addReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#265) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:265 · _addReserves
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CErc20Interface._addReserves(uint256) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#265) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CDelegatorInterface.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#279) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:279 · NewImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CDelegatorInterface.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#279) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    _setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) should be declared external:

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:287 · _setImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:external-function

    Evidence

    _setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) should be declared external: - CDelegatorInterface._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#287) Moreover, the following function parameters should change its data location: becomeImplementationData location should be calldata

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CDelegatorInterface._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#287) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:287 · _setImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CDelegatorInterface._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#287) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    _becomeImplementation(bytes) should be declared external:

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:296 · _becomeImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:external-function

    Evidence

    _becomeImplementation(bytes) should be declared external: - CDelegateInterface._becomeImplementation(bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#296) Moreover, the following function parameters should change its data location: data location should be calldata

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CDelegateInterface._becomeImplementation(bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#296) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:296 · _becomeImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CDelegateInterface._becomeImplementation(bytes) (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#296) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CDelegateInterface._resignImplementation() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#301) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol:301 · _resignImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CDelegateInterface._resignImplementation() (contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol#301) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._mintGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#89) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol:89 · _mintGuardianPaused
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._mintGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#89) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._borrowGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#90) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol:90 · _borrowGuardianPaused
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Variable ComptrollerV2Storage._borrowGuardianPaused (contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol#90) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    ComptrollerErrorReporter.failOpaque(ComptrollerErrorReporter.Error,ComptrollerErrorReporter.FailureInfo,uint256) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#66-70) is never us

    Affected location
    contracts/ErrorReporter.sol:66-70 · failOpaque
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    ComptrollerErrorReporter.failOpaque(ComptrollerErrorReporter.Error,ComptrollerErrorReporter.FailureInfo,uint256) (contracts/ErrorReporter.sol#66-70) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant Exponential.expScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#13) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:13 · expScale
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant Exponential.expScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#13) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant Exponential.doubleScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#14) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:14 · doubleScale
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant Exponential.doubleScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#14) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant Exponential.halfExpScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#15) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:15 · halfExpScale
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant Exponential.halfExpScale (contracts/Exponential.sol#15) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant Exponential.mantissaOne (contracts/Exponential.sol#16) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:16 · mantissaOne
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant Exponential.mantissaOne (contracts/Exponential.sol#16) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.addExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#48-52) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:48-52 · addExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.addExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#48-52) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.subExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#57-61) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:57-61 · subExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.subExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#57-61) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divScalar(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#102-109) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:102-109 · divScalar
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.divScalar(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#102-109) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divScalarByExp(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#114-129) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:114-129 · divScalarByExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.divScalarByExp(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#114-129) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#134-141) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:134-141 · divScalarByExpTruncate
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#134-141) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:146-166 · mulExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#146-166) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mulExp(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#171-173) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:171-173 · mulExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mulExp(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#171-173) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mulExp3(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#178-184) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:178-184 · mulExp3
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mulExp3(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#178-184) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#191-193) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:191-193 · divExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.divExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#191-193) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.lessThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#207-209) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:207-209 · lessThanExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.lessThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#207-209) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.lessThanOrEqualExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#214-216) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:214-216 · lessThanOrEqualExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.lessThanOrEqualExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#214-216) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.greaterThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#221-223) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:221-223 · greaterThanExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.greaterThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#221-223) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.isZeroExp(Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#228-230) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:228-230 · isZeroExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.isZeroExp(Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#228-230) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.safe224(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#232-235) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:232-235 · safe224
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.safe224(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#232-235) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.safe32(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#237-240) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:237-240 · safe32
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.safe32(uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#237-240) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.add_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#242-244) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:242-244 · add_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.add_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#242-244) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.add_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#246-248) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:246-248 · add_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.add_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#246-248) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#250-252) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:250-252 · add_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#250-252) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#254-258) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:254-258 · add_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.add_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#254-258) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#260-262) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:260-262 · sub_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#260-262) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#264-266) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:264-266 · sub_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.sub_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#264-266) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#268-270) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:268-270 · sub_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#268-270) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#272-275) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:272-275 · sub_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.sub_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#272-275) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#277-279) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:277-279 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#277-279) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#281-283) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:281-283 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#281-283) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#285-287) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:285-287 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#285-287) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#289-291) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:289-291 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#289-291) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#293-295) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:293-295 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#293-295) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#297-299) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:297-299 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#297-299) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#301-303) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:301-303 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#301-303) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#305-312) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:305-312 · mul_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mul_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#305-312) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#314-316) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:314-316 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#314-316) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#318-320) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:318-320 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#318-320) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#322-324) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:322-324 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#322-324) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#326-328) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:326-328 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#326-328) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#330-332) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:330-332 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(Exponential.Double,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#330-332) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#334-336) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:334-336 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(uint256,Exponential.Double) (contracts/Exponential.sol#334-336) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#338-340) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:338-340 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#338-340) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#342-345) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:342-345 · div_
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.div_(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Exponential.sol#342-345) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.fraction(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#347-349) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    contracts/Exponential.sol:347-349 · fraction
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.fraction(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Exponential.sol#347-349) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#15) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:15 · NewPendingImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#15) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#20) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:20 · NewImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewImplementation(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#20) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:25 · NewPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#25) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:30 · NewAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewAdmin(address,address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#30) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38-51) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:38-51 · _setPendingImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#38-51) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._acceptImplementation() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#58-76) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:58-76 · _acceptImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._acceptImplementation() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#58-76) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85-101) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:85-101 · _setPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#85-101) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._acceptAdmin() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#108-128) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:108-128 · _acceptAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._acceptAdmin() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#108-128) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses assembly

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:135-147 · fallback
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:assembly

    Evidence

    Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses assembly - INLINE ASM (contracts/Unitroller.sol#139-146)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Low level call in Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147):

    Affected location
    contracts/Unitroller.sol:135-147 · fallback
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:low-level-calls

    Evidence

    Low level call in Unitroller.fallback() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147): - (success,None) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#137)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a multi-file sandboxed bundle of 12 Solidity file(s). Imports resolve between the bundled files; dependencies outside the bundle (an npm package, another repo, a generated file) are NOT analyzed, and an unresolved import makes the run partial rather than clean.
  • Some detectors emitted warnings (see `warnings`); their output was still ingested but should be read with extra care.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • bb2c961c9c9d1b6448b2804c958897c006e740eb93dd14fdb1ad50053419d81f · access-controlhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
    • Caller controls the path that reaches the function

    Action

    Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.

    Impact

    Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.

    False-positive caveats

    • The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
    • Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
    • Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
    • Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
  • eb6c57e1e188c687c63e29c4dd1dd20d0eae40125804e1f0b240b00b4d4ad02a · access-controlhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
    • Caller controls the path that reaches the function

    Action

    Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.

    Impact

    Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.

    False-positive caveats

    • The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
    • Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
    • Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
    • Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
  • 0d3146c14839ccb8114c87f482e9e653c786719f4f21cf0358d3e54d471aad43 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • f4527cbed1e6c1b931c3f1d9175778dca89316f22ae4482b2b1ceb882e3465be · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 5a432213e3cb2747bcc4c1fbf86b7baf25caa21748d0aa918602782bda17b737 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 870697755c61f816e458ef420e2b3ea2cc0196fa89114186b44c041455e7b104 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 398ba9b8020c3299eac346ac6eef5f03b70bedeca2e1cc06fb5ad80a0d973bfc · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 3ff4e0c464039b081cb51c234917ed594c0fb22088dbb66490099621772dc121 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 51a20f76f745c7c25696d020bf1905d9a9a24c7b87928f6b2f583c166bd4c442 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 75cbc91abe3537809c4b216f9f35903de74e1ba34b58ce62303696e4838f03a0 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 29c42f2ea4fb5e66fe91d80ba4cb6ba904533f92a764ebcc9072a9f3aed484e5 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 5aa49507ce252bdf2e518a43ba1ec0903ffcc22ec9a90ee9e05783f0b41fb2f2 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • 8c934683f765f5702deb311f7010a00abdaffce387655e88f777f3bb514e98cb · reentrancymedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
    • Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
    • No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function

    Action

    Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.

    Impact

    Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.

    False-positive caveats

    • The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
    • The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.

    Remediation checklist

    • Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
    • Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
    • Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
  • 0e6013ae9f6b6aff463d84aa42918c7e5bdea7ca10adb933399a5c0e1e594918 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • dfaba343324115e9f2167fca3e0f76ff12f0cbcd64908e7e12f014eb7eee39a3 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • 27b57976ff5fe0d1db4969cd413b07e605ae5fa2bf4c72a1f0d1a3d0b90008ad · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • e71d79a6f3c49afd6c2f7ac29fb029ab8711b3280728ee65b2bd9cf38595ddf2 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • ef7c5e62aae596190d8dff09462d6b246f27aeed30f6e333664dd34e858fa714 · reentrancymedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
    • Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
    • No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function

    Action

    Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.

    Impact

    Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.

    False-positive caveats

    • The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
    • The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.

    Remediation checklist

    • Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
    • Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
    • Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
  • ebd5fc044b515eb41fe7b61e095d586da3a6cace9818c7b0aa1a384e4ca84a8c · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • a3b7a9871cb69a6262a39d7e7e550bc920393e3b5a1ec7b8558a5b6c49a8696f · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • 92fed269aaa4f989bc7c621f7c6a01326b87b526ff6f32728517e1c50632d387 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • d056a368715d01c8f74c8dcd0ef7935c464fe64e455f2f9899ca3a221ac5ac8a · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 470160b8998b07d1718bb884be18143453560a4112acfbe54e7b9d91375c4801 · othermedium

    Not determined

    Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?

    Reason: Finding class is 'other'; no deterministic narrative is safe without operator review.

  • 983f28dc2d09d18bf23418af64b5d57e45028e07a6303e20dfe4f410ec7cb8ed · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 3Partial: 5Blocked: 1
  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay12:36 AM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay12:36 AM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Partial2.3s replay12:36 AM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  4. Static analysis

    Partial138 findings8.8s replay12:36 AM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  5. Finding normalization

    Passed138 findings1.1s replay12:36 AM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial138 findings1.9s replay12:36 AM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
  7. Remediation draft

    Partial138 findings1.5s replay12:36 AM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay12:36 AM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
  9. Finalization

    Partial138 findings620ms replay12:36 AM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

Report badges

Verified source

Badges describe the evidence carried by this report artifact, not financial value or future pricing. Operator-reviewed is never granted automatically.

How to read this report

Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Oct 4, 2026, 12:36 AM · Solidity · Unitroller.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

    AVOID-style triage · this report

    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

  • 20-49

    High caution

    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

Score
Deterministic 0-100 derived from severity counts. Same formula across every report. Lower means more risk.
Confidence
Separate axis. Measures how much VegaSec trusts the input data. Low confidence pushes the verdict toward UNKNOWN; the two are never collapsed into one number.
Ranking / percentile
Only meaningful within the eligible Trust Index set. Shown on /trust-index when the eligible pool is large enough. Today the public index is a controlled preview.

Private Review is separate

A paid Private Review does not raise the public score on this report. Public score reflects public-source evidence only. Private Review adds operator attestation and a confidential memo, never a score bump.

Export and share

  • · Shareable public URL: copy from the report actions panel.
  • · Markdown export: every export carries the report id, target, verdict, generated timestamp, and the public-data disclaimer.
  • · PDF export: not in this MVP. Tracked as a follow-up. The Markdown export contains the same content and prints cleanly to PDF from a browser today.

Source provenance

Verified source via Etherscan

View on Etherscan ↗
Chain
ETHEREUM
Address
0x3d5b…9258
Contract name
Unitroller
Compiler
v0.5.17+commit.d19bba13
License
None
EVM version
Default
Optimization
On · 200 runs
File count
12
Proxy implementation
0x7aa3…53ba

Provenance is the public-explorer metadata captured at scan time. It is not a re-verification of compilation; the analyzer ran against the source string as returned by the explorer.

Scanned source (116,839 chars)

// === FILE: contracts/CToken.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

import "./ComptrollerInterface.sol";
import "./CTokenInterfaces.sol";
import "./ErrorReporter.sol";
import "./Exponential.sol";
import "./EIP20Interface.sol";
import "./EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol";
import "./InterestRateModel.sol";

/**
 * @title Compound's CToken Contract
 * @notice Abstract base for CTokens
 * @author Compound
 */
contract CToken is CTokenInterface, Exponential, TokenErrorReporter {
    /**
     * @notice Initialize the money market
     * @param comptroller_ The address of the Comptroller
     * @param interestRateModel_ The address of the interest rate model
     * @param initialExchangeRateMantissa_ The initial exchange rate, scaled by 1e18
     * @param name_ EIP-20 name of this token
     * @param symbol_ EIP-20 symbol of this token
     * @param decimals_ EIP-20 decimal precision of this token
     */
    function initialize(ComptrollerInterface comptroller_,
                        InterestRateModel interestRateModel_,
                        uint initialExchangeRateMantissa_,
                        string memory name_,
                        string memory symbol_,
                        uint8 decimals_) public {
        require(msg.sender == admin, "only admin may initialize the market");
        require(accrualBlockNumber == 0 && borrowIndex == 0, "market may only be initialized once");

        // Set initial exchange rate
        initialExchangeRateMantissa = initialExchangeRateMantissa_;
        require(initialExchangeRateMantissa > 0, "initial exchange rate must be greater than zero.");

        // Set the comptroller
        uint err = _setComptroller(comptroller_);
        require(err == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "setting comptroller failed");

        // Initialize block number and borrow index (block number mocks depend on comptroller being set)
        accrualBlockNumber = getBlockNumber();
        borrowIndex = mantissaOne;

        // Set the interest rate model (depends on block number / borrow index)
        err = _setInterestRateModelFresh(interestRateModel_);
        require(err == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "setting interest rate model failed");

        name = name_;
        symbol = symbol_;
        decimals = decimals_;

        // The counter starts true to prevent changing it from zero to non-zero (i.e. smaller cost/refund)
        _notEntered = true;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfer `tokens` tokens from `src` to `dst` by `spender`
     * @dev Called by both `transfer` and `transferFrom` internally
     * @param spender The address of the account performing the transfer
     * @param src The address of the source account
     * @param dst The address of the destination account
     * @param tokens The number of tokens to transfer
     * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
     */
    function transferTokens(address spender, address src, address dst, uint tokens) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if transfer not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.transferAllowed(address(this), src, dst, tokens);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Do not allow self-transfers */
        if (src == dst) {
            return fail(Error.BAD_INPUT, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_NOT_ALLOWED);
        }

        /* Get the allowance, infinite for the account owner */
        uint startingAllowance = 0;
        if (spender == src) {
            startingAllowance = uint(-1);
        } else {
            startingAllowance = transferAllowances[src][spender];
        }

        /* Do the calculations, checking for {under,over}flow */
        MathError mathErr;
        uint allowanceNew;
        uint srcTokensNew;
        uint dstTokensNew;

        (mathErr, allowanceNew) = subUInt(startingAllowance, tokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_NOT_ALLOWED);
        }

        (mathErr, srcTokensNew) = subUInt(accountTokens[src], tokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_NOT_ENOUGH);
        }

        (mathErr, dstTokensNew) = addUInt(accountTokens[dst], tokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_TOO_MUCH);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        accountTokens[src] = srcTokensNew;
        accountTokens[dst] = dstTokensNew;

        /* Eat some of the allowance (if necessary) */
        if (startingAllowance != uint(-1)) {
            transferAllowances[src][spender] = allowanceNew;
        }

        /* We emit a Transfer event */
        emit Transfer(src, dst, tokens);

        comptroller.transferVerify(address(this), src, dst, tokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `msg.sender` to `dst`
     * @param dst The address of the destination account
     * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
     * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
     */
    function transfer(address dst, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (bool) {
        return transferTokens(msg.sender, msg.sender, dst, amount) == uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `src` to `dst`
     * @param src The address of the source account
     * @param dst The address of the destination account
     * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
     * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
     */
    function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (bool) {
        return transferTokens(msg.sender, src, dst, amount) == uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Approve `spender` to transfer up to `amount` from `src`
     * @dev This will overwrite the approval amount for `spender`
     *  and is subject to issues noted [here](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#approve)
     * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
     * @param amount The number of tokens that are approved (-1 means infinite)
     * @return Whether or not the approval succeeded
     */
    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {
        address src = msg.sender;
        transferAllowances[src][spender] = amount;
        emit Approval(src, spender, amount);
        return true;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get the current allowance from `owner` for `spender`
     * @param owner The address of the account which owns the tokens to be spent
     * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
     * @return The number of tokens allowed to be spent (-1 means infinite)
     */
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256) {
        return transferAllowances[owner][spender];
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get the token balance of the `owner`
     * @param owner The address of the account to query
     * @return The number of tokens owned by `owner`
     */
    function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256) {
        return accountTokens[owner];
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get the underlying balance of the `owner`
     * @dev This also accrues interest in a transaction
     * @param owner The address of the account to query
     * @return The amount of underlying owned by `owner`
     */
    function balanceOfUnderlying(address owner) external returns (uint) {
        Exp memory exchangeRate = Exp({mantissa: exchangeRateCurrent()});
        (MathError mErr, uint balance) = mulScalarTruncate(exchangeRate, accountTokens[owner]);
        require(mErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "balance could not be calculated");
        return balance;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get a snapshot of the account's balances, and the cached exchange rate
     * @dev This is used by comptroller to more efficiently perform liquidity checks.
     * @param account Address of the account to snapshot
     * @return (possible error, token balance, borrow balance, exchange rate mantissa)
     */
    function getAccountSnapshot(address account) external view returns (uint, uint, uint, uint) {
        uint cTokenBalance = accountTokens[account];
        uint borrowBalance;
        uint exchangeRateMantissa;

        MathError mErr;

        (mErr, borrowBalance) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(account);
        if (mErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (uint(Error.MATH_ERROR), 0, 0, 0);
        }

        (mErr, exchangeRateMantissa) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        if (mErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (uint(Error.MATH_ERROR), 0, 0, 0);
        }

        return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), cTokenBalance, borrowBalance, exchangeRateMantissa);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Function to simply retrieve block number
     *  This exists mainly for inheriting test contracts to stub this result.
     */
    function getBlockNumber() internal view returns (uint) {
        return block.number;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Returns the current per-block borrow interest rate for this cToken
     * @return The borrow interest rate per block, scaled by 1e18
     */
    function borrowRatePerBlock() external view returns (uint) {
        return interestRateModel.getBorrowRate(getCashPrior(), totalBorrows, totalReserves);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Returns the current per-block supply interest rate for this cToken
     * @return The supply interest rate per block, scaled by 1e18
     */
    function supplyRatePerBlock() external view returns (uint) {
        return interestRateModel.getSupplyRate(getCashPrior(), totalBorrows, totalReserves, reserveFactorMantissa);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Returns the current total borrows plus accrued interest
     * @return The total borrows with interest
     */
    function totalBorrowsCurrent() external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        require(accrueInterest() == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "accrue interest failed");
        return totalBorrows;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Accrue interest to updated borrowIndex and then calculate account's borrow balance using the updated borrowIndex
     * @param account The address whose balance should be calculated after updating borrowIndex
     * @return The calculated balance
     */
    function borrowBalanceCurrent(address account) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        require(accrueInterest() == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "accrue interest failed");
        return borrowBalanceStored(account);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Return the borrow balance of account based on stored data
     * @param account The address whose balance should be calculated
     * @return The calculated balance
     */
    function borrowBalanceStored(address account) public view returns (uint) {
        (MathError err, uint result) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(account);
        require(err == MathError.NO_ERROR, "borrowBalanceStored: borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed");
        return result;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Return the borrow balance of account based on stored data
     * @param account The address whose balance should be calculated
     * @return (error code, the calculated balance or 0 if error code is non-zero)
     */
    function borrowBalanceStoredInternal(address account) internal view returns (MathError, uint) {
        /* Note: we do not assert that the market is up to date */
        MathError mathErr;
        uint principalTimesIndex;
        uint result;

        /* Get borrowBalance and borrowIndex */
        BorrowSnapshot storage borrowSnapshot = accountBorrows[account];

        /* If borrowBalance = 0 then borrowIndex is likely also 0.
         * Rather than failing the calculation with a division by 0, we immediately return 0 in this case.
         */
        if (borrowSnapshot.principal == 0) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, 0);
        }

        /* Calculate new borrow balance using the interest index:
         *  recentBorrowBalance = borrower.borrowBalance * market.borrowIndex / borrower.borrowIndex
         */
        (mathErr, principalTimesIndex) = mulUInt(borrowSnapshot.principal, borrowIndex);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (mathErr, 0);
        }

        (mathErr, result) = divUInt(principalTimesIndex, borrowSnapshot.interestIndex);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (mathErr, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, result);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Accrue interest then return the up-to-date exchange rate
     * @return Calculated exchange rate scaled by 1e18
     */
    function exchangeRateCurrent() public nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        require(accrueInterest() == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "accrue interest failed");
        return exchangeRateStored();
    }

    /**
     * @notice Calculates the exchange rate from the underlying to the CToken
     * @dev This function does not accrue interest before calculating the exchange rate
     * @return Calculated exchange rate scaled by 1e18
     */
    function exchangeRateStored() public view returns (uint) {
        (MathError err, uint result) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        require(err == MathError.NO_ERROR, "exchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failed");
        return result;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Calculates the exchange rate from the underlying to the CToken
     * @dev This function does not accrue interest before calculating the exchange rate
     * @return (error code, calculated exchange rate scaled by 1e18)
     */
    function exchangeRateStoredInternal() internal view returns (MathError, uint) {
        uint _totalSupply = totalSupply;
        if (_totalSupply == 0) {
            /*
             * If there are no tokens minted:
             *  exchangeRate = initialExchangeRate
             */
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, initialExchangeRateMantissa);
        } else {
            /*
             * Otherwise:
             *  exchangeRate = (totalCash + totalBorrows - totalReserves) / totalSupply
             */
            uint totalCash = getCashPrior();
            uint cashPlusBorrowsMinusReserves;
            Exp memory exchangeRate;
            MathError mathErr;

            (mathErr, cashPlusBorrowsMinusReserves) = addThenSubUInt(totalCash, totalBorrows, totalReserves);
            if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return (mathErr, 0);
            }

            (mathErr, exchangeRate) = getExp(cashPlusBorrowsMinusReserves, _totalSupply);
            if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return (mathErr, 0);
            }

            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, exchangeRate.mantissa);
        }
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get cash balance of this cToken in the underlying asset
     * @return The quantity of underlying asset owned by this contract
     */
    function getCash() external view returns (uint) {
        return getCashPrior();
    }

    /**
     * @notice Applies accrued interest to total borrows and reserves
     * @dev This calculates interest accrued from the last checkpointed block
     *   up to the current block and writes new checkpoint to storage.
     */
    function accrueInterest() public returns (uint) {
        /* Remember the initial block number */
        uint currentBlockNumber = getBlockNumber();
        uint accrualBlockNumberPrior = accrualBlockNumber;

        /* Short-circuit accumulating 0 interest */
        if (accrualBlockNumberPrior == currentBlockNumber) {
            return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
        }

        /* Read the previous values out of storage */
        uint cashPrior = getCashPrior();
        uint borrowsPrior = totalBorrows;
        uint reservesPrior = totalReserves;
        uint borrowIndexPrior = borrowIndex;

        /* Calculate the current borrow interest rate */
        uint borrowRateMantissa = interestRateModel.getBorrowRate(cashPrior, borrowsPrior, reservesPrior);
        require(borrowRateMantissa <= borrowRateMaxMantissa, "borrow rate is absurdly high");

        /* Calculate the number of blocks elapsed since the last accrual */
        (MathError mathErr, uint blockDelta) = subUInt(currentBlockNumber, accrualBlockNumberPrior);
        require(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "could not calculate block delta");

        /*
         * Calculate the interest accumulated into borrows and reserves and the new index:
         *  simpleInterestFactor = borrowRate * blockDelta
         *  interestAccumulated = simpleInterestFactor * totalBorrows
         *  totalBorrowsNew = interestAccumulated + totalBorrows
         *  totalReservesNew = interestAccumulated * reserveFactor + totalReserves
         *  borrowIndexNew = simpleInterestFactor * borrowIndex + borrowIndex
         */

        Exp memory simpleInterestFactor;
        uint interestAccumulated;
        uint totalBorrowsNew;
        uint totalReservesNew;
        uint borrowIndexNew;

        (mathErr, simpleInterestFactor) = mulScalar(Exp({mantissa: borrowRateMantissa}), blockDelta);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_SIMPLE_INTEREST_FACTOR_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        (mathErr, interestAccumulated) = mulScalarTruncate(simpleInterestFactor, borrowsPrior);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_ACCUMULATED_INTEREST_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        (mathErr, totalBorrowsNew) = addUInt(interestAccumulated, borrowsPrior);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_BORROWS_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        (mathErr, totalReservesNew) = mulScalarTruncateAddUInt(Exp({mantissa: reserveFactorMantissa}), interestAccumulated, reservesPrior);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_RESERVES_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        (mathErr, borrowIndexNew) = mulScalarTruncateAddUInt(simpleInterestFactor, borrowIndexPrior, borrowIndexPrior);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_BORROW_INDEX_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accrualBlockNumber = currentBlockNumber;
        borrowIndex = borrowIndexNew;
        totalBorrows = totalBorrowsNew;
        totalReserves = totalReservesNew;

        /* We emit an AccrueInterest event */
        emit AccrueInterest(cashPrior, interestAccumulated, borrowIndexNew, totalBorrowsNew);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender supplies assets into the market and receives cTokens in exchange
     * @dev Accrues interest whether or not the operation succeeds, unless reverted
     * @param mintAmount The amount of the underlying asset to supply
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual mint amount.
     */
    function mintInternal(uint mintAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return (fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.MINT_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED), 0);
        }
        // mintFresh emits the actual Mint event if successful and logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return mintFresh(msg.sender, mintAmount);
    }

    struct MintLocalVars {
        Error err;
        MathError mathErr;
        uint exchangeRateMantissa;
        uint mintTokens;
        uint totalSupplyNew;
        uint accountTokensNew;
        uint actualMintAmount;
    }

    /**
     * @notice User supplies assets into the market and receives cTokens in exchange
     * @dev Assumes interest has already been accrued up to the current block
     * @param minter The address of the account which is supplying the assets
     * @param mintAmount The amount of the underlying asset to supply
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual mint amount.
     */
    function mintFresh(address minter, uint mintAmount) internal returns (uint, uint) {
        /* Fail if mint not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.mintAllowed(address(this), minter, mintAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.MINT_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed), 0);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.MINT_FRESHNESS_CHECK), 0);
        }

        MintLocalVars memory vars;

        (vars.mathErr, vars.exchangeRateMantissa) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr)), 0);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         *  We call `doTransferIn` for the minter and the mintAmount.
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  `doTransferIn` reverts if anything goes wrong, since we can't be sure if
         *  side-effects occurred. The function returns the amount actually transferred,
         *  in case of a fee. On success, the cToken holds an additional `actualMintAmount`
         *  of cash.
         */
        vars.actualMintAmount = doTransferIn(minter, mintAmount);

        /*
         * We get the current exchange rate and calculate the number of cTokens to be minted:
         *  mintTokens = actualMintAmount / exchangeRate
         */

        (vars.mathErr, vars.mintTokens) = divScalarByExpTruncate(vars.actualMintAmount, Exp({mantissa: vars.exchangeRateMantissa}));
        require(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED");

        /*
         * We calculate the new total supply of cTokens and minter token balance, checking for overflow:
         *  totalSupplyNew = totalSupply + mintTokens
         *  accountTokensNew = accountTokens[minter] + mintTokens
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalSupplyNew) = addUInt(totalSupply, vars.mintTokens);
        require(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED");

        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountTokensNew) = addUInt(accountTokens[minter], vars.mintTokens);
        require(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED");

        /* We write previously calculated values into storage */
        totalSupply = vars.totalSupplyNew;
        accountTokens[minter] = vars.accountTokensNew;

        /* We emit a Mint event, and a Transfer event */
        emit Mint(minter, vars.actualMintAmount, vars.mintTokens);
        emit Transfer(address(this), minter, vars.mintTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.mintVerify(address(this), minter, vars.actualMintAmount, vars.mintTokens);

        return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), vars.actualMintAmount);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender redeems cTokens in exchange for the underlying asset
     * @dev Accrues interest whether or not the operation succeeds, unless reverted
     * @param redeemTokens The number of cTokens to redeem into underlying
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function redeemInternal(uint redeemTokens) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted redeem failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REDEEM_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // redeemFresh emits redeem-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return redeemFresh(msg.sender, redeemTokens, 0);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender redeems cTokens in exchange for a specified amount of underlying asset
     * @dev Accrues interest whether or not the operation succeeds, unless reverted
     * @param redeemAmount The amount of underlying to receive from redeeming cTokens
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint redeemAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted redeem failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REDEEM_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // redeemFresh emits redeem-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return redeemFresh(msg.sender, 0, redeemAmount);
    }

    struct RedeemLocalVars {
        Error err;
        MathError mathErr;
        uint exchangeRateMantissa;
        uint redeemTokens;
        uint redeemAmount;
        uint totalSupplyNew;
        uint accountTokensNew;
    }

    /**
     * @notice User redeems cTokens in exchange for the underlying asset
     * @dev Assumes interest has already been accrued up to the current block
     * @param redeemer The address of the account which is redeeming the tokens
     * @param redeemTokensIn The number of cTokens to redeem into underlying (only one of redeemTokensIn or redeemAmountIn may be non-zero)
     * @param redeemAmountIn The number of underlying tokens to receive from redeeming cTokens (only one of redeemTokensIn or redeemAmountIn may be non-zero)
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function redeemFresh(address payable redeemer, uint redeemTokensIn, uint redeemAmountIn) internal returns (uint) {
        require(redeemTokensIn == 0 || redeemAmountIn == 0, "one of redeemTokensIn or redeemAmountIn must be zero");

        RedeemLocalVars memory vars;

        /* exchangeRate = invoke Exchange Rate Stored() */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.exchangeRateMantissa) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /* If redeemTokensIn > 0: */
        if (redeemTokensIn > 0) {
            /*
             * We calculate the exchange rate and the amount of underlying to be redeemed:
             *  redeemTokens = redeemTokensIn
             *  redeemAmount = redeemTokensIn x exchangeRateCurrent
             */
            vars.redeemTokens = redeemTokensIn;

            (vars.mathErr, vars.redeemAmount) = mulScalarTruncate(Exp({mantissa: vars.exchangeRateMantissa}), redeemTokensIn);
            if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_EXCHANGE_TOKENS_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
            }
        } else {
            /*
             * We get the current exchange rate and calculate the amount to be redeemed:
             *  redeemTokens = redeemAmountIn / exchangeRate
             *  redeemAmount = redeemAmountIn
             */

            (vars.mathErr, vars.redeemTokens) = divScalarByExpTruncate(redeemAmountIn, Exp({mantissa: vars.exchangeRateMantissa}));
            if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_EXCHANGE_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
            }

            vars.redeemAmount = redeemAmountIn;
        }

        /* Fail if redeem not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this), redeemer, vars.redeemTokens);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.REDEEM_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.REDEEM_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        /*
         * We calculate the new total supply and redeemer balance, checking for underflow:
         *  totalSupplyNew = totalSupply - redeemTokens
         *  accountTokensNew = accountTokens[redeemer] - redeemTokens
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalSupplyNew) = subUInt(totalSupply, vars.redeemTokens);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountTokensNew) = subUInt(accountTokens[redeemer], vars.redeemTokens);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /* Fail gracefully if protocol has insufficient cash */
        if (getCashPrior() < vars.redeemAmount) {
            return fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH, FailureInfo.REDEEM_TRANSFER_OUT_NOT_POSSIBLE);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We invoke doTransferOut for the redeemer and the redeemAmount.
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken has redeemAmount less of cash.
         *  doTransferOut reverts if anything goes wrong, since we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         */
        doTransferOut(redeemer, vars.redeemAmount);

        /* We write previously calculated values into storage */
        totalSupply = vars.totalSupplyNew;
        accountTokens[redeemer] = vars.accountTokensNew;

        /* We emit a Transfer event, and a Redeem event */
        emit Transfer(redeemer, address(this), vars.redeemTokens);
        emit Redeem(redeemer, vars.redeemAmount, vars.redeemTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.redeemVerify(address(this), redeemer, vars.redeemAmount, vars.redeemTokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Sender borrows assets from the protocol to their own address
      * @param borrowAmount The amount of the underlying asset to borrow
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function borrowInternal(uint borrowAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // borrowFresh emits borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return borrowFresh(msg.sender, borrowAmount);
    }

    struct BorrowLocalVars {
        MathError mathErr;
        uint accountBorrows;
        uint accountBorrowsNew;
        uint totalBorrowsNew;
    }

    /**
      * @notice Users borrow assets from the protocol to their own address
      * @param borrowAmount The amount of the underlying asset to borrow
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function borrowFresh(address payable borrower, uint borrowAmount) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if borrow not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.borrowAllowed(address(this), borrower, borrowAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        /* Fail gracefully if protocol has insufficient underlying cash */
        if (getCashPrior() < borrowAmount) {
            return fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH, FailureInfo.BORROW_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE);
        }

        BorrowLocalVars memory vars;

        /*
         * We calculate the new borrower and total borrow balances, failing on overflow:
         *  accountBorrowsNew = accountBorrows + borrowAmount
         *  totalBorrowsNew = totalBorrows + borrowAmount
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrows) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(borrower);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrowsNew) = addUInt(vars.accountBorrows, borrowAmount);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalBorrowsNew) = addUInt(totalBorrows, borrowAmount);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We invoke doTransferOut for the borrower and the borrowAmount.
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken borrowAmount less of cash.
         *  doTransferOut reverts if anything goes wrong, since we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         */
        doTransferOut(borrower, borrowAmount);

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accountBorrows[borrower].principal = vars.accountBorrowsNew;
        accountBorrows[borrower].interestIndex = borrowIndex;
        totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew;

        /* We emit a Borrow event */
        emit Borrow(borrower, borrowAmount, vars.accountBorrowsNew, vars.totalBorrowsNew);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.borrowVerify(address(this), borrower, borrowAmount);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender repays their own borrow
     * @param repayAmount The amount to repay
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
     */
    function repayBorrowInternal(uint repayAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return (fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED), 0);
        }
        // repayBorrowFresh emits repay-borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return repayBorrowFresh(msg.sender, msg.sender, repayAmount);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender repays a borrow belonging to borrower
     * @param borrower the account with the debt being payed off
     * @param repayAmount The amount to repay
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
     */
    function repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address borrower, uint repayAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return (fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REPAY_BEHALF_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED), 0);
        }
        // repayBorrowFresh emits repay-borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return repayBorrowFresh(msg.sender, borrower, repayAmount);
    }

    struct RepayBorrowLocalVars {
        Error err;
        MathError mathErr;
        uint repayAmount;
        uint borrowerIndex;
        uint accountBorrows;
        uint accountBorrowsNew;
        uint totalBorrowsNew;
        uint actualRepayAmount;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Borrows are repaid by another user (possibly the borrower).
     * @param payer the account paying off the borrow
     * @param borrower the account with the debt being payed off
     * @param repayAmount the amount of undelrying tokens being returned
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
     */
    function repayBorrowFresh(address payer, address borrower, uint repayAmount) internal returns (uint, uint) {
        /* Fail if repayBorrow not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this), payer, borrower, repayAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed), 0);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK), 0);
        }

        RepayBorrowLocalVars memory vars;

        /* We remember the original borrowerIndex for verification purposes */
        vars.borrowerIndex = accountBorrows[borrower].interestIndex;

        /* We fetch the amount the borrower owes, with accumulated interest */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrows) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(borrower);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr)), 0);
        }

        /* If repayAmount == -1, repayAmount = accountBorrows */
        if (repayAmount == uint(-1)) {
            vars.repayAmount = vars.accountBorrows;
        } else {
            vars.repayAmount = repayAmount;
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We call doTransferIn for the payer and the repayAmount
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken holds an additional repayAmount of cash.
         *  doTransferIn reverts if anything goes wrong, since we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         *   it returns the amount actually transferred, in case of a fee.
         */
        vars.actualRepayAmount = doTransferIn(payer, vars.repayAmount);

        /*
         * We calculate the new borrower and total borrow balances, failing on underflow:
         *  accountBorrowsNew = accountBorrows - actualRepayAmount
         *  totalBorrowsNew = totalBorrows - actualRepayAmount
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrowsNew) = subUInt(vars.accountBorrows, vars.actualRepayAmount);
        require(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED");

        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalBorrowsNew) = subUInt(totalBorrows, vars.actualRepayAmount);
        require(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED");

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accountBorrows[borrower].principal = vars.accountBorrowsNew;
        accountBorrows[borrower].interestIndex = borrowIndex;
        totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew;

        /* We emit a RepayBorrow event */
        emit RepayBorrow(payer, borrower, vars.actualRepayAmount, vars.accountBorrowsNew, vars.totalBorrowsNew);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.repayBorrowVerify(address(this), payer, borrower, vars.actualRepayAmount, vars.borrowerIndex);

        return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), vars.actualRepayAmount);
    }

    /**
     * @notice The sender liquidates the borrowers collateral.
     *  The collateral seized is transferred to the liquidator.
     * @param borrower The borrower of this cToken to be liquidated
     * @param cTokenCollateral The market in which to seize collateral from the borrower
     * @param repayAmount The amount of the underlying borrowed asset to repay
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
     */
    function liquidateBorrowInternal(address borrower, uint repayAmount, CTokenInterface cTokenCollateral) internal nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted liquidation failed
            return (fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_BORROW_INTEREST_FAILED), 0);
        }

        error = cTokenCollateral.accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted liquidation failed
            return (fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_COLLATERAL_INTEREST_FAILED), 0);
        }

        // liquidateBorrowFresh emits borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender, borrower, repayAmount, cTokenCollateral);
    }

    /**
     * @notice The liquidator liquidates the borrowers collateral.
     *  The collateral seized is transferred to the liquidator.
     * @param borrower The borrower of this cToken to be liquidated
     * @param liquidator The address repaying the borrow and seizing collateral
     * @param cTokenCollateral The market in which to seize collateral from the borrower
     * @param repayAmount The amount of the underlying borrowed asset to repay
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
     */
    function liquidateBorrowFresh(address liquidator, address borrower, uint repayAmount, CTokenInterface cTokenCollateral) internal returns (uint, uint) {
        /* Fail if liquidate not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this), address(cTokenCollateral), liquidator, borrower, repayAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return (failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed), 0);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_FRESHNESS_CHECK), 0);
        }

        /* Verify cTokenCollateral market's block number equals current block number */
        if (cTokenCollateral.accrualBlockNumber() != getBlockNumber()) {
            return (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COLLATERAL_FRESHNESS_CHECK), 0);
        }

        /* Fail if borrower = liquidator */
        if (borrower == liquidator) {
            return (fail(Error.INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER), 0);
        }

        /* Fail if repayAmount = 0 */
        if (repayAmount == 0) {
            return (fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_ZERO), 0);
        }

        /* Fail if repayAmount = -1 */
        if (repayAmount == uint(-1)) {
            return (fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_UINT_MAX), 0);
        }


        /* Fail if repayBorrow fails */
        (uint repayBorrowError, uint actualRepayAmount) = repayBorrowFresh(liquidator, borrower, repayAmount);
        if (repayBorrowError != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            return (fail(Error(repayBorrowError), FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_REPAY_BORROW_FRESH_FAILED), 0);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /* We calculate the number of collateral tokens that will be seized */
        (uint amountSeizeError, uint seizeTokens) = comptroller.liquidateCalculateSeizeTokens(address(this), address(cTokenCollateral), actualRepayAmount);
        require(amountSeizeError == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED");

        /* Revert if borrower collateral token balance < seizeTokens */
        require(cTokenCollateral.balanceOf(borrower) >= seizeTokens, "LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_TOO_MUCH");

        // If this is also the collateral, run seizeInternal to avoid re-entrancy, otherwise make an external call
        uint seizeError;
        if (address(cTokenCollateral) == address(this)) {
            seizeError = seizeInternal(address(this), liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);
        } else {
            seizeError = cTokenCollateral.seize(liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);
        }

        /* Revert if seize tokens fails (since we cannot be sure of side effects) */
        require(seizeError == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "token seizure failed");

        /* We emit a LiquidateBorrow event */
        emit LiquidateBorrow(liquidator, borrower, actualRepayAmount, address(cTokenCollateral), seizeTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.liquidateBorrowVerify(address(this), address(cTokenCollateral), liquidator, borrower, actualRepayAmount, seizeTokens);

        return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), actualRepayAmount);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfers collateral tokens (this market) to the liquidator.
     * @dev Will fail unless called by another cToken during the process of liquidation.
     *  Its absolutely critical to use msg.sender as the borrowed cToken and not a parameter.
     * @param liquidator The account receiving seized collateral
     * @param borrower The account having collateral seized
     * @param seizeTokens The number of cTokens to seize
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function seize(address liquidator, address borrower, uint seizeTokens) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        return seizeInternal(msg.sender, liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfers collateral tokens (this market) to the liquidator.
     * @dev Called only during an in-kind liquidation, or by liquidateBorrow during the liquidation of another CToken.
     *  Its absolutely critical to use msg.sender as the seizer cToken and not a parameter.
     * @param seizerToken The contract seizing the collateral (i.e. borrowed cToken)
     * @param liquidator The account receiving seized collateral
     * @param borrower The account having collateral seized
     * @param seizeTokens The number of cTokens to seize
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function seizeInternal(address seizerToken, address liquidator, address borrower, uint seizeTokens) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if seize not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.seizeAllowed(address(this), seizerToken, liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Fail if borrower = liquidator */
        if (borrower == liquidator) {
            return fail(Error.INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER);
        }

        MathError mathErr;
        uint borrowerTokensNew;
        uint liquidatorTokensNew;

        /*
         * We calculate the new borrower and liquidator token balances, failing on underflow/overflow:
         *  borrowerTokensNew = accountTokens[borrower] - seizeTokens
         *  liquidatorTokensNew = accountTokens[liquidator] + seizeTokens
         */
        (mathErr, borrowerTokensNew) = subUInt(accountTokens[borrower], seizeTokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_DECREMENT_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        (mathErr, liquidatorTokensNew) = addUInt(accountTokens[liquidator], seizeTokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_INCREMENT_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accountTokens[borrower] = borrowerTokensNew;
        accountTokens[liquidator] = liquidatorTokensNew;

        /* Emit a Transfer event */
        emit Transfer(borrower, liquidator, seizeTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.seizeVerify(address(this), seizerToken, liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }


    /*** Admin Functions ***/

    /**
      * @notice Begins transfer of admin rights. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @dev Admin function to begin change of admin. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @param newPendingAdmin New pending admin.
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setPendingAdmin(address payable newPendingAdmin) external returns (uint) {
        // Check caller = admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current value, if any, for inclusion in log
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store pendingAdmin with value newPendingAdmin
        pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin;

        // Emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin)
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Accepts transfer of admin rights. msg.sender must be pendingAdmin
      * @dev Admin function for pending admin to accept role and update admin
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _acceptAdmin() external returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is pendingAdmin and pendingAdmin ≠ address(0)
        if (msg.sender != pendingAdmin || msg.sender == address(0)) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current values for inclusion in log
        address oldAdmin = admin;
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store admin with value pendingAdmin
        admin = pendingAdmin;

        // Clear the pending value
        pendingAdmin = address(0);

        emit NewAdmin(oldAdmin, admin);
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, pendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Sets a new comptroller for the market
      * @dev Admin function to set a new comptroller
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface newComptroller) public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_COMPTROLLER_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        ComptrollerInterface oldComptroller = comptroller;
        // Ensure invoke comptroller.isComptroller() returns true
        require(newComptroller.isComptroller(), "marker method returned false");

        // Set market's comptroller to newComptroller
        comptroller = newComptroller;

        // Emit NewComptroller(oldComptroller, newComptroller)
        emit NewComptroller(oldComptroller, newComptroller);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice accrues interest and sets a new reserve factor for the protocol using _setReserveFactorFresh
      * @dev Admin function to accrue interest and set a new reserve factor
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setReserveFactor(uint newReserveFactorMantissa) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but on top of that we want to log the fact that an attempted reserve factor change failed.
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // _setReserveFactorFresh emits reserve-factor-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to.
        return _setReserveFactorFresh(newReserveFactorMantissa);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Sets a new reserve factor for the protocol (*requires fresh interest accrual)
      * @dev Admin function to set a new reserve factor
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setReserveFactorFresh(uint newReserveFactorMantissa) internal returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // Verify market's block number equals current block number
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_FRESH_CHECK);
        }

        // Check newReserveFactor ≤ maxReserveFactor
        if (newReserveFactorMantissa > reserveFactorMaxMantissa) {
            return fail(Error.BAD_INPUT, FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_BOUNDS_CHECK);
        }

        uint oldReserveFactorMantissa = reserveFactorMantissa;
        reserveFactorMantissa = newReserveFactorMantissa;

        emit NewReserveFactor(oldReserveFactorMantissa, newReserveFactorMantissa);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Accrues interest and reduces reserves by transferring from msg.sender
     * @param addAmount Amount of addition to reserves
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _addReservesInternal(uint addAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but on top of that we want to log the fact that an attempted reduce reserves failed.
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.ADD_RESERVES_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }

        // _addReservesFresh emits reserve-addition-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to.
        (error, ) = _addReservesFresh(addAmount);
        return error;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Add reserves by transferring from caller
     * @dev Requires fresh interest accrual
     * @param addAmount Amount of addition to reserves
     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)) and the actual amount added, net token fees
     */
    function _addReservesFresh(uint addAmount) internal returns (uint, uint) {
        // totalReserves + actualAddAmount
        uint totalReservesNew;
        uint actualAddAmount;

        // We fail gracefully unless market's block number equals current block number
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return (fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.ADD_RESERVES_FRESH_CHECK), actualAddAmount);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We call doTransferIn for the caller and the addAmount
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken holds an additional addAmount of cash.
         *  doTransferIn reverts if anything goes wrong, since we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         *  it returns the amount actually transferred, in case of a fee.
         */

        actualAddAmount = doTransferIn(msg.sender, addAmount);

        totalReservesNew = totalReserves + actualAddAmount;

        /* Revert on overflow */
        require(totalReservesNew >= totalReserves, "add reserves unexpected overflow");

        // Store reserves[n+1] = reserves[n] + actualAddAmount
        totalReserves = totalReservesNew;

        /* Emit NewReserves(admin, actualAddAmount, reserves[n+1]) */
        emit ReservesAdded(msg.sender, actualAddAmount, totalReservesNew);

        /* Return (NO_ERROR, actualAddAmount) */
        return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), actualAddAmount);
    }


    /**
     * @notice Accrues interest and reduces reserves by transferring to admin
     * @param reduceAmount Amount of reduction to reserves
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _reduceReserves(uint reduceAmount) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but on top of that we want to log the fact that an attempted reduce reserves failed.
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // _reduceReservesFresh emits reserve-reduction-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to.
        return _reduceReservesFresh(reduceAmount);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Reduces reserves by transferring to admin
     * @dev Requires fresh interest accrual
     * @param reduceAmount Amount of reduction to reserves
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _reduceReservesFresh(uint reduceAmount) internal returns (uint) {
        // totalReserves - reduceAmount
        uint totalReservesNew;

        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // We fail gracefully unless market's block number equals current block number
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_FRESH_CHECK);
        }

        // Fail gracefully if protocol has insufficient underlying cash
        if (getCashPrior() < reduceAmount) {
            return fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE);
        }

        // Check reduceAmount ≤ reserves[n] (totalReserves)
        if (reduceAmount > totalReserves) {
            return fail(Error.BAD_INPUT, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_VALIDATION);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        totalReservesNew = totalReserves - reduceAmount;
        // We checked reduceAmount <= totalReserves above, so this should never revert.
        require(totalReservesNew <= totalReserves, "reduce reserves unexpected underflow");

        // Store reserves[n+1] = reserves[n] - reduceAmount
        totalReserves = totalReservesNew;

        // doTransferOut reverts if anything goes wrong, since we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
        doTransferOut(admin, reduceAmount);

        emit ReservesReduced(admin, reduceAmount, totalReservesNew);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice accrues interest and updates the interest rate model using _setInterestRateModelFresh
     * @dev Admin function to accrue interest and update the interest rate model
     * @param newInterestRateModel the new interest rate model to use
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel newInterestRateModel) public returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but on top of that we want to log the fact that an attempted change of interest rate model failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // _setInterestRateModelFresh emits interest-rate-model-update-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to.
        return _setInterestRateModelFresh(newInterestRateModel);
    }

    /**
     * @notice updates the interest rate model (*requires fresh interest accrual)
     * @dev Admin function to update the interest rate model
     * @param newInterestRateModel the new interest rate model to use
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _setInterestRateModelFresh(InterestRateModel newInterestRateModel) internal returns (uint) {

        // Used to store old model for use in the event that is emitted on success
        InterestRateModel oldInterestRateModel;

        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        // We fail gracefully unless market's block number equals current block number
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_FRESH_CHECK);
        }

        // Track the market's current interest rate model
        oldInterestRateModel = interestRateModel;

        // Ensure invoke newInterestRateModel.isInterestRateModel() returns true
        require(newInterestRateModel.isInterestRateModel(), "marker method returned false");

        // Set the interest rate model to newInterestRateModel
        interestRateModel = newInterestRateModel;

        // Emit NewMarketInterestRateModel(oldInterestRateModel, newInterestRateModel)
        emit NewMarketInterestRateModel(oldInterestRateModel, newInterestRateModel);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /*** Safe Token ***/

    /**
     * @notice Gets balance of this contract in terms of the underlying
     * @dev This excludes the value of the current message, if any
     * @return The quantity of underlying owned by this contract
     */
    function getCashPrior() internal view returns (uint);

    /**
     * @dev Performs a transfer in, reverting upon failure. Returns the amount actually transferred to the protocol, in case of a fee.
     *  This may revert due to insufficient balance or insufficient allowance.
     */
    function doTransferIn(address from, uint amount) internal returns (uint);

    /**
     * @dev Performs a transfer out, ideally returning an explanatory error code upon failure tather than reverting.
     *  If caller has not called checked protocol's balance, may revert due to insufficient cash held in the contract.
     *  If caller has checked protocol's balance, and verified it is >= amount, this should not revert in normal conditions.
     */
    function doTransferOut(address payable to, uint amount) internal;


    /*** Reentrancy Guard ***/

    /**
     * @dev Prevents a contract from calling itself, directly or indirectly.
     */
    modifier nonReentrant() {
        require(_notEntered, "re-entered");
        _notEntered = false;
        _;
        _notEntered = true; // get a gas-refund post-Istanbul
    }
}

// === FILE: contracts/CTokenInterfaces.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

import "./ComptrollerInterface.sol";
import "./InterestRateModel.sol";

contract CTokenStorage {
    /**
     * @dev Guard variable for re-entrancy checks
     */
    bool internal _notEntered;

    /**
     * @notice EIP-20 token name for this token
     */
    string public name;

    /**
     * @notice EIP-20 token symbol for this token
     */
    string public symbol;

    /**
     * @notice EIP-20 token decimals for this token
     */
    uint8 public decimals;

    /**
     * @notice Maximum borrow rate that can ever be applied (.0005% / block)
     */

    uint internal constant borrowRateMaxMantissa = 0.0005e16;

    /**
     * @notice Maximum fraction of interest that can be set aside for reserves
     */
    uint internal constant reserveFactorMaxMantissa = 1e18;

    /**
     * @notice Administrator for this contract
     */
    address payable public admin;

    /**
     * @notice Pending administrator for this contract
     */
    address payable public pendingAdmin;

    /**
     * @notice Contract which oversees inter-cToken operations
     */
    ComptrollerInterface public comptroller;

    /**
     * @notice Model which tells what the current interest rate should be
     */
    InterestRateModel public interestRateModel;

    /**
     * @notice Initial exchange rate used when minting the first CTokens (used when totalSupply = 0)
     */
    uint internal initialExchangeRateMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Fraction of interest currently set aside for reserves
     */
    uint public reserveFactorMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Block number that interest was last accrued at
     */
    uint public accrualBlockNumber;

    /**
     * @notice Accumulator of the total earned interest rate since the opening of the market
     */
    uint public borrowIndex;

    /**
     * @notice Total amount of outstanding borrows of the underlying in this market
     */
    uint public totalBorrows;

    /**
     * @notice Total amount of reserves of the underlying held in this market
     */
    uint public totalReserves;

    /**
     * @notice Total number of tokens in circulation
     */
    uint public totalSupply;

    /**
     * @notice Official record of token balances for each account
     */
    mapping (address => uint) internal accountTokens;

    /**
     * @notice Approved token transfer amounts on behalf of others
     */
    mapping (address => mapping (address => uint)) internal transferAllowances;

    /**
     * @notice Container for borrow balance information
     * @member principal Total balance (with accrued interest), after applying the most recent balance-changing action
     * @member interestIndex Global borrowIndex as of the most recent balance-changing action
     */
    struct BorrowSnapshot {
        uint principal;
        uint interestIndex;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Mapping of account addresses to outstanding borrow balances
     */
    mapping(address => BorrowSnapshot) internal accountBorrows;
}

contract CTokenInterface is CTokenStorage {
    /**
     * @notice Indicator that this is a CToken contract (for inspection)
     */
    bool public constant isCToken = true;


    /*** Market Events ***/

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when interest is accrued
     */
    event AccrueInterest(uint cashPrior, uint interestAccumulated, uint borrowIndex, uint totalBorrows);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when tokens are minted
     */
    event Mint(address minter, uint mintAmount, uint mintTokens);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when tokens are redeemed
     */
    event Redeem(address redeemer, uint redeemAmount, uint redeemTokens);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when underlying is borrowed
     */
    event Borrow(address borrower, uint borrowAmount, uint accountBorrows, uint totalBorrows);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when a borrow is repaid
     */
    event RepayBorrow(address payer, address borrower, uint repayAmount, uint accountBorrows, uint totalBorrows);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when a borrow is liquidated
     */
    event LiquidateBorrow(address liquidator, address borrower, uint repayAmount, address cTokenCollateral, uint seizeTokens);


    /*** Admin Events ***/

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when pendingAdmin is changed
     */
    event NewPendingAdmin(address oldPendingAdmin, address newPendingAdmin);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when pendingAdmin is accepted, which means admin is updated
     */
    event NewAdmin(address oldAdmin, address newAdmin);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when comptroller is changed
     */
    event NewComptroller(ComptrollerInterface oldComptroller, ComptrollerInterface newComptroller);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when interestRateModel is changed
     */
    event NewMarketInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel oldInterestRateModel, InterestRateModel newInterestRateModel);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when the reserve factor is changed
     */
    event NewReserveFactor(uint oldReserveFactorMantissa, uint newReserveFactorMantissa);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when the reserves are added
     */
    event ReservesAdded(address benefactor, uint addAmount, uint newTotalReserves);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when the reserves are reduced
     */
    event ReservesReduced(address admin, uint reduceAmount, uint newTotalReserves);

    /**
     * @notice EIP20 Transfer event
     */
    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint amount);

    /**
     * @notice EIP20 Approval event
     */
    event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint amount);

    /**
     * @notice Failure event
     */
    event Failure(uint error, uint info, uint detail);


    /*** User Interface ***/

    function transfer(address dst, uint amount) external returns (bool);
    function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint amount) external returns (bool);
    function approve(address spender, uint amount) external returns (bool);
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint);
    function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint);
    function balanceOfUnderlying(address owner) external returns (uint);
    function getAccountSnapshot(address account) external view returns (uint, uint, uint, uint);
    function borrowRatePerBlock() external view returns (uint);
    function supplyRatePerBlock() external view returns (uint);
    function totalBorrowsCurrent() external returns (uint);
    function borrowBalanceCurrent(address account) external returns (uint);
    function borrowBalanceStored(address account) public view returns (uint);
    function exchangeRateCurrent() public returns (uint);
    function exchangeRateStored() public view returns (uint);
    function getCash() external view returns (uint);
    function accrueInterest() public returns (uint);
    function seize(address liquidator, address borrower, uint seizeTokens) external returns (uint);


    /*** Admin Functions ***/

    function _setPendingAdmin(address payable newPendingAdmin) external returns (uint);
    function _acceptAdmin() external returns (uint);
    function _setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface newComptroller) public returns (uint);
    function _setReserveFactor(uint newReserveFactorMantissa) external returns (uint);
    function _reduceReserves(uint reduceAmount) external returns (uint);
    function _setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel newInterestRateModel) public returns (uint);
}

contract CErc20Storage {
    /**
     * @notice Underlying asset for this CToken
     */
    address public underlying;
}

contract CErc20Interface is CErc20Storage {

    /*** User Interface ***/

    function mint(uint mintAmount) external returns (uint);
    function redeem(uint redeemTokens) external returns (uint);
    function redeemUnderlying(uint redeemAmount) external returns (uint);
    function borrow(uint borrowAmount) external returns (uint);
    function repayBorrow(uint repayAmount) external returns (uint);
    function repayBorrowBehalf(address borrower, uint repayAmount) external returns (uint);
    function liquidateBorrow(address borrower, uint repayAmount, CTokenInterface cTokenCollateral) external returns (uint);


    /*** Admin Functions ***/

    function _addReserves(uint addAmount) external returns (uint);
}

contract CDelegationStorage {
    /**
     * @notice Implementation address for this contract
     */
    address public implementation;
}

contract CDelegatorInterface is CDelegationStorage {
    /**
     * @notice Emitted when implementation is changed
     */
    event NewImplementation(address oldImplementation, address newImplementation);

    /**
     * @notice Called by the admin to update the implementation of the delegator
     * @param implementation_ The address of the new implementation for delegation
     * @param allowResign Flag to indicate whether to call _resignImplementation on the old implementation
     * @param becomeImplementationData The encoded bytes data to be passed to _becomeImplementation
     */
    function _setImplementation(address implementation_, bool allowResign, bytes memory becomeImplementationData) public;
}

contract CDelegateInterface is CDelegationStorage {
    /**
     * @notice Called by the delegator on a delegate to initialize it for duty
     * @dev Should revert if any issues arise which make it unfit for delegation
     * @param data The encoded bytes data for any initialization
     */
    function _becomeImplementation(bytes memory data) public;

    /**
     * @notice Called by the delegator on a delegate to forfeit its responsibility
     */
    function _resignImplementation() public;
}

// === FILE: contracts/CarefulMath.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

/**
  * @title Careful Math
  * @author Compound
  * @notice Derived from OpenZeppelin's SafeMath library
  *         https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/master/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol
  */
contract CarefulMath {

    /**
     * @dev Possible error codes that we can return
     */
    enum MathError {
        NO_ERROR,
        DIVISION_BY_ZERO,
        INTEGER_OVERFLOW,
        INTEGER_UNDERFLOW
    }

    /**
    * @dev Multiplies two numbers, returns an error on overflow.
    */
    function mulUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        if (a == 0) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, 0);
        }

        uint c = a * b;

        if (c / a != b) {
            return (MathError.INTEGER_OVERFLOW, 0);
        } else {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, c);
        }
    }

    /**
    * @dev Integer division of two numbers, truncating the quotient.
    */
    function divUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        if (b == 0) {
            return (MathError.DIVISION_BY_ZERO, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, a / b);
    }

    /**
    * @dev Subtracts two numbers, returns an error on overflow (i.e. if subtrahend is greater than minuend).
    */
    function subUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        if (b <= a) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, a - b);
        } else {
            return (MathError.INTEGER_UNDERFLOW, 0);
        }
    }

    /**
    * @dev Adds two numbers, returns an error on overflow.
    */
    function addUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        uint c = a + b;

        if (c >= a) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, c);
        } else {
            return (MathError.INTEGER_OVERFLOW, 0);
        }
    }

    /**
    * @dev add a and b and then subtract c
    */
    function addThenSubUInt(uint a, uint b, uint c) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err0, uint sum) = addUInt(a, b);

        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, 0);
        }

        return subUInt(sum, c);
    }
}

// === FILE: contracts/ComptrollerInterface.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

contract ComptrollerInterface {
    /// @notice Indicator that this is a Comptroller contract (for inspection)
    bool public constant isComptroller = true;

    /*** Assets You Are In ***/

    function enterMarkets(address[] calldata cTokens) external returns (uint[] memory);
    function exitMarket(address cToken) external returns (uint);

    /*** Policy Hooks ***/

    function mintAllowed(address cToken, address minter, uint mintAmount) external returns (uint);
    function mintVerify(address cToken, address minter, uint mintAmount, uint mintTokens) external;

    function redeemAllowed(address cToken, address redeemer, uint redeemTokens) external returns (uint);
    function redeemVerify(address cToken, address redeemer, uint redeemAmount, uint redeemTokens) external;

    function borrowAllowed(address cToken, address borrower, uint borrowAmount) external returns (uint);
    function borrowVerify(address cToken, address borrower, uint borrowAmount) external;

    function repayBorrowAllowed(
        address cToken,
        address payer,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount) external returns (uint);
    function repayBorrowVerify(
        address cToken,
        address payer,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount,
        uint borrowerIndex) external;

    function liquidateBorrowAllowed(
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount) external returns (uint);
    function liquidateBorrowVerify(
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount,
        uint seizeTokens) external;

    function seizeAllowed(
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint seizeTokens) external returns (uint);
    function seizeVerify(
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint seizeTokens) external;

    function transferAllowed(address cToken, address src, address dst, uint transferTokens) external returns (uint);
    function transferVerify(address cToken, address src, address dst, uint transferTokens) external;

    /*** Liquidity/Liquidation Calculations ***/

    function liquidateCalculateSeizeTokens(
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address cTokenCollateral,
        uint repayAmount) external view returns (uint, uint);
}

// === FILE: contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

import "./CToken.sol";
import "./PriceOracle.sol";

contract UnitrollerAdminStorage {
    /**
    * @notice Administrator for this contract
    */
    address public admin;

    /**
    * @notice Pending administrator for this contract
    */
    address public pendingAdmin;

    /**
    * @notice Active brains of Unitroller
    */
    address public comptrollerImplementation;

    /**
    * @notice Pending brains of Unitroller
    */
    address public pendingComptrollerImplementation;
}

contract ComptrollerV1Storage is UnitrollerAdminStorage {

    /**
     * @notice Oracle which gives the price of any given asset
     */
    PriceOracle public oracle;

    /**
     * @notice Multiplier used to calculate the maximum repayAmount when liquidating a borrow
     */
    uint public closeFactorMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Multiplier representing the discount on collateral that a liquidator receives
     */
    uint public liquidationIncentiveMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Max number of assets a single account can participate in (borrow or use as collateral)
     */
    uint public maxAssets;

    /**
     * @notice Per-account mapping of "assets you are in", capped by maxAssets
     */
    mapping(address => CToken[]) public accountAssets;

}

contract ComptrollerV2Storage is ComptrollerV1Storage {
    struct Market {
        /// @notice Whether or not this market is listed
        bool isListed;

        /**
         * @notice Multiplier representing the most one can borrow against their collateral in this market.
         *  For instance, 0.9 to allow borrowing 90% of collateral value.
         *  Must be between 0 and 1, and stored as a mantissa.
         */
        uint collateralFactorMantissa;

        /// @notice Per-market mapping of "accounts in this asset"
        mapping(address => bool) accountMembership;

        /// @notice Whether or not this market receives COMP
        bool isComped;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Official mapping of cTokens -> Market metadata
     * @dev Used e.g. to determine if a market is supported
     */
    mapping(address => Market) public markets;


    /**
     * @notice The Pause Guardian can pause certain actions as a safety mechanism.
     *  Actions which allow users to remove their own assets cannot be paused.
     *  Liquidation / seizing / transfer can only be paused globally, not by market.
     */
    address public pauseGuardian;
    bool public _mintGuardianPaused;
    bool public _borrowGuardianPaused;
    bool public transferGuardianPaused;
    bool public seizeGuardianPaused;
    mapping(address => bool) public mintGuardianPaused;
    mapping(address => bool) public borrowGuardianPaused;
}

contract ComptrollerV3Storage is ComptrollerV2Storage {
    struct CompMarketState {
        /// @notice The market's last updated compBorrowIndex or compSupplyIndex
        uint224 index;

        /// @notice The block number the index was last updated at
        uint32 block;
    }

    /// @notice A list of all markets
    CToken[] public allMarkets;

    /// @notice The rate at which the flywheel distributes COMP, per block
    uint public compRate;

    /// @notice The portion of compRate that each market currently receives
    mapping(address => uint) public compSpeeds;

    /// @notice The COMP market supply state for each market
    mapping(address => CompMarketState) public compSupplyState;

    /// @notice The COMP market borrow state for each market
    mapping(address => CompMarketState) public compBorrowState;

    /// @notice The COMP borrow index for each market for each supplier as of the last time they accrued COMP
    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint)) public compSupplierIndex;

    /// @notice The COMP borrow index for each market for each borrower as of the last time they accrued COMP
    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint)) public compBorrowerIndex;

    /// @notice The COMP accrued but not yet transferred to each user
    mapping(address => uint) public compAccrued;
}

// === FILE: contracts/EIP20Interface.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

/**
 * @title ERC 20 Token Standard Interface
 *  https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20
 */
interface EIP20Interface {
    function name() external view returns (string memory);
    function symbol() external view returns (string memory);
    function decimals() external view returns (uint8);

    /**
      * @notice Get the total number of tokens in circulation
      * @return The supply of tokens
      */
    function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);

    /**
     * @notice Gets the balance of the specified address
     * @param owner The address from which the balance will be retrieved
     * @return The balance
     */
    function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256 balance);

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `msg.sender` to `dst`
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
      */
    function transfer(address dst, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `src` to `dst`
      * @param src The address of the source account
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
      */
    function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Approve `spender` to transfer up to `amount` from `src`
      * @dev This will overwrite the approval amount for `spender`
      *  and is subject to issues noted [here](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#approve)
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @param amount The number of tokens that are approved (-1 means infinite)
      * @return Whether or not the approval succeeded
      */
    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Get the current allowance from `owner` for `spender`
      * @param owner The address of the account which owns the tokens to be spent
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @return The number of tokens allowed to be spent (-1 means infinite)
      */
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256 remaining);

    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 amount);
    event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 amount);
}

// === FILE: contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

/**
 * @title EIP20NonStandardInterface
 * @dev Version of ERC20 with no return values for `transfer` and `transferFrom`
 *  See https://medium.com/coinmonks/missing-return-value-bug-at-least-130-tokens-affected-d67bf08521ca
 */
interface EIP20NonStandardInterface {

    /**
     * @notice Get the total number of tokens in circulation
     * @return The supply of tokens
     */
    function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);

    /**
     * @notice Gets the balance of the specified address
     * @param owner The address from which the balance will be retrieved
     * @return The balance
     */
    function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256 balance);

    ///
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    /// !!! NOTICE !!! `transfer` does not return a value, in violation of the ERC-20 specification
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    ///

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `msg.sender` to `dst`
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      */
    function transfer(address dst, uint256 amount) external;

    ///
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    /// !!! NOTICE !!! `transferFrom` does not return a value, in violation of the ERC-20 specification
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    ///

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `src` to `dst`
      * @param src The address of the source account
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      */
    function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint256 amount) external;

    /**
      * @notice Approve `spender` to transfer up to `amount` from `src`
      * @dev This will overwrite the approval amount for `spender`
      *  and is subject to issues noted [here](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#approve)
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @param amount The number of tokens that are approved
      * @return Whether or not the approval succeeded
      */
    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Get the current allowance from `owner` for `spender`
      * @param owner The address of the account which owns the tokens to be spent
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @return The number of tokens allowed to be spent
      */
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256 remaining);

    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 amount);
    event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 amount);
}

// === FILE: contracts/ErrorReporter.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

contract ComptrollerErrorReporter {
    enum Error {
        NO_ERROR,
        UNAUTHORIZED,
        COMPTROLLER_MISMATCH,
        INSUFFICIENT_SHORTFALL,
        INSUFFICIENT_LIQUIDITY,
        INVALID_CLOSE_FACTOR,
        INVALID_COLLATERAL_FACTOR,
        INVALID_LIQUIDATION_INCENTIVE,
        MARKET_NOT_ENTERED, // no longer possible
        MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        MARKET_ALREADY_LISTED,
        MATH_ERROR,
        NONZERO_BORROW_BALANCE,
        PRICE_ERROR,
        REJECTION,
        SNAPSHOT_ERROR,
        TOO_MANY_ASSETS,
        TOO_MUCH_REPAY
    }

    enum FailureInfo {
        ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK,
        ACCEPT_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_ADDRESS_CHECK,
        EXIT_MARKET_BALANCE_OWED,
        EXIT_MARKET_REJECTION,
        SET_CLOSE_FACTOR_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_CLOSE_FACTOR_VALIDATION,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_NO_EXISTS,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_VALIDATION,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_WITHOUT_PRICE,
        SET_IMPLEMENTATION_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_LIQUIDATION_INCENTIVE_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_LIQUIDATION_INCENTIVE_VALIDATION,
        SET_MAX_ASSETS_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_PRICE_ORACLE_OWNER_CHECK,
        SUPPORT_MARKET_EXISTS,
        SUPPORT_MARKET_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_PAUSE_GUARDIAN_OWNER_CHECK
    }

    /**
      * @dev `error` corresponds to enum Error; `info` corresponds to enum FailureInfo, and `detail` is an arbitrary
      * contract-specific code that enables us to report opaque error codes from upgradeable contracts.
      **/
    event Failure(uint error, uint info, uint detail);

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting a known error from the money market or a non-upgradeable collaborator
      */
    function fail(Error err, FailureInfo info) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), 0);

        return uint(err);
    }

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting an opaque error from an upgradeable collaborator contract
      */
    function failOpaque(Error err, FailureInfo info, uint opaqueError) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), opaqueError);

        return uint(err);
    }
}

contract TokenErrorReporter {
    enum Error {
        NO_ERROR,
        UNAUTHORIZED,
        BAD_INPUT,
        COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        COMPTROLLER_CALCULATION_ERROR,
        INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_ERROR,
        INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR,
        INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED,
        INVALID_COLLATERAL_FACTOR,
        MATH_ERROR,
        MARKET_NOT_FRESH,
        MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_ALLOWANCE,
        TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE,
        TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,
        TOKEN_TRANSFER_IN_FAILED,
        TOKEN_TRANSFER_OUT_FAILED
    }

    /*
     * Note: FailureInfo (but not Error) is kept in alphabetical order
     *       This is because FailureInfo grows significantly faster, and
     *       the order of Error has some meaning, while the order of FailureInfo
     *       is entirely arbitrary.
     */
    enum FailureInfo {
        ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_ACCUMULATED_INTEREST_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_BORROW_RATE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_BORROW_INDEX_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_BORROWS_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_RESERVES_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_SIMPLE_INTEREST_FACTOR_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        BORROW_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE,
        BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_BORROW_INTEREST_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_COLLATERAL_INTEREST_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_COLLATERAL_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_UINT_MAX,
        LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_ZERO,
        LIQUIDATE_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        LIQUIDATE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER,
        LIQUIDATE_REPAY_BORROW_FRESH_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_INCREMENT_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_DECREMENT_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_TOO_MUCH,
        MINT_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        MINT_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        MINT_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED,
        MINT_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        MINT_TRANSFER_IN_FAILED,
        MINT_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE,
        REDEEM_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REDEEM_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        REDEEM_EXCHANGE_TOKENS_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_EXCHANGE_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED,
        REDEEM_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        REDEEM_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_TRANSFER_OUT_NOT_POSSIBLE,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_ADMIN_CHECK,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_FRESH_CHECK,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_VALIDATION,
        REPAY_BEHALF_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        REPAY_BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_VALIDATION,
        SET_COMPTROLLER_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_FRESH_CHECK,
        SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_MAX_ASSETS_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_ORACLE_MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ADMIN_CHECK,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_FRESH_CHECK,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_BOUNDS_CHECK,
        TRANSFER_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        TRANSFER_NOT_ALLOWED,
        TRANSFER_NOT_ENOUGH,
        TRANSFER_TOO_MUCH,
        ADD_RESERVES_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        ADD_RESERVES_FRESH_CHECK,
        ADD_RESERVES_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE
    }

    /**
      * @dev `error` corresponds to enum Error; `info` corresponds to enum FailureInfo, and `detail` is an arbitrary
      * contract-specific code that enables us to report opaque error codes from upgradeable contracts.
      **/
    event Failure(uint error, uint info, uint detail);

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting a known error from the money market or a non-upgradeable collaborator
      */
    function fail(Error err, FailureInfo info) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), 0);

        return uint(err);
    }

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting an opaque error from an upgradeable collaborator contract
      */
    function failOpaque(Error err, FailureInfo info, uint opaqueError) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), opaqueError);

        return uint(err);
    }
}

// === FILE: contracts/Exponential.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

import "./CarefulMath.sol";

/**
 * @title Exponential module for storing fixed-precision decimals
 * @author Compound
 * @notice Exp is a struct which stores decimals with a fixed precision of 18 decimal places.
 *         Thus, if we wanted to store the 5.1, mantissa would store 5.1e18. That is:
 *         `Exp({mantissa: 5100000000000000000})`.
 */
contract Exponential is CarefulMath {
    uint constant expScale = 1e18;
    uint constant doubleScale = 1e36;
    uint constant halfExpScale = expScale/2;
    uint constant mantissaOne = expScale;

    struct Exp {
        uint mantissa;
    }

    struct Double {
        uint mantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @dev Creates an exponential from numerator and denominator values.
     *      Note: Returns an error if (`num` * 10e18) > MAX_INT,
     *            or if `denom` is zero.
     */
    function getExp(uint num, uint denom) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err0, uint scaledNumerator) = mulUInt(num, expScale);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        (MathError err1, uint rational) = divUInt(scaledNumerator, denom);
        if (err1 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err1, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: rational}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Adds two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function addExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError error, uint result) = addUInt(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);

        return (error, Exp({mantissa: result}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Subtracts two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function subExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError error, uint result) = subUInt(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);

        return (error, Exp({mantissa: result}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiply an Exp by a scalar, returning a new Exp.
     */
    function mulScalar(Exp memory a, uint scalar) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err0, uint scaledMantissa) = mulUInt(a.mantissa, scalar);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: scaledMantissa}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiply an Exp by a scalar, then truncate to return an unsigned integer.
     */
    function mulScalarTruncate(Exp memory a, uint scalar) pure internal returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory product) = mulScalar(a, scalar);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, truncate(product));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiply an Exp by a scalar, truncate, then add an to an unsigned integer, returning an unsigned integer.
     */
    function mulScalarTruncateAddUInt(Exp memory a, uint scalar, uint addend) pure internal returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory product) = mulScalar(a, scalar);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, 0);
        }

        return addUInt(truncate(product), addend);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divide an Exp by a scalar, returning a new Exp.
     */
    function divScalar(Exp memory a, uint scalar) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err0, uint descaledMantissa) = divUInt(a.mantissa, scalar);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: descaledMantissa}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divide a scalar by an Exp, returning a new Exp.
     */
    function divScalarByExp(uint scalar, Exp memory divisor) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        /*
          We are doing this as:
          getExp(mulUInt(expScale, scalar), divisor.mantissa)

          How it works:
          Exp = a / b;
          Scalar = s;
          `s / (a / b)` = `b * s / a` and since for an Exp `a = mantissa, b = expScale`
        */
        (MathError err0, uint numerator) = mulUInt(expScale, scalar);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }
        return getExp(numerator, divisor.mantissa);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divide a scalar by an Exp, then truncate to return an unsigned integer.
     */
    function divScalarByExpTruncate(uint scalar, Exp memory divisor) pure internal returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory fraction) = divScalarByExp(scalar, divisor);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, truncate(fraction));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiplies two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function mulExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {

        (MathError err0, uint doubleScaledProduct) = mulUInt(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        // We add half the scale before dividing so that we get rounding instead of truncation.
        //  See "Listing 6" and text above it at https://accu.org/index.php/journals/1717
        // Without this change, a result like 6.6...e-19 will be truncated to 0 instead of being rounded to 1e-18.
        (MathError err1, uint doubleScaledProductWithHalfScale) = addUInt(halfExpScale, doubleScaledProduct);
        if (err1 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err1, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        (MathError err2, uint product) = divUInt(doubleScaledProductWithHalfScale, expScale);
        // The only error `div` can return is MathError.DIVISION_BY_ZERO but we control `expScale` and it is not zero.
        assert(err2 == MathError.NO_ERROR);

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: product}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiplies two exponentials given their mantissas, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function mulExp(uint a, uint b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        return mulExp(Exp({mantissa: a}), Exp({mantissa: b}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiplies three exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function mulExp3(Exp memory a, Exp memory b, Exp memory c) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory ab) = mulExp(a, b);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, ab);
        }
        return mulExp(ab, c);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divides two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     *     (a/scale) / (b/scale) = (a/scale) * (scale/b) = a/b,
     *  which we can scale as an Exp by calling getExp(a.mantissa, b.mantissa)
     */
    function divExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        return getExp(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Truncates the given exp to a whole number value.
     *      For example, truncate(Exp{mantissa: 15 * expScale}) = 15
     */
    function truncate(Exp memory exp) pure internal returns (uint) {
        // Note: We are not using careful math here as we're performing a division that cannot fail
        return exp.mantissa / expScale;
    }

    /**
     * @dev Checks if first Exp is less than second Exp.
     */
    function lessThanExp(Exp memory left, Exp memory right) pure internal returns (bool) {
        return left.mantissa < right.mantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @dev Checks if left Exp <= right Exp.
     */
    function lessThanOrEqualExp(Exp memory left, Exp memory right) pure internal returns (bool) {
        return left.mantissa <= right.mantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @dev Checks if left Exp > right Exp.
     */
    function greaterThanExp(Exp memory left, Exp memory right) pure internal returns (bool) {
        return left.mantissa > right.mantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @dev returns true if Exp is exactly zero
     */
    function isZeroExp(Exp memory value) pure internal returns (bool) {
        return value.mantissa == 0;
    }

    function safe224(uint n, string memory errorMessage) pure internal returns (uint224) {
        require(n < 2**224, errorMessage);
        return uint224(n);
    }

    function safe32(uint n, string memory errorMessage) pure internal returns (uint32) {
        require(n < 2**32, errorMessage);
        return uint32(n);
    }

    function add_(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (Exp memory) {
        return Exp({mantissa: add_(a.mantissa, b.mantissa)});
    }

    function add_(Double memory a, Double memory b) pure internal returns (Double memory) {
        return Double({mantissa: add_(a.mantissa, b.mantissa)});
    }

    function add_(uint a, uint b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return add_(a, b, "addition overflow");
    }

    function add_(uint a, uint b, string memory errorMessage) pure internal returns (uint) {
        uint c = a + b;
        require(c >= a, errorMessage);
        return c;
    }

    function sub_(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (Exp memory) {
        return Exp({mantissa: sub_(a.mantissa, b.mantissa)});
    }

    function sub_(Double memory a, Double memory b) pure internal returns (Double memory) {
        return Double({mantissa: sub_(a.mantissa, b.mantissa)});
    }

    function sub_(uint a, uint b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return sub_(a, b, "subtraction underflow");
    }

    function sub_(uint a, uint b, string memory errorMessage) pure internal returns (uint) {
        require(b <= a, errorMessage);
        return a - b;
    }

    function mul_(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (Exp memory) {
        return Exp({mantissa: mul_(a.mantissa, b.mantissa) / expScale});
    }

    function mul_(Exp memory a, uint b) pure internal returns (Exp memory) {
        return Exp({mantissa: mul_(a.mantissa, b)});
    }

    function mul_(uint a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return mul_(a, b.mantissa) / expScale;
    }

    function mul_(Double memory a, Double memory b) pure internal returns (Double memory) {
        return Double({mantissa: mul_(a.mantissa, b.mantissa) / doubleScale});
    }

    function mul_(Double memory a, uint b) pure internal returns (Double memory) {
        return Double({mantissa: mul_(a.mantissa, b)});
    }

    function mul_(uint a, Double memory b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return mul_(a, b.mantissa) / doubleScale;
    }

    function mul_(uint a, uint b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return mul_(a, b, "multiplication overflow");
    }

    function mul_(uint a, uint b, string memory errorMessage) pure internal returns (uint) {
        if (a == 0 || b == 0) {
            return 0;
        }
        uint c = a * b;
        require(c / a == b, errorMessage);
        return c;
    }

    function div_(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (Exp memory) {
        return Exp({mantissa: div_(mul_(a.mantissa, expScale), b.mantissa)});
    }

    function div_(Exp memory a, uint b) pure internal returns (Exp memory) {
        return Exp({mantissa: div_(a.mantissa, b)});
    }

    function div_(uint a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return div_(mul_(a, expScale), b.mantissa);
    }

    function div_(Double memory a, Double memory b) pure internal returns (Double memory) {
        return Double({mantissa: div_(mul_(a.mantissa, doubleScale), b.mantissa)});
    }

    function div_(Double memory a, uint b) pure internal returns (Double memory) {
        return Double({mantissa: div_(a.mantissa, b)});
    }

    function div_(uint a, Double memory b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return div_(mul_(a, doubleScale), b.mantissa);
    }

    function div_(uint a, uint b) pure internal returns (uint) {
        return div_(a, b, "divide by zero");
    }

    function div_(uint a, uint b, string memory errorMessage) pure internal returns (uint) {
        require(b > 0, errorMessage);
        return a / b;
    }

    function fraction(uint a, uint b) pure internal returns (Double memory) {
        return Double({mantissa: div_(mul_(a, doubleScale), b)});
    }
}

// === FILE: contracts/InterestRateModel.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

/**
  * @title Compound's InterestRateModel Interface
  * @author Compound
  */
contract InterestRateModel {
    /// @notice Indicator that this is an InterestRateModel contract (for inspection)
    bool public constant isInterestRateModel = true;

    /**
      * @notice Calculates the current borrow interest rate per block
      * @param cash The total amount of cash the market has
      * @param borrows The total amount of borrows the market has outstanding
      * @param reserves The total amnount of reserves the market has
      * @return The borrow rate per block (as a percentage, and scaled by 1e18)
      */
    function getBorrowRate(uint cash, uint borrows, uint reserves) external view returns (uint);

    /**
      * @notice Calculates the current supply interest rate per block
      * @param cash The total amount of cash the market has
      * @param borrows The total amount of borrows the market has outstanding
      * @param reserves The total amnount of reserves the market has
      * @param reserveFactorMantissa The current reserve factor the market has
      * @return The supply rate per block (as a percentage, and scaled by 1e18)
      */
    function getSupplyRate(uint cash, uint borrows, uint reserves, uint reserveFactorMantissa) external view returns (uint);

}

// === FILE: contracts/PriceOracle.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

import "./CToken.sol";

contract PriceOracle {
    /// @notice Indicator that this is a PriceOracle contract (for inspection)
    bool public constant isPriceOracle = true;

    /**
      * @notice Get the underlying price of a cToken asset
      * @param cToken The cToken to get the underlying price of
      * @return The underlying asset price mantissa (scaled by 1e18).
      *  Zero means the price is unavailable.
      */
    function getUnderlyingPrice(CToken cToken) external view returns (uint);
}

// === FILE: contracts/Unitroller.sol ===
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;

import "./ErrorReporter.sol";
import "./ComptrollerStorage.sol";
/**
 * @title ComptrollerCore
 * @dev Storage for the comptroller is at this address, while execution is delegated to the `comptrollerImplementation`.
 * CTokens should reference this contract as their comptroller.
 */
contract Unitroller is UnitrollerAdminStorage, ComptrollerErrorReporter {

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingComptrollerImplementation is changed
      */
    event NewPendingImplementation(address oldPendingImplementation, address newPendingImplementation);

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingComptrollerImplementation is accepted, which means comptroller implementation is updated
      */
    event NewImplementation(address oldImplementation, address newImplementation);

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingAdmin is changed
      */
    event NewPendingAdmin(address oldPendingAdmin, address newPendingAdmin);

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingAdmin is accepted, which means admin is updated
      */
    event NewAdmin(address oldAdmin, address newAdmin);

    constructor() public {
        // Set admin to caller
        admin = msg.sender;
    }

    /*** Admin Functions ***/
    function _setPendingImplementation(address newPendingImplementation) public returns (uint) {

        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        address oldPendingImplementation = pendingComptrollerImplementation;

        pendingComptrollerImplementation = newPendingImplementation;

        emit NewPendingImplementation(oldPendingImplementation, pendingComptrollerImplementation);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
    * @notice Accepts new implementation of comptroller. msg.sender must be pendingImplementation
    * @dev Admin function for new implementation to accept it's role as implementation
    * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
    */
    function _acceptImplementation() public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is pendingImplementation and pendingImplementation ≠ address(0)
        if (msg.sender != pendingComptrollerImplementation || pendingComptrollerImplementation == address(0)) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.ACCEPT_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_ADDRESS_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current values for inclusion in log
        address oldImplementation = comptrollerImplementation;
        address oldPendingImplementation = pendingComptrollerImplementation;

        comptrollerImplementation = pendingComptrollerImplementation;

        pendingComptrollerImplementation = address(0);

        emit NewImplementation(oldImplementation, comptrollerImplementation);
        emit NewPendingImplementation(oldPendingImplementation, pendingComptrollerImplementation);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }


    /**
      * @notice Begins transfer of admin rights. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @dev Admin function to begin change of admin. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @param newPendingAdmin New pending admin.
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setPendingAdmin(address newPendingAdmin) public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller = admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current value, if any, for inclusion in log
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store pendingAdmin with value newPendingAdmin
        pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin;

        // Emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin)
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Accepts transfer of admin rights. msg.sender must be pendingAdmin
      * @dev Admin function for pending admin to accept role and update admin
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _acceptAdmin() public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is pendingAdmin and pendingAdmin ≠ address(0)
        if (msg.sender != pendingAdmin || msg.sender == address(0)) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current values for inclusion in log
        address oldAdmin = admin;
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store admin with value pendingAdmin
        admin = pendingAdmin;

        // Clear the pending value
        pendingAdmin = address(0);

        emit NewAdmin(oldAdmin, admin);
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, pendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Delegates execution to an implementation contract.
     * It returns to the external caller whatever the implementation returns
     * or forwards reverts.
     */
    function () payable external {
        // delegate all other functions to current implementation
        (bool success, ) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data);

        assembly {
              let free_mem_ptr := mload(0x40)
              returndatacopy(free_mem_ptr, 0, returndatasize)

              switch success
              case 0 { revert(free_mem_ptr, returndatasize) }
              default { return(free_mem_ptr, returndatasize) }
        }
    }
}

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.