VegaSec / Solidity scan report

Unitroller.sol

VSS-20261004-ZTOB8VVZ · generated Oct 4, 2026, 12:37 AM

AVOID-style triage84 findings1 highEtherscan verified4 warningssemgrep 1.163.0

Verdict is derived from severity counts via the same deterministic formula every VegaSec report uses. Unitroller.sol was scanned from etherscan verified. This is static-analysis triage, not a certification or formal audit attestation.

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Solidity evidence report

84 audit findings

critical: 0high: 1medium: 23low: 8informational: 52

Severity distribution

Executive summary

  • 84 findings surfaced (0 critical, 1 high, 23 medium, 8 low, 52 informational).
  • HIGH · Unitroller.fallback() (Unitroller.sol#2586-2599) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id (fallback) — exploitability medium.
  • Automated static analysis only. A human operator review has not been attached to this report.

Warnings (4)

  • · Unmapped detector slither:erc20-interface — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:dead-code — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:unimplemented-functions — classified as 'other'
  • · Unmapped detector slither:unindexed-event-address — classified as 'other'
semgrep 1.163.0
  • highAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Unitroller.fallback() (Unitroller.sol#2586-2599) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2586-2599 · fallback
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:controlled-delegatecall

    Evidence

    Unitroller.fallback() (Unitroller.sol#2586-2599) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id - (success,None) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (Unitroller.sol#2588)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CarefulMath.mulUInt(uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#311-323) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:311-323 · mulUInt
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CarefulMath.mulUInt(uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#311-323) uses a dangerous strict equality: - a == 0 (Unitroller.sol#312)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CarefulMath.divUInt(uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#328-334) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:328-334 · divUInt
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CarefulMath.divUInt(uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#328-334) uses a dangerous strict equality: - b == 0 (Unitroller.sol#329)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#515-535) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:515-535 · mulExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    Exponential.mulExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#515-535) uses a dangerous strict equality: - assert(bool)(err2 == MathError.NO_ERROR) (Unitroller.sol#532)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    EIP20NonStandardInterface (Unitroller.sol#666-728) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Unitr

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:666-728 · EIP20NonStandardInterface
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:erc20-interface

    Evidence

    EIP20NonStandardInterface (Unitroller.sol#666-728) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#706)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.constructor(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1000-1028) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1000-1028 · constructor
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.constructor(ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1000-1028) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),Setting interest rate model failed) (Unitroller.sol#1023)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.transfer(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1107-1109) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1107-1109 · transfer
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.transfer(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1107-1109) uses a dangerous strict equality: - transferTokens(msg.sender,msg.sender,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (Unitroller.sol#1108)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1118-1120) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1118-1120 · transferFrom
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1118-1120) uses a dangerous strict equality: - transferTokens(msg.sender,src,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (Unitroller.sol#1119)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (Unitroller.sol#1162-1167) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1162-1167 · balanceOfUnderlying
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (Unitroller.sol#1162-1167) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool)(mErr == MathError.NO_ERROR) (Unitroller.sol#1165)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.supplyRatePerBlock() (Unitroller.sol#1217-1241) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1217-1241 · supplyRatePerBlock
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.supplyRatePerBlock() (Unitroller.sol#1217-1241) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(e1 == MathError.NO_ERROR,supplyRatePerBlock: calculating underlying failed) (Unitroller.sol#1229)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (Unitroller.sol#1267-1271) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1267-1271 · borrowBalanceStored
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (Unitroller.sol#1267-1271) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowBalanceStored: borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed) (Unitroller.sol#1269)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.exchangeRateStored() (Unitroller.sol#1324-1328) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1324-1328 · exchangeRateStored
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.exchangeRateStored() (Unitroller.sol#1324-1328) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,exchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failed) (Unitroller.sol#1326)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (Unitroller.sol#1335-1364) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1335-1364 · exchangeRateStoredInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (Unitroller.sol#1335-1364) uses a dangerous strict equality: - totalSupply == 0 (Unitroller.sol#1336)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.accrueInterest() (Unitroller.sol#1394-1458) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1394-1458 · accrueInterest
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.accrueInterest() (Unitroller.sol#1394-1458) uses a dangerous strict equality: - assert(bool)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR) (Unitroller.sol#1409)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.accrueInterest().vars (Unitroller.sol#1395) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1395 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.accrueInterest().vars (Unitroller.sol#1395) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1504) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1504 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1504) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1621-1717 · redeemFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(vars.err == Error.NO_ERROR,redeem transfer out failed) (Unitroller.sol#1703)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1621-1717 · redeemFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-no-eth

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this),redeemer,vars.redeemTokens) (Unitroller.sol#1661) State variables written after the call(s): - totalSupply = vars.totalSupplyNew (Unitroller.sol#1706) CToken.totalSupply (Unitroller.sol#897) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (Unitroller.sol#1335-1364) - CToken.supplyRatePerBlock() (Unitroller.sol#1217-1241) - CToken.totalSupply (Unitroller.sol#897)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1624) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1624 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1624) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1747-1812) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1747-1812 · borrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1747-1812) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(vars.err == Error.NO_ERROR,borrow transfer out failed) (Unitroller.sol#1798)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1764) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1764 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1764) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1862-1939) uses a dangerous strict equality:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1862-1939 · repayBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:incorrect-equality

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1862-1939) uses a dangerous strict equality: - require(bool,string)(vars.err == Error.NO_ERROR,repay borrow transfer in failed) (Unitroller.sol#1925)

    Exploitability notes

    Low-severity finding even at higher confidence; unlikely to be directly exploitable.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumUninitializedConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1874) is a local variable never initialized

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1874 · vars
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:uninitialized-local

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256).vars (Unitroller.sol#1874) is a local variable never initialized

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Initialize storage variables explicitly in the constructor/initializer; for upgradeable contracts call the initializer through a tested pattern.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • mediumReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1949-1964):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1949-1964 · liquidateBorrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-no-eth

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1949-1964): External calls: - error = cTokenCollateral.accrueInterest() (Unitroller.sol#1956) - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,cTokenCollateral) (Unitroller.sol#1963) - allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this),payer,borrower,repayAmount) (Unitroller.sol#1864) - allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,repayAmount) (Unitroller.sol#1977) - seizeError = cTokenCollateral.seize(liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (Unitroller.sol#2025) - comptroller.liquidateBorrowVerify(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,repayAmount,seizeTokens) (Unitroller.sol#2032) - comptroller.repayBorrowVerify(address(this),payer,borrower,vars.repayAmount,vars.borrowerIndex) (Unitroller.sol#1936) State variables written after the call(s): - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,cTokenCollateral) (Unitroller.sol#1963) - totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew (Unitroller.sol#1930) CToken.totalBorrows (Unitroller.sol#887) can be used in cross function reentrancies: - CToken.accrueInterest() (Unitroller.sol#1394-1458) - CToken.borrowRatePerBlock() (Unitroller.sol#1207-1211) - CToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (Unitroller.sol#1335-1364) - CToken.supplyRatePerBlock() (Unitroller.sol#1217-1241) - CToken.totalBorrows (Unitroller.sol#887)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1492-1569):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1492-1569 · mintFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1492-1569): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.mintAllowed(address(this),minter,mintAmount) (Unitroller.sol#1494) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.MINT_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (Unitroller.sol#1501) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1538) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(vars.err,FailureInfo.MINT_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE) (Unitroller.sol#1509) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1523) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(vars.err,FailureInfo.MINT_TRANSFER_IN_FAILED) (Unitroller.sol#1554) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.MINT_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (Unitroller.sol#1496) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1533) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.MINT_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1518) - Mint(minter,mintAmount,vars.mintTokens) (Unitroller.sol#1562) - Transfer(address(this),minter,vars.mintTokens) (Unitroller.sol#1563)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1621-1717 · redeemFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this),redeemer,vars.redeemTokens) (Unitroller.sol#1661) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1683) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1678) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,FailureInfo.REDEEM_TRANSFER_OUT_NOT_POSSIBLE) (Unitroller.sol#1688) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.REDEEM_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (Unitroller.sol#1663) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.REDEEM_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (Unitroller.sol#1668) - Redeem(redeemer,vars.redeemAmount,vars.redeemTokens) (Unitroller.sol#1711) - Transfer(redeemer,address(this),vars.redeemTokens) (Unitroller.sol#1710)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1747-1812):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1747-1812 · borrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1747-1812): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.borrowAllowed(address(this),borrower,borrowAmount) (Unitroller.sol#1749) Event emitted after the call(s): - Borrow(borrower,borrowAmount,vars.accountBorrowsNew,vars.totalBorrowsNew) (Unitroller.sol#1806) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (Unitroller.sol#1756) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,FailureInfo.BORROW_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE) (Unitroller.sol#1761) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1773) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1778) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1783) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (Unitroller.sol#1751)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1862-1939):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1862-1939 · repayBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1862-1939): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this),payer,borrower,repayAmount) (Unitroller.sol#1864) Event emitted after the call(s): - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,allowed) (Unitroller.sol#1866) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1882) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1905) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(vars.err,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE) (Unitroller.sol#1895) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),0) (Unitroller.sol#193) - fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK) (Unitroller.sol#1871) - Failure(uint256(err),uint256(info),opaqueError) (Unitroller.sol#202) - failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR,FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,uint256(vars.mathErr)) (Unitroller.sol#1910) - RepayBorrow(payer,borrower,vars.repayAmount,vars.accountBorrowsNew,vars.totalBorrowsNew) (Unitroller.sol#1933)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowReentrancyConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1975-2035):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1975-2035 · liquidateBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:reentrancy-events

    Evidence

    Reentrancy in CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1975-2035): External calls: - allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this),address(cTokenCollateral),liquidator,borrower,repayAmount) (Unitroller.sol#1977) - repayBorrowError = repayBorrowFresh(liquidator,borrower,repayAmount) (Unitroller.sol#2019) - allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this),payer,borrower,repayAmount) (Unitroller.sol#1864) - comptroller.repayBorrowVerify(address(this),payer,borrower,vars.repayAmount,vars.borrowerIndex) (Unitroller.sol#1936) - seizeError = cTokenCollateral.seize(liquidator,borrower,seizeTokens) (Unitroller.sol#2025) Event emitted after the call(s): - LiquidateBorrow(liquidator,borrower,repayAmount,address(cTokenCollateral),seizeTokens) (Unitroller.sol#2029)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern. State writes must happen before external calls, and consider OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard for high-risk entry points.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    CToken._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (Unitroller.sol#2105) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2105 · newPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    CToken._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (Unitroller.sol#2105) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin (Unitroller.sol#2115)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address).newPendingImplementation (Unitroller.sol#2487) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2487 · newPendingImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address).newPendingImplementation (Unitroller.sol#2487) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingComptrollerImplementation = newPendingImplementation (Unitroller.sol#2495)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • lowAccess controlConfidence: mediumExploitability: mediumDetector: slither

    Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (Unitroller.sol#2536) lacks a zero-check on :

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2536 · newPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:missing-zero-check

    Evidence

    Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address).newPendingAdmin (Unitroller.sol#2536) lacks a zero-check on : - pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin (Unitroller.sol#2546)

    Exploitability notes

    Medium-confidence detection; manual review required before relying on the finding either way.

    Remediation

    Gate privileged functions behind a tested role/ownership pattern (e.g. OpenZeppelin Ownable/AccessControl). Avoid tx.origin for authorization.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Exploitability depends on deployment context, permissions, balances, and reachable preconditions.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Version constraint ^0.5.8 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:3 · ^0.5.8
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:solc-version

    Evidence

    Version constraint ^0.5.8 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html) - AbiReencodingHeadOverflowWithStaticArrayCleanup - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage - NestedCalldataArrayAbiReencodingSizeValidation - ABIDecodeTwoDimensionalArrayMemory - KeccakCaching - EmptyByteArrayCopy - DynamicArrayCleanup - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck - TupleAssignmentMultiStackSlotComponents - MemoryArrayCreationOverflow - privateCanBeOverridden - YulOptimizerRedundantAssignmentBreakContinue0.5 - ABIEncoderV2CalldataStructsWithStaticallySizedAndDynamicallyEncodedMembers - SignedArrayStorageCopy - ABIEncoderV2StorageArrayWithMultiSlotElement - DynamicConstructorArgumentsClippedABIV2. It is used by: - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#3) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#210) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#288) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#376) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#597) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#659) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#732) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#767) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#799) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#2373) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#2393) - ^0.5.8 (Unitroller.sol#2450)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    ComptrollerErrorReporter.failOpaque(ComptrollerErrorReporter.Error,ComptrollerErrorReporter.FailureInfo,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#68-72) is never used and should

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:68-72 · failOpaque
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    ComptrollerErrorReporter.failOpaque(ComptrollerErrorReporter.Error,ComptrollerErrorReporter.FailureInfo,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#68-72) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant Exponential.expScale (Unitroller.sol#387) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:387 · expScale
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant Exponential.expScale (Unitroller.sol#387) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant Exponential.halfExpScale (Unitroller.sol#388) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:388 · halfExpScale
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant Exponential.halfExpScale (Unitroller.sol#388) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant Exponential.mantissaOne (Unitroller.sol#389) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:389 · mantissaOne
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant Exponential.mantissaOne (Unitroller.sol#389) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.addExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#417-421) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:417-421 · addExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.addExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#417-421) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divScalar(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#471-478) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:471-478 · divScalar
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.divScalar(Exponential.Exp,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#471-478) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#503-510) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:503-510 · divScalarByExpTruncate
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.divScalarByExpTruncate(uint256,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#503-510) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.mulExp(uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#540-542) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:540-542 · mulExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.mulExp(uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#540-542) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.divExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#560-562) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:560-562 · divExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.divExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#560-562) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.lessThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#576-578) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:576-578 · lessThanExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.lessThanExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#576-578) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.lessThanOrEqualExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#583-585) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:583-585 · lessThanOrEqualExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.lessThanOrEqualExp(Exponential.Exp,Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#583-585) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Exponential.isZeroExp(Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#590-592) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:590-592 · isZeroExp
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    Exponential.isZeroExp(Exponential.Exp) (Unitroller.sol#590-592) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken (Unitroller.sol#813-2369) does not implement functions:

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:813-2369 · CToken
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unimplemented-functions

    Evidence

    CToken (Unitroller.sol#813-2369) does not implement functions: - CToken.checkTransferIn(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#2354) - CToken.doTransferIn(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#2361) - CToken.doTransferOut(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#2368) - CToken.getCashPrior() (Unitroller.sol#2348)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant CToken.borrowRateMaxMantissa (Unitroller.sol#837) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:837 · borrowRateMaxMantissa
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant CToken.borrowRateMaxMantissa (Unitroller.sol#837) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Constant CToken.reserveFactorMaxMantissa (Unitroller.sol#842) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:842 · reserveFactorMaxMantissa
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Constant CToken.reserveFactorMaxMantissa (Unitroller.sol#842) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.Mint(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#935) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:935 · Mint
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.Mint(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#935) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.Redeem(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#940) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:940 · Redeem
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.Redeem(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#940) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.Borrow(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#945) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:945 · Borrow
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.Borrow(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#945) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.RepayBorrow(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#950) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:950 · RepayBorrow
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.RepayBorrow(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#950) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.LiquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#955) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:955 · LiquidateBorrow
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.LiquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#955) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#963) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:963 · NewPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#963) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.NewAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#968) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:968 · NewAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.NewAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#968) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event CToken.ReservesReduced(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#988) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:988 · ReservesReduced
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event CToken.ReservesReduced(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#988) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.mintInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1466-1474) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1466-1474 · mintInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.mintInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1466-1474) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1492-1569) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1492-1569 · mintFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1492-1569) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1577-1585) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1577-1585 · redeemInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1577-1585) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1593-1601) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1593-1601 · redeemUnderlyingInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1593-1601) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1621-1717 · redeemFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.redeemFresh(address,uint256,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1621-1717) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1724-1732) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1724-1732 · borrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1724-1732) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1747-1812) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1747-1812 · borrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.borrowFresh(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1747-1812) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1819-1827) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1819-1827 · repayBorrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowInternal(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1819-1827) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1835-1843) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1835-1843 · repayBorrowBehalfInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1835-1843) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1862-1939) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1862-1939 · repayBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (Unitroller.sol#1862-1939) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1949-1964) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1949-1964 · liquidateBorrowInternal
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1949-1964) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: mediumExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1975-2035) is never used and should be removed

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:1975-2035 · liquidateBorrowFresh
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:dead-code

    Evidence

    CToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,CToken) (Unitroller.sol#1975-2035) is never used and should be removed

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • Medium analyzer confidence; manual review should confirm the code path and preconditions.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setPendingAdmin(address) (Unitroller.sol#2105-2121) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2105-2121 · _setPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setPendingAdmin(address) (Unitroller.sol#2105-2121) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._acceptAdmin() (Unitroller.sol#2128-2148) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2128-2148 · _acceptAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._acceptAdmin() (Unitroller.sol#2128-2148) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (Unitroller.sol#2155-2172) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2155-2172 · _setComptroller
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface) (Unitroller.sol#2155-2172) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setReserveFactor(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#2179-2187) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2179-2187 · _setReserveFactor
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setReserveFactor(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#2179-2187) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._reduceReserves(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#2224-2232) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2224-2232 · _reduceReserves
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._reduceReserves(uint256) (Unitroller.sol#2224-2232) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function CToken._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (Unitroller.sol#2294-2302) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2294-2302 · _setInterestRateModel
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function CToken._setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel) (Unitroller.sol#2294-2302) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingImplementation(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2464) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2464 · NewPendingImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingImplementation(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2464) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewImplementation(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2469) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2469 · NewImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewImplementation(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2469) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2474) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2474 · NewPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewPendingAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2474) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalOtherConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Event Unitroller.NewAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2479) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2479 · NewAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:unindexed-event-address

    Evidence

    Event Unitroller.NewAdmin(address,address) (Unitroller.sol#2479) has address parameters but no indexed parameters

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Review the detector output against the source manually; if exploitable, design a fix and add a regression test before deploying.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address) (Unitroller.sol#2487-2500) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2487-2500 · _setPendingImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._setPendingImplementation(address) (Unitroller.sol#2487-2500) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._acceptImplementation() (Unitroller.sol#2507-2525) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2507-2525 · _acceptImplementation
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._acceptImplementation() (Unitroller.sol#2507-2525) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address) (Unitroller.sol#2536-2552) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2536-2552 · _setPendingAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._setPendingAdmin(address) (Unitroller.sol#2536-2552) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Function Unitroller._acceptAdmin() (Unitroller.sol#2559-2579) is not in mixedCase

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2559-2579 · _acceptAdmin
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:naming-convention

    Evidence

    Function Unitroller._acceptAdmin() (Unitroller.sol#2559-2579) is not in mixedCase

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalLogicConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Unitroller.fallback() (Unitroller.sol#2586-2599) uses assembly

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2586-2599 · fallback
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:assembly

    Evidence

    Unitroller.fallback() (Unitroller.sol#2586-2599) uses assembly - INLINE ASM (Unitroller.sol#2591-2598)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Re-derive the business rule by hand, write a property-based test that fails on the current path, and only then fix the implementation.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.
  • informationalUnchecked callConfidence: highExploitability: lowDetector: slither

    Low level call in Unitroller.fallback() (Unitroller.sol#2586-2599):

    Affected location
    Unitroller.sol:2586-2599 · fallback
    Detector / source
    slither · slither:low-level-calls

    Evidence

    Low level call in Unitroller.fallback() (Unitroller.sol#2586-2599): - (success,None) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (Unitroller.sol#2588)

    Exploitability notes

    Informational signal; not directly exploitable without additional context.

    Remediation

    Check the boolean return of low-level call/delegatecall/send and revert on failure with a descriptive reason string.

    Limitations

    • High analyzer confidence, still requires source-level review before promotion.
    • Direct exploitability is not established; keep the signal as a remediation/checklist item.
    • Analyzer output did not include a source excerpt for this finding.

Limitations

  • VegaSec runs static analysis only. Findings can include false positives, miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover, and never replace manual auditor judgement.
  • Scan ran slither and semgrep against a single sandboxed copy of the source. Multi-file dependency analysis beyond what slither resolves automatically is out of scope.
  • Some detectors emitted warnings (see `warnings`); their output was still ingested but should be read with extra care.
  • This report is not a certification, audit attestation, or financial advice.

Exploit reasoning

Reference-grade reasoning tied to evidence

  • 47714bc3f62d1dc1657d68c427f75a5c8f7159e7b1453344d0278f8ed4c93fb0 · access-controlhigh
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Sensitive function lacks an explicit caller restriction or relies on tx.origin
    • Caller controls the path that reaches the function

    Action

    Attacker calls the unprotected function from an attacker-controlled address, bypassing the intended restriction.

    Impact

    Unauthorized state mutation: ownership transfer, parameter changes, balance writes, or admin-only operations executed by a non-admin.

    False-positive caveats

    • The function may be intentionally callable by anyone (e.g. a public mint with a price guard).
    • Access control may live in a modifier the analyzer did not parse.

    Remediation checklist

    • Replace tx.origin checks with msg.sender against a role registry.
    • Add a `onlyRole(...)` or equivalent modifier from a vetted access control library.
    • Add unit tests that assert non-admin callers revert.
  • c58aa21c96043e1138a136fa5121c5b0e20e5fbf2b345eeae5a37877d9af6cfc · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 621c896ac1a4a55914cfb05d283c1959f768894e80de14c4ff027955bc971af2 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 5d3e639e66230f1dc4c819d7a2b1784a3331c76d6068b0a08c56443012711a7c · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 470160b8998b07d1718bb884be18143453560a4112acfbe54e7b9d91375c4801 · othermedium

    Not determined

    Question: Is this finding exploitable in this specific contract?

    Reason: Finding class is 'other'; no deterministic narrative is safe without operator review.

  • 0c39f7a11bd6b0730a69feece7c184d1404efe811ff8b8e1e6c8fd92a1a4a782 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 51424ac06037bf29dbbdc3805d99e57763fabc19c68c1b5085fd374aa822d0a8 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 466be0c856872b54b8bf12cc5d32bfa16020fae8a4b1d446ceede0062383e9d3 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • a5f5f07422ae14f74fc24263bff9ebf89fdf08d73dc74ff13eb399ec1b8c1a00 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 3a8b64ee09e7e8853bfc1fac1e3717507dc85b56256bc31ee870d1dc4cbac64e · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • ad74e062fc82f781ebcfcd418eb94fae3e8f63cc21568f192f707f06bf1dad64 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 7873f2c074712af7d64e6cad5efe85a06e900230c4200cc86923b336bd00aae9 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • e5cb00eadea83a14bccaadc8380b2c84749be92faee2e6c306a9f18e2accd6e7 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 21c8514a55dbfa5c0e1cd696d3a438fe48850b9f6b712bd614f0ea5fb98cc78a · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • 6ea66fb7f3767aa2397d0eef2bf80971a455e46b02ce8b0dd293fc1d85d152cd · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • 5aa49507ce252bdf2e518a43ba1ec0903ffcc22ec9a90ee9e05783f0b41fb2f2 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • d02fc4b8c5b0d6e0e2a9f88a480c88f0ba9bfdb10992c536aef1bf3628eb7736 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • d22b8033a04044e1fec23a78e74fa43e56c27e4480f5b03c6a05b8d63dda7648 · reentrancymedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
    • Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
    • No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function

    Action

    Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.

    Impact

    Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.

    False-positive caveats

    • The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
    • The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.

    Remediation checklist

    • Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
    • Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
    • Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.
  • 0e6013ae9f6b6aff463d84aa42918c7e5bdea7ca10adb933399a5c0e1e594918 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • e80f8eb2e0c36ec76685d7d4ad80d771d84d478b8f3443c8e69fa3e7e2d1873e · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • dfaba343324115e9f2167fca3e0f76ff12f0cbcd64908e7e12f014eb7eee39a3 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • d1c99438d1e1811698369b7ce050398d9192c922c66bc69aa650bc523d110930 · logicmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions are partial; exploit requires further evidence the analyzer did not produce.

    Preconditions

    • Application-specific invariant the analyzer flagged as possibly violated

    Action

    Operator review required to determine whether the flagged path is reachable and whether the impact materializes in this specific contract.

    Impact

    Depends on the specific invariant; impact assessment requires operator context.

    False-positive caveats

    • Logic flags are application-specific; the analyzer may have misread the intent.
    • The flagged code path may be unreachable in production.

    Remediation checklist

    • Operator should manually validate the invariant the analyzer flagged.
    • Add a unit test that exercises the suspected path.
  • e71d79a6f3c49afd6c2f7ac29fb029ab8711b3280728ee65b2bd9cf38595ddf2 · uninitializedmedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • Storage variable used before being set in the constructor or initialize() function
    • Upgradeable contract whose initialize() was not called

    Action

    Attacker calls initialize() (or relies on the default zero value) to set themselves as owner / admin.

    Impact

    Full takeover of the proxy or unbounded admin power.

    False-positive caveats

    • The contract may be deployed with the initializer invoked atomically by a factory.
    • Default zero values may be intentional for the variable's semantics.

    Remediation checklist

    • Require initialize() to be called exactly once via OpenZeppelin Initializable.
    • Disable initializers in the implementation constructor for upgradeable proxies.
    • Add a deployment test that fails if initialize() is callable post-deployment.
  • c2b2edf6cd116438bd83e93bf79908b5753d5a4c4954b9035f0028abfd4eeff7 · reentrancymedium
    Confidence: low

    Conditions point at the exploit but at least one precondition needs operator confirmation.

    Preconditions

    • External call to an untrusted address before the contract's own state is updated
    • Contract or callback path reachable from the external caller
    • No nonReentrant guard or equivalent on the entry-point function

    Action

    Attacker contract receives control during the external call and re-enters the original function before the original state write completes, repeating the state-changing side effect.

    Impact

    Duplicated withdrawals, double-spend on accounting balances, or out-of-order updates to invariants the function relies on.

    False-positive caveats

    • The external call may be to a known, trusted contract whose behavior is provable.
    • The function may be guarded indirectly by a flag or external lock not visible to the analyzer.

    Remediation checklist

    • Apply checks-effects-interactions: update internal state before any external call.
    • Add a nonReentrant guard on the entry-point function.
    • Where feasible, pull-payment instead of push-payment on user balances.

Audit pipeline

Audit cockpit

Honest stage-by-stage view of what VegaSec ran against this contract. Automated stages do not replace a human operator review.

Passed: 3Partial: 5Blocked: 1
  1. Audit intake

    Passed320ms replay12:37 AM

    Normalize the submitted contract target and confirm it can enter the Solidity audit lane.

    Next: Acquire verified source or scan the pasted Solidity source.

  2. Source acquisition

    Passed1.4s replay12:37 AM

    Resolve pasted source or verified explorer source without treating malformed input as demo data.

    Next: Validate the analyzer toolchain against the acquired source.

  3. Toolchain validation

    Partial2.3s replay12:37 AM

    Confirm the configured static analyzers can run and produce parseable output.

    Next: Run static analysis and capture raw detector evidence.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  4. Static analysis

    Partial84 findings8.8s replay12:37 AM

    Run static analyzers against the sandboxed source and collect raw detector evidence.

    Next: Normalize detector output into one deduped finding set.

    • One or more analyzers emitted warnings; report findings remain usable but should be read with limitations.
  5. Finding normalization

    Passed84 findings1.1s replay12:37 AM

    Dedupe detectors, classify vulnerability classes and compute severity-weighted risk.

    Next: Review exploitability conservatively against confidence and limitations.

  6. Exploitability review

    Partial84 findings1.9s replay12:37 AM

    Frame automated findings with conservative exploitability and limitation notes.

    Next: Draft remediation notes from the normalized evidence.

    • Automated exploitability review is conservative and does not replace a manual exploitability assessment.
  7. Remediation draft

    Partial84 findings1.5s replay12:37 AM

    Prepare remediation-oriented evidence for the shareable report artifact.

    Next: Attach an operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • Remediation notes are generated from detector evidence and require project-specific engineering review.
  8. Operator review

    Blocked0ms replay12:37 AM

    Record whether a human operator artifact exists before buyer escalation.

    Next: Attach a real operator review artifact before claiming human review.

    • No operator review artifact is attached to this automated scan.
    • Human operator review has not been attached to this automated scan yet.
  9. Finalization

    Partial84 findings620ms replay12:37 AM

    Publish the automated report artifact or explain why the scan failed closed.

    Next: Share the report with explicit limitations and review state.

    Artifact: Automated Solidity report · solidity-2f746d702f766567

    • Final report is an automated static-analysis artifact; no operator review artifact is attached.

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Score, confidence, ranking: four moving parts, no hand-tuning.

Generated Oct 4, 2026, 12:37 AM · Solidity · Unitroller.sol

Score bands

  • 0-19

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    Multiple high or critical findings, low source confidence, or unverified context. Public action should pause until a Private Review or a re-scan with better evidence.

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    Notable findings or thin evidence. Worth a Private Review before relying on the artifact.

  • 50-69

    Watch

    Mixed signals: some evidence, some gaps. Re-scan after material changes to the target.

  • 70-89

    Clear surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings via static analysis. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

  • 90-100

    Strong surface (automated)

    No critical or high findings, verified source, and high source confidence. Not a safety claim: human review is still recommended for diligence work.

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Source provenance

Verified source via Etherscan

View on Etherscan ↗
Chain
ETHEREUM
Address
0x3d98…cd3b
Contract name
Unitroller
Compiler
v0.5.8+commit.23d335f2
License
-
EVM version
Default
Optimization
On · 200 runs
File count
1
Proxy implementation
0xbafe…b526

Provenance is the public-explorer metadata captured at scan time. It is not a re-verification of compilation; the analyzer ran against the source string as returned by the explorer.

Scanned source (104,213 chars)

// File: contracts/ErrorReporter.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;

contract ComptrollerErrorReporter {
    enum Error {
        NO_ERROR,
        UNAUTHORIZED,
        COMPTROLLER_MISMATCH,
        INSUFFICIENT_SHORTFALL,
        INSUFFICIENT_LIQUIDITY,
        INVALID_CLOSE_FACTOR,
        INVALID_COLLATERAL_FACTOR,
        INVALID_LIQUIDATION_INCENTIVE,
        MARKET_NOT_ENTERED,
        MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        MARKET_ALREADY_LISTED,
        MATH_ERROR,
        NONZERO_BORROW_BALANCE,
        PRICE_ERROR,
        REJECTION,
        SNAPSHOT_ERROR,
        TOO_MANY_ASSETS,
        TOO_MUCH_REPAY
    }

    enum FailureInfo {
        ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK,
        ACCEPT_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_ADDRESS_CHECK,
        EXIT_MARKET_BALANCE_OWED,
        EXIT_MARKET_REJECTION,
        SET_CLOSE_FACTOR_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_CLOSE_FACTOR_VALIDATION,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_NO_EXISTS,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_VALIDATION,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_WITHOUT_PRICE,
        SET_IMPLEMENTATION_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_LIQUIDATION_INCENTIVE_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_LIQUIDATION_INCENTIVE_VALIDATION,
        SET_MAX_ASSETS_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_PRICE_ORACLE_OWNER_CHECK,
        SUPPORT_MARKET_EXISTS,
        SUPPORT_MARKET_OWNER_CHECK,
        ZUNUSED
    }

    /**
      * @dev `error` corresponds to enum Error; `info` corresponds to enum FailureInfo, and `detail` is an arbitrary
      * contract-specific code that enables us to report opaque error codes from upgradeable contracts.
      **/
    event Failure(uint error, uint info, uint detail);

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting a known error from the money market or a non-upgradeable collaborator
      */
    function fail(Error err, FailureInfo info) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), 0);

        return uint(err);
    }

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting an opaque error from an upgradeable collaborator contract
      */
    function failOpaque(Error err, FailureInfo info, uint opaqueError) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), opaqueError);

        return uint(err);
    }
}

contract TokenErrorReporter {
    enum Error {
        NO_ERROR,
        UNAUTHORIZED,
        BAD_INPUT,
        COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        COMPTROLLER_CALCULATION_ERROR,
        INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_ERROR,
        INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR,
        INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED,
        INVALID_COLLATERAL_FACTOR,
        MATH_ERROR,
        MARKET_NOT_FRESH,
        MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_ALLOWANCE,
        TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE,
        TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH,
        TOKEN_TRANSFER_IN_FAILED,
        TOKEN_TRANSFER_OUT_FAILED
    }

    /*
     * Note: FailureInfo (but not Error) is kept in alphabetical order
     *       This is because FailureInfo grows significantly faster, and
     *       the order of Error has some meaning, while the order of FailureInfo
     *       is entirely arbitrary.
     */
    enum FailureInfo {
        ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_ACCUMULATED_INTEREST_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_BORROW_RATE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_BORROW_INDEX_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_BORROWS_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_RESERVES_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        ACCRUE_INTEREST_SIMPLE_INTEREST_FACTOR_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        BORROW_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE,
        BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        BORROW_MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_BORROW_INTEREST_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_COLLATERAL_INTEREST_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_COLLATERAL_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_UINT_MAX,
        LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_ZERO,
        LIQUIDATE_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        LIQUIDATE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER,
        LIQUIDATE_REPAY_BORROW_FRESH_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_INCREMENT_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_DECREMENT_FAILED,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER,
        LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_TOO_MUCH,
        MINT_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        MINT_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        MINT_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED,
        MINT_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        MINT_TRANSFER_IN_FAILED,
        MINT_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE,
        REDEEM_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REDEEM_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        REDEEM_EXCHANGE_TOKENS_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_EXCHANGE_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED,
        REDEEM_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        REDEEM_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REDEEM_TRANSFER_OUT_NOT_POSSIBLE,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_ADMIN_CHECK,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_FRESH_CHECK,
        REDUCE_RESERVES_VALIDATION,
        REPAY_BEHALF_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        REPAY_BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK,
        REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED,
        REPAY_BORROW_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_COLLATERAL_FACTOR_VALIDATION,
        SET_COMPTROLLER_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_FRESH_CHECK,
        SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_MAX_ASSETS_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_ORACLE_MARKET_NOT_LISTED,
        SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ADMIN_CHECK,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_FRESH_CHECK,
        SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_BOUNDS_CHECK,
        TRANSFER_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION,
        TRANSFER_NOT_ALLOWED,
        TRANSFER_NOT_ENOUGH,
        TRANSFER_TOO_MUCH
    }

    /**
      * @dev `error` corresponds to enum Error; `info` corresponds to enum FailureInfo, and `detail` is an arbitrary
      * contract-specific code that enables us to report opaque error codes from upgradeable contracts.
      **/
    event Failure(uint error, uint info, uint detail);

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting a known error from the money market or a non-upgradeable collaborator
      */
    function fail(Error err, FailureInfo info) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), 0);

        return uint(err);
    }

    /**
      * @dev use this when reporting an opaque error from an upgradeable collaborator contract
      */
    function failOpaque(Error err, FailureInfo info, uint opaqueError) internal returns (uint) {
        emit Failure(uint(err), uint(info), opaqueError);

        return uint(err);
    }
}

// File: contracts/ComptrollerInterface.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;

interface ComptrollerInterface {
    /**
     * @notice Marker function used for light validation when updating the comptroller of a market
     * @dev Implementations should simply return true.
     * @return true
     */
    function isComptroller() external view returns (bool);

    /*** Assets You Are In ***/

    function enterMarkets(address[] calldata cTokens) external returns (uint[] memory);
    function exitMarket(address cToken) external returns (uint);

    /*** Policy Hooks ***/

    function mintAllowed(address cToken, address minter, uint mintAmount) external returns (uint);
    function mintVerify(address cToken, address minter, uint mintAmount, uint mintTokens) external;

    function redeemAllowed(address cToken, address redeemer, uint redeemTokens) external returns (uint);
    function redeemVerify(address cToken, address redeemer, uint redeemAmount, uint redeemTokens) external;

    function borrowAllowed(address cToken, address borrower, uint borrowAmount) external returns (uint);
    function borrowVerify(address cToken, address borrower, uint borrowAmount) external;

    function repayBorrowAllowed(
        address cToken,
        address payer,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount) external returns (uint);
    function repayBorrowVerify(
        address cToken,
        address payer,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount,
        uint borrowerIndex) external;

    function liquidateBorrowAllowed(
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount) external returns (uint);
    function liquidateBorrowVerify(
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint repayAmount,
        uint seizeTokens) external;

    function seizeAllowed(
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint seizeTokens) external returns (uint);
    function seizeVerify(
        address cTokenCollateral,
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address liquidator,
        address borrower,
        uint seizeTokens) external;

    function transferAllowed(address cToken, address src, address dst, uint transferTokens) external returns (uint);
    function transferVerify(address cToken, address src, address dst, uint transferTokens) external;

    /*** Liquidity/Liquidation Calculations ***/

    function liquidateCalculateSeizeTokens(
        address cTokenBorrowed,
        address cTokenCollateral,
        uint repayAmount) external view returns (uint, uint);
}

// File: contracts/CarefulMath.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;

/**
  * @title Careful Math
  * @author Compound
  * @notice Derived from OpenZeppelin's SafeMath library
  *         https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/master/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol
  */
contract CarefulMath {

    /**
     * @dev Possible error codes that we can return
     */
    enum MathError {
        NO_ERROR,
        DIVISION_BY_ZERO,
        INTEGER_OVERFLOW,
        INTEGER_UNDERFLOW
    }

    /**
    * @dev Multiplies two numbers, returns an error on overflow.
    */
    function mulUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        if (a == 0) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, 0);
        }

        uint c = a * b;

        if (c / a != b) {
            return (MathError.INTEGER_OVERFLOW, 0);
        } else {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, c);
        }
    }

    /**
    * @dev Integer division of two numbers, truncating the quotient.
    */
    function divUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        if (b == 0) {
            return (MathError.DIVISION_BY_ZERO, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, a / b);
    }

    /**
    * @dev Subtracts two numbers, returns an error on overflow (i.e. if subtrahend is greater than minuend).
    */
    function subUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        if (b <= a) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, a - b);
        } else {
            return (MathError.INTEGER_UNDERFLOW, 0);
        }
    }

    /**
    * @dev Adds two numbers, returns an error on overflow.
    */
    function addUInt(uint a, uint b) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        uint c = a + b;

        if (c >= a) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, c);
        } else {
            return (MathError.INTEGER_OVERFLOW, 0);
        }
    }

    /**
    * @dev add a and b and then subtract c
    */
    function addThenSubUInt(uint a, uint b, uint c) internal pure returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err0, uint sum) = addUInt(a, b);

        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, 0);
        }

        return subUInt(sum, c);
    }
}

// File: contracts/Exponential.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;


/**
 * @title Exponential module for storing fixed-decision decimals
 * @author Compound
 * @notice Exp is a struct which stores decimals with a fixed precision of 18 decimal places.
 *         Thus, if we wanted to store the 5.1, mantissa would store 5.1e18. That is:
 *         `Exp({mantissa: 5100000000000000000})`.
 */
contract Exponential is CarefulMath {
    uint constant expScale = 1e18;
    uint constant halfExpScale = expScale/2;
    uint constant mantissaOne = expScale;

    struct Exp {
        uint mantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @dev Creates an exponential from numerator and denominator values.
     *      Note: Returns an error if (`num` * 10e18) > MAX_INT,
     *            or if `denom` is zero.
     */
    function getExp(uint num, uint denom) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err0, uint scaledNumerator) = mulUInt(num, expScale);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        (MathError err1, uint rational) = divUInt(scaledNumerator, denom);
        if (err1 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err1, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: rational}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Adds two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function addExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError error, uint result) = addUInt(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);

        return (error, Exp({mantissa: result}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Subtracts two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function subExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError error, uint result) = subUInt(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);

        return (error, Exp({mantissa: result}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiply an Exp by a scalar, returning a new Exp.
     */
    function mulScalar(Exp memory a, uint scalar) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err0, uint scaledMantissa) = mulUInt(a.mantissa, scalar);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: scaledMantissa}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiply an Exp by a scalar, then truncate to return an unsigned integer.
     */
    function mulScalarTruncate(Exp memory a, uint scalar) pure internal returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory product) = mulScalar(a, scalar);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, truncate(product));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiply an Exp by a scalar, truncate, then add an to an unsigned integer, returning an unsigned integer.
     */
    function mulScalarTruncateAddUInt(Exp memory a, uint scalar, uint addend) pure internal returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory product) = mulScalar(a, scalar);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, 0);
        }

        return addUInt(truncate(product), addend);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divide an Exp by a scalar, returning a new Exp.
     */
    function divScalar(Exp memory a, uint scalar) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err0, uint descaledMantissa) = divUInt(a.mantissa, scalar);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: descaledMantissa}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divide a scalar by an Exp, returning a new Exp.
     */
    function divScalarByExp(uint scalar, Exp memory divisor) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        /*
          We are doing this as:
          getExp(mulUInt(expScale, scalar), divisor.mantissa)

          How it works:
          Exp = a / b;
          Scalar = s;
          `s / (a / b)` = `b * s / a` and since for an Exp `a = mantissa, b = expScale`
        */
        (MathError err0, uint numerator) = mulUInt(expScale, scalar);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }
        return getExp(numerator, divisor.mantissa);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divide a scalar by an Exp, then truncate to return an unsigned integer.
     */
    function divScalarByExpTruncate(uint scalar, Exp memory divisor) pure internal returns (MathError, uint) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory fraction) = divScalarByExp(scalar, divisor);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, truncate(fraction));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiplies two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function mulExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {

        (MathError err0, uint doubleScaledProduct) = mulUInt(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);
        if (err0 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err0, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        // We add half the scale before dividing so that we get rounding instead of truncation.
        //  See "Listing 6" and text above it at https://accu.org/index.php/journals/1717
        // Without this change, a result like 6.6...e-19 will be truncated to 0 instead of being rounded to 1e-18.
        (MathError err1, uint doubleScaledProductWithHalfScale) = addUInt(halfExpScale, doubleScaledProduct);
        if (err1 != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err1, Exp({mantissa: 0}));
        }

        (MathError err2, uint product) = divUInt(doubleScaledProductWithHalfScale, expScale);
        // The only error `div` can return is MathError.DIVISION_BY_ZERO but we control `expScale` and it is not zero.
        assert(err2 == MathError.NO_ERROR);

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, Exp({mantissa: product}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiplies two exponentials given their mantissas, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function mulExp(uint a, uint b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        return mulExp(Exp({mantissa: a}), Exp({mantissa: b}));
    }

    /**
     * @dev Multiplies three exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     */
    function mulExp3(Exp memory a, Exp memory b, Exp memory c) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        (MathError err, Exp memory ab) = mulExp(a, b);
        if (err != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (err, ab);
        }
        return mulExp(ab, c);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Divides two exponentials, returning a new exponential.
     *     (a/scale) / (b/scale) = (a/scale) * (scale/b) = a/b,
     *  which we can scale as an Exp by calling getExp(a.mantissa, b.mantissa)
     */
    function divExp(Exp memory a, Exp memory b) pure internal returns (MathError, Exp memory) {
        return getExp(a.mantissa, b.mantissa);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Truncates the given exp to a whole number value.
     *      For example, truncate(Exp{mantissa: 15 * expScale}) = 15
     */
    function truncate(Exp memory exp) pure internal returns (uint) {
        // Note: We are not using careful math here as we're performing a division that cannot fail
        return exp.mantissa / expScale;
    }

    /**
     * @dev Checks if first Exp is less than second Exp.
     */
    function lessThanExp(Exp memory left, Exp memory right) pure internal returns (bool) {
        return left.mantissa < right.mantissa; //TODO: Add some simple tests and this in another PR yo.
    }

    /**
     * @dev Checks if left Exp <= right Exp.
     */
    function lessThanOrEqualExp(Exp memory left, Exp memory right) pure internal returns (bool) {
        return left.mantissa <= right.mantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @dev returns true if Exp is exactly zero
     */
    function isZeroExp(Exp memory value) pure internal returns (bool) {
        return value.mantissa == 0;
    }
}

// File: contracts/EIP20Interface.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;

/**
 * @title ERC 20 Token Standard Interface
 *  https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20
 */
interface EIP20Interface {

    /**
      * @notice Get the total number of tokens in circulation
      * @return The supply of tokens
      */
    function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);

    /**
     * @notice Gets the balance of the specified address
     * @param owner The address from which the balance will be retrieved
     * @return The balance
     */
    function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256 balance);

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `msg.sender` to `dst`
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
      */
    function transfer(address dst, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `src` to `dst`
      * @param src The address of the source account
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
      */
    function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Approve `spender` to transfer up to `amount` from `src`
      * @dev This will overwrite the approval amount for `spender`
      *  and is subject to issues noted [here](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#approve)
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @param amount The number of tokens that are approved (-1 means infinite)
      * @return Whether or not the approval succeeded
      */
    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Get the current allowance from `owner` for `spender`
      * @param owner The address of the account which owns the tokens to be spent
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @return The number of tokens allowed to be spent (-1 means infinite)
      */
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256 remaining);

    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 amount);
    event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 amount);
}

// File: contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;

/**
 * @title EIP20NonStandardInterface
 * @dev Version of ERC20 with no return values for `transfer` and `transferFrom`
 *  See https://medium.com/coinmonks/missing-return-value-bug-at-least-130-tokens-affected-d67bf08521ca
 */
interface EIP20NonStandardInterface {

    /**
     * @notice Get the total number of tokens in circulation
     * @return The supply of tokens
     */
    function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);

    /**
     * @notice Gets the balance of the specified address
     * @param owner The address from which the balance will be retrieved
     * @return The balance
     */
    function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256 balance);

    ///
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    /// !!! NOTICE !!! `transfer` does not return a value, in violation of the ERC-20 specification
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    ///

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `msg.sender` to `dst`
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      */
    function transfer(address dst, uint256 amount) external;

    ///
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    /// !!! NOTICE !!! `transferFrom` does not return a value, in violation of the ERC-20 specification
    /// !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    ///

    /**
      * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `src` to `dst`
      * @param src The address of the source account
      * @param dst The address of the destination account
      * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
      */
    function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint256 amount) external;

    /**
      * @notice Approve `spender` to transfer up to `amount` from `src`
      * @dev This will overwrite the approval amount for `spender`
      *  and is subject to issues noted [here](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#approve)
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @param amount The number of tokens that are approved
      * @return Whether or not the approval succeeded
      */
    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool success);

    /**
      * @notice Get the current allowance from `owner` for `spender`
      * @param owner The address of the account which owns the tokens to be spent
      * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
      * @return The number of tokens allowed to be spent
      */
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256 remaining);

    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 amount);
    event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 amount);
}

// File: contracts/ReentrancyGuard.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;

/**
 * @title Helps contracts guard against reentrancy attacks.
 * @author Remco Bloemen <remco@2π.com>, Eenae <alexey@mixbytes.io>
 * @dev If you mark a function `nonReentrant`, you should also
 * mark it `external`.
 */
contract ReentrancyGuard {
    /// @dev counter to allow mutex lock with only one SSTORE operation
    uint256 private _guardCounter;

    constructor () internal {
        // The counter starts at one to prevent changing it from zero to a non-zero
        // value, which is a more expensive operation.
        _guardCounter = 1;
    }

    /**
     * @dev Prevents a contract from calling itself, directly or indirectly.
     * Calling a `nonReentrant` function from another `nonReentrant`
     * function is not supported. It is possible to prevent this from happening
     * by making the `nonReentrant` function external, and make it call a
     * `private` function that does the actual work.
     */
    modifier nonReentrant() {
        _guardCounter += 1;
        uint256 localCounter = _guardCounter;
        _;
        require(localCounter == _guardCounter, "re-entered");
    }
}

// File: contracts/InterestRateModel.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;

/**
  * @title The Compound InterestRateModel Interface
  * @author Compound
  * @notice Any interest rate model should derive from this contract.
  * @dev These functions are specifically not marked `pure` as implementations of this
  *      contract may read from storage variables.
  */
interface InterestRateModel {
    /**
      * @notice Gets the current borrow interest rate based on the given asset, total cash, total borrows
      *         and total reserves.
      * @dev The return value should be scaled by 1e18, thus a return value of
      *      `(true, 1000000000000)` implies an interest rate of 0.000001 or 0.0001% *per block*.
      * @param cash The total cash of the underlying asset in the CToken
      * @param borrows The total borrows of the underlying asset in the CToken
      * @param reserves The total reserves of the underlying asset in the CToken
      * @return Success or failure and the borrow interest rate per block scaled by 10e18
      */
    function getBorrowRate(uint cash, uint borrows, uint reserves) external view returns (uint, uint);

    /**
      * @notice Marker function used for light validation when updating the interest rate model of a market
      * @dev Marker function used for light validation when updating the interest rate model of a market. Implementations should simply return true.
      * @return Success or failure
      */
    function isInterestRateModel() external view returns (bool);
}

// File: contracts/CToken.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;








/**
 * @title Compound's CToken Contract
 * @notice Abstract base for CTokens
 * @author Compound
 */
contract CToken is EIP20Interface, Exponential, TokenErrorReporter, ReentrancyGuard {
    /**
     * @notice Indicator that this is a CToken contract (for inspection)
     */
    bool public constant isCToken = true;

    /**
     * @notice EIP-20 token name for this token
     */
    string public name;

    /**
     * @notice EIP-20 token symbol for this token
     */
    string public symbol;

    /**
     * @notice EIP-20 token decimals for this token
     */
    uint public decimals;

    /**
     * @notice Maximum borrow rate that can ever be applied (.0005% / block)
     */
    uint constant borrowRateMaxMantissa = 5e14;

    /**
     * @notice Maximum fraction of interest that can be set aside for reserves
     */
    uint constant reserveFactorMaxMantissa = 1e18;

    /**
     * @notice Administrator for this contract
     */
    address payable public admin;

    /**
     * @notice Pending administrator for this contract
     */
    address payable public pendingAdmin;

    /**
     * @notice Contract which oversees inter-cToken operations
     */
    ComptrollerInterface public comptroller;

    /**
     * @notice Model which tells what the current interest rate should be
     */
    InterestRateModel public interestRateModel;

    /**
     * @notice Initial exchange rate used when minting the first CTokens (used when totalSupply = 0)
     */
    uint public initialExchangeRateMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Fraction of interest currently set aside for reserves
     */
    uint public reserveFactorMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Block number that interest was last accrued at
     */
    uint public accrualBlockNumber;

    /**
     * @notice Accumulator of total earned interest since the opening of the market
     */
    uint public borrowIndex;

    /**
     * @notice Total amount of outstanding borrows of the underlying in this market
     */
    uint public totalBorrows;

    /**
     * @notice Total amount of reserves of the underlying held in this market
     */
    uint public totalReserves;

    /**
     * @notice Total number of tokens in circulation
     */
    uint256 public totalSupply;

    /**
     * @notice Official record of token balances for each account
     */
    mapping (address => uint256) accountTokens;

    /**
     * @notice Approved token transfer amounts on behalf of others
     */
    mapping (address => mapping (address => uint256)) transferAllowances;

    /**
     * @notice Container for borrow balance information
     * @member principal Total balance (with accrued interest), after applying the most recent balance-changing action
     * @member interestIndex Global borrowIndex as of the most recent balance-changing action
     */
    struct BorrowSnapshot {
        uint principal;
        uint interestIndex;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Mapping of account addresses to outstanding borrow balances
     */
    mapping(address => BorrowSnapshot) accountBorrows;


    /*** Market Events ***/

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when interest is accrued
     */
    event AccrueInterest(uint interestAccumulated, uint borrowIndex, uint totalBorrows);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when tokens are minted
     */
    event Mint(address minter, uint mintAmount, uint mintTokens);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when tokens are redeemed
     */
    event Redeem(address redeemer, uint redeemAmount, uint redeemTokens);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when underlying is borrowed
     */
    event Borrow(address borrower, uint borrowAmount, uint accountBorrows, uint totalBorrows);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when a borrow is repaid
     */
    event RepayBorrow(address payer, address borrower, uint repayAmount, uint accountBorrows, uint totalBorrows);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when a borrow is liquidated
     */
    event LiquidateBorrow(address liquidator, address borrower, uint repayAmount, address cTokenCollateral, uint seizeTokens);


    /*** Admin Events ***/

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when pendingAdmin is changed
     */
    event NewPendingAdmin(address oldPendingAdmin, address newPendingAdmin);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when pendingAdmin is accepted, which means admin is updated
     */
    event NewAdmin(address oldAdmin, address newAdmin);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when comptroller is changed
     */
    event NewComptroller(ComptrollerInterface oldComptroller, ComptrollerInterface newComptroller);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when interestRateModel is changed
     */
    event NewMarketInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel oldInterestRateModel, InterestRateModel newInterestRateModel);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when the reserve factor is changed
     */
    event NewReserveFactor(uint oldReserveFactorMantissa, uint newReserveFactorMantissa);

    /**
     * @notice Event emitted when the reserves are reduced
     */
    event ReservesReduced(address admin, uint reduceAmount, uint newTotalReserves);


    /**
     * @notice Construct a new money market
     * @param comptroller_ The address of the Comptroller
     * @param interestRateModel_ The address of the interest rate model
     * @param initialExchangeRateMantissa_ The initial exchange rate, scaled by 1e18
     * @param name_ EIP-20 name of this token
     * @param symbol_ EIP-20 symbol of this token
     * @param decimals_ EIP-20 decimal precision of this token
     */
    constructor(ComptrollerInterface comptroller_,
                InterestRateModel interestRateModel_,
                uint initialExchangeRateMantissa_,
                string memory name_,
                string memory symbol_,
                uint decimals_) internal {
        // Set admin to msg.sender
        admin = msg.sender;

        // Set initial exchange rate
        initialExchangeRateMantissa = initialExchangeRateMantissa_;
        require(initialExchangeRateMantissa > 0, "Initial exchange rate must be greater than zero.");

        // Set the comptroller
        uint err = _setComptroller(comptroller_);
        require(err == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "Setting comptroller failed");

        // Initialize block number and borrow index (block number mocks depend on comptroller being set)
        accrualBlockNumber = getBlockNumber();
        borrowIndex = mantissaOne;

        // Set the interest rate model (depends on block number / borrow index)
        err = _setInterestRateModelFresh(interestRateModel_);
        require(err == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "Setting interest rate model failed");

        name = name_;
        symbol = symbol_;
        decimals = decimals_;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfer `tokens` tokens from `src` to `dst` by `spender`
     * @dev Called by both `transfer` and `transferFrom` internally
     * @param spender The address of the account performing the transfer
     * @param src The address of the source account
     * @param dst The address of the destination account
     * @param tokens The number of tokens to transfer
     * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
     */
    function transferTokens(address spender, address src, address dst, uint tokens) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if transfer not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.transferAllowed(address(this), src, dst, tokens);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Do not allow self-transfers */
        if (src == dst) {
            return fail(Error.BAD_INPUT, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_NOT_ALLOWED);
        }

        /* Get the allowance, infinite for the account owner */
        uint startingAllowance = 0;
        if (spender == src) {
            startingAllowance = uint(-1);
        } else {
            startingAllowance = transferAllowances[src][spender];
        }

        /* Do the calculations, checking for {under,over}flow */
        MathError mathErr;
        uint allowanceNew;
        uint srcTokensNew;
        uint dstTokensNew;

        (mathErr, allowanceNew) = subUInt(startingAllowance, tokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_NOT_ALLOWED);
        }

        (mathErr, srcTokensNew) = subUInt(accountTokens[src], tokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_NOT_ENOUGH);
        }

        (mathErr, dstTokensNew) = addUInt(accountTokens[dst], tokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.TRANSFER_TOO_MUCH);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        accountTokens[src] = srcTokensNew;
        accountTokens[dst] = dstTokensNew;

        /* Eat some of the allowance (if necessary) */
        if (startingAllowance != uint(-1)) {
            transferAllowances[src][spender] = allowanceNew;
        }

        /* We emit a Transfer event */
        emit Transfer(src, dst, tokens);

        /* We call the defense hook (which checks for under-collateralization) */
        comptroller.transferVerify(address(this), src, dst, tokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `msg.sender` to `dst`
     * @param dst The address of the destination account
     * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
     * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
     */
    function transfer(address dst, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (bool) {
        return transferTokens(msg.sender, msg.sender, dst, amount) == uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfer `amount` tokens from `src` to `dst`
     * @param src The address of the source account
     * @param dst The address of the destination account
     * @param amount The number of tokens to transfer
     * @return Whether or not the transfer succeeded
     */
    function transferFrom(address src, address dst, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (bool) {
        return transferTokens(msg.sender, src, dst, amount) == uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Approve `spender` to transfer up to `amount` from `src`
     * @dev This will overwrite the approval amount for `spender`
     *  and is subject to issues noted [here](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#approve)
     * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
     * @param amount The number of tokens that are approved (-1 means infinite)
     * @return Whether or not the approval succeeded
     */
    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {
        address src = msg.sender;
        transferAllowances[src][spender] = amount;
        emit Approval(src, spender, amount);
        return true;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get the current allowance from `owner` for `spender`
     * @param owner The address of the account which owns the tokens to be spent
     * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
     * @return The number of tokens allowed to be spent (-1 means infinite)
     */
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256) {
        return transferAllowances[owner][spender];
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get the token balance of the `owner`
     * @param owner The address of the account to query
     * @return The number of tokens owned by `owner`
     */
    function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256) {
        return accountTokens[owner];
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get the underlying balance of the `owner`
     * @dev This also accrues interest in a transaction
     * @param owner The address of the account to query
     * @return The amount of underlying owned by `owner`
     */
    function balanceOfUnderlying(address owner) external returns (uint) {
        Exp memory exchangeRate = Exp({mantissa: exchangeRateCurrent()});
        (MathError mErr, uint balance) = mulScalarTruncate(exchangeRate, accountTokens[owner]);
        require(mErr == MathError.NO_ERROR);
        return balance;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get a snapshot of the account's balances, and the cached exchange rate
     * @dev This is used by comptroller to more efficiently perform liquidity checks.
     * @param account Address of the account to snapshot
     * @return (possible error, token balance, borrow balance, exchange rate mantissa)
     */
    function getAccountSnapshot(address account) external view returns (uint, uint, uint, uint) {
        uint cTokenBalance = accountTokens[account];
        uint borrowBalance;
        uint exchangeRateMantissa;

        MathError mErr;

        (mErr, borrowBalance) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(account);
        if (mErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (uint(Error.MATH_ERROR), 0, 0, 0);
        }

        (mErr, exchangeRateMantissa) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        if (mErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (uint(Error.MATH_ERROR), 0, 0, 0);
        }

        return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), cTokenBalance, borrowBalance, exchangeRateMantissa);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Function to simply retrieve block number
     *  This exists mainly for inheriting test contracts to stub this result.
     */
    function getBlockNumber() internal view returns (uint) {
        return block.number;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Returns the current per-block borrow interest rate for this cToken
     * @return The borrow interest rate per block, scaled by 1e18
     */
    function borrowRatePerBlock() external view returns (uint) {
        (uint opaqueErr, uint borrowRateMantissa) = interestRateModel.getBorrowRate(getCashPrior(), totalBorrows, totalReserves);
        require(opaqueErr == 0, "borrowRatePerBlock: interestRateModel.borrowRate failed"); // semi-opaque
        return borrowRateMantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Returns the current per-block supply interest rate for this cToken
     * @return The supply interest rate per block, scaled by 1e18
     */
    function supplyRatePerBlock() external view returns (uint) {
        /* We calculate the supply rate:
         *  underlying = totalSupply × exchangeRate
         *  borrowsPer = totalBorrows ÷ underlying
         *  supplyRate = borrowRate × (1-reserveFactor) × borrowsPer
         */
        uint exchangeRateMantissa = exchangeRateStored();

        (uint e0, uint borrowRateMantissa) = interestRateModel.getBorrowRate(getCashPrior(), totalBorrows, totalReserves);
        require(e0 == 0, "supplyRatePerBlock: calculating borrowRate failed"); // semi-opaque

        (MathError e1, Exp memory underlying) = mulScalar(Exp({mantissa: exchangeRateMantissa}), totalSupply);
        require(e1 == MathError.NO_ERROR, "supplyRatePerBlock: calculating underlying failed");

        (MathError e2, Exp memory borrowsPer) = divScalarByExp(totalBorrows, underlying);
        require(e2 == MathError.NO_ERROR, "supplyRatePerBlock: calculating borrowsPer failed");

        (MathError e3, Exp memory oneMinusReserveFactor) = subExp(Exp({mantissa: mantissaOne}), Exp({mantissa: reserveFactorMantissa}));
        require(e3 == MathError.NO_ERROR, "supplyRatePerBlock: calculating oneMinusReserveFactor failed");

        (MathError e4, Exp memory supplyRate) = mulExp3(Exp({mantissa: borrowRateMantissa}), oneMinusReserveFactor, borrowsPer);
        require(e4 == MathError.NO_ERROR, "supplyRatePerBlock: calculating supplyRate failed");

        return supplyRate.mantissa;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Returns the current total borrows plus accrued interest
     * @return The total borrows with interest
     */
    function totalBorrowsCurrent() external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        require(accrueInterest() == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "accrue interest failed");
        return totalBorrows;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Accrue interest to updated borrowIndex and then calculate account's borrow balance using the updated borrowIndex
     * @param account The address whose balance should be calculated after updating borrowIndex
     * @return The calculated balance
     */
    function borrowBalanceCurrent(address account) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        require(accrueInterest() == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "accrue interest failed");
        return borrowBalanceStored(account);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Return the borrow balance of account based on stored data
     * @param account The address whose balance should be calculated
     * @return The calculated balance
     */
    function borrowBalanceStored(address account) public view returns (uint) {
        (MathError err, uint result) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(account);
        require(err == MathError.NO_ERROR, "borrowBalanceStored: borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed");
        return result;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Return the borrow balance of account based on stored data
     * @param account The address whose balance should be calculated
     * @return (error code, the calculated balance or 0 if error code is non-zero)
     */
    function borrowBalanceStoredInternal(address account) internal view returns (MathError, uint) {
        /* Note: we do not assert that the market is up to date */
        MathError mathErr;
        uint principalTimesIndex;
        uint result;

        /* Get borrowBalance and borrowIndex */
        BorrowSnapshot storage borrowSnapshot = accountBorrows[account];

        /* If borrowBalance = 0 then borrowIndex is likely also 0.
         * Rather than failing the calculation with a division by 0, we immediately return 0 in this case.
         */
        if (borrowSnapshot.principal == 0) {
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, 0);
        }

        /* Calculate new borrow balance using the interest index:
         *  recentBorrowBalance = borrower.borrowBalance * market.borrowIndex / borrower.borrowIndex
         */
        (mathErr, principalTimesIndex) = mulUInt(borrowSnapshot.principal, borrowIndex);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (mathErr, 0);
        }

        (mathErr, result) = divUInt(principalTimesIndex, borrowSnapshot.interestIndex);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return (mathErr, 0);
        }

        return (MathError.NO_ERROR, result);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Accrue interest then return the up-to-date exchange rate
     * @return Calculated exchange rate scaled by 1e18
     */
    function exchangeRateCurrent() public nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        require(accrueInterest() == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "accrue interest failed");
        return exchangeRateStored();
    }

    /**
     * @notice Calculates the exchange rate from the underlying to the CToken
     * @dev This function does not accrue interest before calculating the exchange rate
     * @return Calculated exchange rate scaled by 1e18
     */
    function exchangeRateStored() public view returns (uint) {
        (MathError err, uint result) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        require(err == MathError.NO_ERROR, "exchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failed");
        return result;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Calculates the exchange rate from the underlying to the CToken
     * @dev This function does not accrue interest before calculating the exchange rate
     * @return (error code, calculated exchange rate scaled by 1e18)
     */
    function exchangeRateStoredInternal() internal view returns (MathError, uint) {
        if (totalSupply == 0) {
            /*
             * If there are no tokens minted:
             *  exchangeRate = initialExchangeRate
             */
            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, initialExchangeRateMantissa);
        } else {
            /*
             * Otherwise:
             *  exchangeRate = (totalCash + totalBorrows - totalReserves) / totalSupply
             */
            uint totalCash = getCashPrior();
            uint cashPlusBorrowsMinusReserves;
            Exp memory exchangeRate;
            MathError mathErr;

            (mathErr, cashPlusBorrowsMinusReserves) = addThenSubUInt(totalCash, totalBorrows, totalReserves);
            if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return (mathErr, 0);
            }

            (mathErr, exchangeRate) = getExp(cashPlusBorrowsMinusReserves, totalSupply);
            if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return (mathErr, 0);
            }

            return (MathError.NO_ERROR, exchangeRate.mantissa);
        }
    }

    /**
     * @notice Get cash balance of this cToken in the underlying asset
     * @return The quantity of underlying asset owned by this contract
     */
    function getCash() external view returns (uint) {
        return getCashPrior();
    }

    struct AccrueInterestLocalVars {
        MathError mathErr;
        uint opaqueErr;
        uint borrowRateMantissa;
        uint currentBlockNumber;
        uint blockDelta;

        Exp simpleInterestFactor;

        uint interestAccumulated;
        uint totalBorrowsNew;
        uint totalReservesNew;
        uint borrowIndexNew;
    }

    /**
      * @notice Applies accrued interest to total borrows and reserves.
      * @dev This calculates interest accrued from the last checkpointed block
      *      up to the current block and writes new checkpoint to storage.
      */
    function accrueInterest() public returns (uint) {
        AccrueInterestLocalVars memory vars;

        /* Calculate the current borrow interest rate */
        (vars.opaqueErr, vars.borrowRateMantissa) = interestRateModel.getBorrowRate(getCashPrior(), totalBorrows, totalReserves);
        require(vars.borrowRateMantissa <= borrowRateMaxMantissa, "borrow rate is absurdly high");
        if (vars.opaqueErr != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_BORROW_RATE_CALCULATION_FAILED, vars.opaqueErr);
        }

        /* Remember the initial block number */
        vars.currentBlockNumber = getBlockNumber();

        /* Calculate the number of blocks elapsed since the last accrual */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.blockDelta) = subUInt(vars.currentBlockNumber, accrualBlockNumber);
        assert(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR); // Block delta should always succeed and if it doesn't, blow up.

        /*
         * Calculate the interest accumulated into borrows and reserves and the new index:
         *  simpleInterestFactor = borrowRate * blockDelta
         *  interestAccumulated = simpleInterestFactor * totalBorrows
         *  totalBorrowsNew = interestAccumulated + totalBorrows
         *  totalReservesNew = interestAccumulated * reserveFactor + totalReserves
         *  borrowIndexNew = simpleInterestFactor * borrowIndex + borrowIndex
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.simpleInterestFactor) = mulScalar(Exp({mantissa: vars.borrowRateMantissa}), vars.blockDelta);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_SIMPLE_INTEREST_FACTOR_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.interestAccumulated) = mulScalarTruncate(vars.simpleInterestFactor, totalBorrows);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_ACCUMULATED_INTEREST_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalBorrowsNew) = addUInt(vars.interestAccumulated, totalBorrows);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_BORROWS_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalReservesNew) = mulScalarTruncateAddUInt(Exp({mantissa: reserveFactorMantissa}), vars.interestAccumulated, totalReserves);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_TOTAL_RESERVES_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.borrowIndexNew) = mulScalarTruncateAddUInt(vars.simpleInterestFactor, borrowIndex, borrowIndex);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.ACCRUE_INTEREST_NEW_BORROW_INDEX_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accrualBlockNumber = vars.currentBlockNumber;
        borrowIndex = vars.borrowIndexNew;
        totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew;
        totalReserves = vars.totalReservesNew;

        /* We emit an AccrueInterest event */
        emit AccrueInterest(vars.interestAccumulated, vars.borrowIndexNew, totalBorrows);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender supplies assets into the market and receives cTokens in exchange
     * @dev Accrues interest whether or not the operation succeeds, unless reverted
     * @param mintAmount The amount of the underlying asset to supply
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function mintInternal(uint mintAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.MINT_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // mintFresh emits the actual Mint event if successful and logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return mintFresh(msg.sender, mintAmount);
    }

    struct MintLocalVars {
        Error err;
        MathError mathErr;
        uint exchangeRateMantissa;
        uint mintTokens;
        uint totalSupplyNew;
        uint accountTokensNew;
    }

    /**
     * @notice User supplies assets into the market and receives cTokens in exchange
     * @dev Assumes interest has already been accrued up to the current block
     * @param minter The address of the account which is supplying the assets
     * @param mintAmount The amount of the underlying asset to supply
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function mintFresh(address minter, uint mintAmount) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if mint not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.mintAllowed(address(this), minter, mintAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.MINT_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.MINT_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        MintLocalVars memory vars;

        /* Fail if checkTransferIn fails */
        vars.err = checkTransferIn(minter, mintAmount);
        if (vars.err != Error.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(vars.err, FailureInfo.MINT_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE);
        }

        /*
         * We get the current exchange rate and calculate the number of cTokens to be minted:
         *  mintTokens = mintAmount / exchangeRate
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.exchangeRateMantissa) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.mintTokens) = divScalarByExpTruncate(mintAmount, Exp({mantissa: vars.exchangeRateMantissa}));
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /*
         * We calculate the new total supply of cTokens and minter token balance, checking for overflow:
         *  totalSupplyNew = totalSupply + mintTokens
         *  accountTokensNew = accountTokens[minter] + mintTokens
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalSupplyNew) = addUInt(totalSupply, vars.mintTokens);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountTokensNew) = addUInt(accountTokens[minter], vars.mintTokens);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We call doTransferIn for the minter and the mintAmount
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken holds an additional mintAmount of cash.
         *  If doTransferIn fails despite the fact we checked pre-conditions,
         *   we revert because we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         */
        vars.err = doTransferIn(minter, mintAmount);
        if (vars.err != Error.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(vars.err, FailureInfo.MINT_TRANSFER_IN_FAILED);
        }

        /* We write previously calculated values into storage */
        totalSupply = vars.totalSupplyNew;
        accountTokens[minter] = vars.accountTokensNew;

        /* We emit a Mint event, and a Transfer event */
        emit Mint(minter, mintAmount, vars.mintTokens);
        emit Transfer(address(this), minter, vars.mintTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.mintVerify(address(this), minter, mintAmount, vars.mintTokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender redeems cTokens in exchange for the underlying asset
     * @dev Accrues interest whether or not the operation succeeds, unless reverted
     * @param redeemTokens The number of cTokens to redeem into underlying
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function redeemInternal(uint redeemTokens) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted redeem failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REDEEM_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // redeemFresh emits redeem-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return redeemFresh(msg.sender, redeemTokens, 0);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender redeems cTokens in exchange for a specified amount of underlying asset
     * @dev Accrues interest whether or not the operation succeeds, unless reverted
     * @param redeemAmount The amount of underlying to redeem
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function redeemUnderlyingInternal(uint redeemAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted redeem failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REDEEM_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // redeemFresh emits redeem-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return redeemFresh(msg.sender, 0, redeemAmount);
    }

    struct RedeemLocalVars {
        Error err;
        MathError mathErr;
        uint exchangeRateMantissa;
        uint redeemTokens;
        uint redeemAmount;
        uint totalSupplyNew;
        uint accountTokensNew;
    }

    /**
     * @notice User redeems cTokens in exchange for the underlying asset
     * @dev Assumes interest has already been accrued up to the current block
     * @param redeemer The address of the account which is redeeming the tokens
     * @param redeemTokensIn The number of cTokens to redeem into underlying (only one of redeemTokensIn or redeemAmountIn may be zero)
     * @param redeemAmountIn The number of cTokens to redeem into underlying (only one of redeemTokensIn or redeemAmountIn may be zero)
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function redeemFresh(address payable redeemer, uint redeemTokensIn, uint redeemAmountIn) internal returns (uint) {
        require(redeemTokensIn == 0 || redeemAmountIn == 0, "one of redeemTokensIn or redeemAmountIn must be zero");

        RedeemLocalVars memory vars;

        /* exchangeRate = invoke Exchange Rate Stored() */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.exchangeRateMantissa) = exchangeRateStoredInternal();
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_EXCHANGE_RATE_READ_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /* If redeemTokensIn > 0: */
        if (redeemTokensIn > 0) {
            /*
             * We calculate the exchange rate and the amount of underlying to be redeemed:
             *  redeemTokens = redeemTokensIn
             *  redeemAmount = redeemTokensIn x exchangeRateCurrent
             */
            vars.redeemTokens = redeemTokensIn;

            (vars.mathErr, vars.redeemAmount) = mulScalarTruncate(Exp({mantissa: vars.exchangeRateMantissa}), redeemTokensIn);
            if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_EXCHANGE_TOKENS_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
            }
        } else {
            /*
             * We get the current exchange rate and calculate the amount to be redeemed:
             *  redeemTokens = redeemAmountIn / exchangeRate
             *  redeemAmount = redeemAmountIn
             */

            (vars.mathErr, vars.redeemTokens) = divScalarByExpTruncate(redeemAmountIn, Exp({mantissa: vars.exchangeRateMantissa}));
            if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
                return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_EXCHANGE_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
            }

            vars.redeemAmount = redeemAmountIn;
        }

        /* Fail if redeem not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.redeemAllowed(address(this), redeemer, vars.redeemTokens);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.REDEEM_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.REDEEM_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        /*
         * We calculate the new total supply and redeemer balance, checking for underflow:
         *  totalSupplyNew = totalSupply - redeemTokens
         *  accountTokensNew = accountTokens[redeemer] - redeemTokens
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalSupplyNew) = subUInt(totalSupply, vars.redeemTokens);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountTokensNew) = subUInt(accountTokens[redeemer], vars.redeemTokens);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REDEEM_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /* Fail gracefully if protocol has insufficient cash */
        if (getCashPrior() < vars.redeemAmount) {
            return fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH, FailureInfo.REDEEM_TRANSFER_OUT_NOT_POSSIBLE);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We invoke doTransferOut for the redeemer and the redeemAmount.
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken has redeemAmount less of cash.
         *  If doTransferOut fails despite the fact we checked pre-conditions,
         *   we revert because we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         */
        vars.err = doTransferOut(redeemer, vars.redeemAmount);
        require(vars.err == Error.NO_ERROR, "redeem transfer out failed");

        /* We write previously calculated values into storage */
        totalSupply = vars.totalSupplyNew;
        accountTokens[redeemer] = vars.accountTokensNew;

        /* We emit a Transfer event, and a Redeem event */
        emit Transfer(redeemer, address(this), vars.redeemTokens);
        emit Redeem(redeemer, vars.redeemAmount, vars.redeemTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.redeemVerify(address(this), redeemer, vars.redeemAmount, vars.redeemTokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Sender borrows assets from the protocol to their own address
      * @param borrowAmount The amount of the underlying asset to borrow
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function borrowInternal(uint borrowAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // borrowFresh emits borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return borrowFresh(msg.sender, borrowAmount);
    }

    struct BorrowLocalVars {
        Error err;
        MathError mathErr;
        uint accountBorrows;
        uint accountBorrowsNew;
        uint totalBorrowsNew;
    }

    /**
      * @notice Users borrow assets from the protocol to their own address
      * @param borrowAmount The amount of the underlying asset to borrow
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function borrowFresh(address payable borrower, uint borrowAmount) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if borrow not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.borrowAllowed(address(this), borrower, borrowAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        /* Fail gracefully if protocol has insufficient underlying cash */
        if (getCashPrior() < borrowAmount) {
            return fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH, FailureInfo.BORROW_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE);
        }

        BorrowLocalVars memory vars;

        /*
         * We calculate the new borrower and total borrow balances, failing on overflow:
         *  accountBorrowsNew = accountBorrows + borrowAmount
         *  totalBorrowsNew = totalBorrows + borrowAmount
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrows) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(borrower);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrowsNew) = addUInt(vars.accountBorrows, borrowAmount);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalBorrowsNew) = addUInt(totalBorrows, borrowAmount);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We invoke doTransferOut for the borrower and the borrowAmount.
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken borrowAmount less of cash.
         *  If doTransferOut fails despite the fact we checked pre-conditions,
         *   we revert because we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         */
        vars.err = doTransferOut(borrower, borrowAmount);
        require(vars.err == Error.NO_ERROR, "borrow transfer out failed");

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accountBorrows[borrower].principal = vars.accountBorrowsNew;
        accountBorrows[borrower].interestIndex = borrowIndex;
        totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew;

        /* We emit a Borrow event */
        emit Borrow(borrower, borrowAmount, vars.accountBorrowsNew, vars.totalBorrowsNew);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.borrowVerify(address(this), borrower, borrowAmount);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender repays their own borrow
     * @param repayAmount The amount to repay
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function repayBorrowInternal(uint repayAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // repayBorrowFresh emits repay-borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return repayBorrowFresh(msg.sender, msg.sender, repayAmount);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Sender repays a borrow belonging to borrower
     * @param borrower the account with the debt being payed off
     * @param repayAmount The amount to repay
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function repayBorrowBehalfInternal(address borrower, uint repayAmount) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted borrow failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REPAY_BEHALF_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // repayBorrowFresh emits repay-borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return repayBorrowFresh(msg.sender, borrower, repayAmount);
    }

    struct RepayBorrowLocalVars {
        Error err;
        MathError mathErr;
        uint repayAmount;
        uint borrowerIndex;
        uint accountBorrows;
        uint accountBorrowsNew;
        uint totalBorrowsNew;
    }

    /**
     * @notice Borrows are repaid by another user (possibly the borrower).
     * @param payer the account paying off the borrow
     * @param borrower the account with the debt being payed off
     * @param repayAmount the amount of undelrying tokens being returned
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function repayBorrowFresh(address payer, address borrower, uint repayAmount) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if repayBorrow not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.repayBorrowAllowed(address(this), payer, borrower, repayAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        RepayBorrowLocalVars memory vars;

        /* We remember the original borrowerIndex for verification purposes */
        vars.borrowerIndex = accountBorrows[borrower].interestIndex;

        /* We fetch the amount the borrower owes, with accumulated interest */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrows) = borrowBalanceStoredInternal(borrower);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_ACCUMULATED_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /* If repayAmount == -1, repayAmount = accountBorrows */
        if (repayAmount == uint(-1)) {
            vars.repayAmount = vars.accountBorrows;
        } else {
            vars.repayAmount = repayAmount;
        }

        /* Fail if checkTransferIn fails */
        vars.err = checkTransferIn(payer, vars.repayAmount);
        if (vars.err != Error.NO_ERROR) {
            return fail(vars.err, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_TRANSFER_IN_NOT_POSSIBLE);
        }

        /*
         * We calculate the new borrower and total borrow balances, failing on underflow:
         *  accountBorrowsNew = accountBorrows - repayAmount
         *  totalBorrowsNew = totalBorrows - repayAmount
         */
        (vars.mathErr, vars.accountBorrowsNew) = subUInt(vars.accountBorrows, vars.repayAmount);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        (vars.mathErr, vars.totalBorrowsNew) = subUInt(totalBorrows, vars.repayAmount);
        if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /*
         * We call doTransferIn for the payer and the repayAmount
         *  Note: The cToken must handle variations between ERC-20 and ETH underlying.
         *  On success, the cToken holds an additional repayAmount of cash.
         *  If doTransferIn fails despite the fact we checked pre-conditions,
         *   we revert because we can't be sure if side effects occurred.
         */
        vars.err = doTransferIn(payer, vars.repayAmount);
        require(vars.err == Error.NO_ERROR, "repay borrow transfer in failed");

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accountBorrows[borrower].principal = vars.accountBorrowsNew;
        accountBorrows[borrower].interestIndex = borrowIndex;
        totalBorrows = vars.totalBorrowsNew;

        /* We emit a RepayBorrow event */
        emit RepayBorrow(payer, borrower, vars.repayAmount, vars.accountBorrowsNew, vars.totalBorrowsNew);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.repayBorrowVerify(address(this), payer, borrower, vars.repayAmount, vars.borrowerIndex);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice The sender liquidates the borrowers collateral.
     *  The collateral seized is transferred to the liquidator.
     * @param borrower The borrower of this cToken to be liquidated
     * @param cTokenCollateral The market in which to seize collateral from the borrower
     * @param repayAmount The amount of the underlying borrowed asset to repay
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function liquidateBorrowInternal(address borrower, uint repayAmount, CToken cTokenCollateral) internal nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted liquidation failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_BORROW_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }

        error = cTokenCollateral.accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted liquidation failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_COLLATERAL_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }

        // liquidateBorrowFresh emits borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
        return liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender, borrower, repayAmount, cTokenCollateral);
    }

    /**
     * @notice The liquidator liquidates the borrowers collateral.
     *  The collateral seized is transferred to the liquidator.
     * @param borrower The borrower of this cToken to be liquidated
     * @param liquidator The address repaying the borrow and seizing collateral
     * @param cTokenCollateral The market in which to seize collateral from the borrower
     * @param repayAmount The amount of the underlying borrowed asset to repay
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function liquidateBorrowFresh(address liquidator, address borrower, uint repayAmount, CToken cTokenCollateral) internal returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if liquidate not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.liquidateBorrowAllowed(address(this), address(cTokenCollateral), liquidator, borrower, repayAmount);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Verify market's block number equals current block number */
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        /* Verify cTokenCollateral market's block number equals current block number */
        if (cTokenCollateral.accrualBlockNumber() != getBlockNumber()) {
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COLLATERAL_FRESHNESS_CHECK);
        }

        /* Fail if borrower = liquidator */
        if (borrower == liquidator) {
            return fail(Error.INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER);
        }

        /* Fail if repayAmount = 0 */
        if (repayAmount == 0) {
            return fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_ZERO);
        }

        /* Fail if repayAmount = -1 */
        if (repayAmount == uint(-1)) {
            return fail(Error.INVALID_CLOSE_AMOUNT_REQUESTED, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_CLOSE_AMOUNT_IS_UINT_MAX);
        }

        /* We calculate the number of collateral tokens that will be seized */
        (uint amountSeizeError, uint seizeTokens) = comptroller.liquidateCalculateSeizeTokens(address(this), address(cTokenCollateral), repayAmount);
        if (amountSeizeError != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_CALCULATION_ERROR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED, amountSeizeError);
        }

        /* Fail if seizeTokens > borrower collateral token balance */
        if (seizeTokens > cTokenCollateral.balanceOf(borrower)) {
            return fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_TOO_MUCH);
        }

        /* Fail if repayBorrow fails */
        uint repayBorrowError = repayBorrowFresh(liquidator, borrower, repayAmount);
        if (repayBorrowError != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            return fail(Error(repayBorrowError), FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_REPAY_BORROW_FRESH_FAILED);
        }

        /* Revert if seize tokens fails (since we cannot be sure of side effects) */
        uint seizeError = cTokenCollateral.seize(liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);
        require(seizeError == uint(Error.NO_ERROR), "token seizure failed");

        /* We emit a LiquidateBorrow event */
        emit LiquidateBorrow(liquidator, borrower, repayAmount, address(cTokenCollateral), seizeTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.liquidateBorrowVerify(address(this), address(cTokenCollateral), liquidator, borrower, repayAmount, seizeTokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Transfers collateral tokens (this market) to the liquidator.
     * @dev Will fail unless called by another cToken during the process of liquidation.
     *  Its absolutely critical to use msg.sender as the borrowed cToken and not a parameter.
     * @param liquidator The account receiving seized collateral
     * @param borrower The account having collateral seized
     * @param seizeTokens The number of cTokens to seize
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function seize(address liquidator, address borrower, uint seizeTokens) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        /* Fail if seize not allowed */
        uint allowed = comptroller.seizeAllowed(address(this), msg.sender, liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);
        if (allowed != 0) {
            return failOpaque(Error.COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_COMPTROLLER_REJECTION, allowed);
        }

        /* Fail if borrower = liquidator */
        if (borrower == liquidator) {
            return fail(Error.INVALID_ACCOUNT_PAIR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_LIQUIDATOR_IS_BORROWER);
        }

        MathError mathErr;
        uint borrowerTokensNew;
        uint liquidatorTokensNew;

        /*
         * We calculate the new borrower and liquidator token balances, failing on underflow/overflow:
         *  borrowerTokensNew = accountTokens[borrower] - seizeTokens
         *  liquidatorTokensNew = accountTokens[liquidator] + seizeTokens
         */
        (mathErr, borrowerTokensNew) = subUInt(accountTokens[borrower], seizeTokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_DECREMENT_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        (mathErr, liquidatorTokensNew) = addUInt(accountTokens[liquidator], seizeTokens);
        if (mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
            return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.LIQUIDATE_SEIZE_BALANCE_INCREMENT_FAILED, uint(mathErr));
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        /* We write the previously calculated values into storage */
        accountTokens[borrower] = borrowerTokensNew;
        accountTokens[liquidator] = liquidatorTokensNew;

        /* Emit a Transfer event */
        emit Transfer(borrower, liquidator, seizeTokens);

        /* We call the defense hook */
        comptroller.seizeVerify(address(this), msg.sender, liquidator, borrower, seizeTokens);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }


    /*** Admin Functions ***/

    /**
      * @notice Begins transfer of admin rights. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @dev Admin function to begin change of admin. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @param newPendingAdmin New pending admin.
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      *
      * TODO: Should we add a second arg to verify, like a checksum of `newAdmin` address?
      */
    function _setPendingAdmin(address payable newPendingAdmin) external returns (uint) {
        // Check caller = admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current value, if any, for inclusion in log
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store pendingAdmin with value newPendingAdmin
        pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin;

        // Emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin)
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Accepts transfer of admin rights. msg.sender must be pendingAdmin
      * @dev Admin function for pending admin to accept role and update admin
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _acceptAdmin() external returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is pendingAdmin and pendingAdmin ≠ address(0)
        if (msg.sender != pendingAdmin || msg.sender == address(0)) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current values for inclusion in log
        address oldAdmin = admin;
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store admin with value pendingAdmin
        admin = pendingAdmin;

        // Clear the pending value
        pendingAdmin = address(0);

        emit NewAdmin(oldAdmin, admin);
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, pendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Sets a new comptroller for the market
      * @dev Admin function to set a new comptroller
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setComptroller(ComptrollerInterface newComptroller) public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_COMPTROLLER_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        ComptrollerInterface oldComptroller = comptroller;
        // Ensure invoke comptroller.isComptroller() returns true
        require(newComptroller.isComptroller(), "marker method returned false");

        // Set market's comptroller to newComptroller
        comptroller = newComptroller;

        // Emit NewComptroller(oldComptroller, newComptroller)
        emit NewComptroller(oldComptroller, newComptroller);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice accrues interest and sets a new reserve factor for the protocol using _setReserveFactorFresh
      * @dev Admin function to accrue interest and set a new reserve factor
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setReserveFactor(uint newReserveFactorMantissa) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but on top of that we want to log the fact that an attempted reserve factor change failed.
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // _setReserveFactorFresh emits reserve-factor-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to.
        return _setReserveFactorFresh(newReserveFactorMantissa);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Sets a new reserve factor for the protocol (*requires fresh interest accrual)
      * @dev Admin function to set a new reserve factor
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _setReserveFactorFresh(uint newReserveFactorMantissa) internal returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // Verify market's block number equals current block number
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            // TODO: static_assert + no error code?
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_FRESH_CHECK);
        }

        // Check newReserveFactor ≤ maxReserveFactor
        if (newReserveFactorMantissa > reserveFactorMaxMantissa) {
            return fail(Error.BAD_INPUT, FailureInfo.SET_RESERVE_FACTOR_BOUNDS_CHECK);
        }

        uint oldReserveFactorMantissa = reserveFactorMantissa;
        reserveFactorMantissa = newReserveFactorMantissa;

        emit NewReserveFactor(oldReserveFactorMantissa, newReserveFactorMantissa);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Accrues interest and reduces reserves by transferring to admin
     * @param reduceAmount Amount of reduction to reserves
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _reduceReserves(uint reduceAmount) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but on top of that we want to log the fact that an attempted reduce reserves failed.
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // _reduceReservesFresh emits reserve-reduction-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to.
        return _reduceReservesFresh(reduceAmount);
    }

    /**
     * @notice Reduces reserves by transferring to admin
     * @dev Requires fresh interest accrual
     * @param reduceAmount Amount of reduction to reserves
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _reduceReservesFresh(uint reduceAmount) internal returns (uint) {
        Error err;
        // totalReserves - reduceAmount
        uint totalReservesNew;

        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // We fail gracefully unless market's block number equals current block number
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            // TODO: static_assert + no error code?
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_FRESH_CHECK);
        }

        // Fail gracefully if protocol has insufficient underlying cash
        if (getCashPrior() < reduceAmount) {
            return fail(Error.TOKEN_INSUFFICIENT_CASH, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_CASH_NOT_AVAILABLE);
        }

        // Check reduceAmount ≤ reserves[n] (totalReserves)
        // TODO: I'm following the spec literally here but I think we should we just use SafeMath instead and fail on an error (which would be underflow)
        if (reduceAmount > totalReserves) {
            return fail(Error.BAD_INPUT, FailureInfo.REDUCE_RESERVES_VALIDATION);
        }

        /////////////////////////
        // EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS
        // (No safe failures beyond this point)

        totalReservesNew = totalReserves - reduceAmount;
        // We checked reduceAmount <= totalReserves above, so this should never revert.
        require(totalReservesNew <= totalReserves, "reduce reserves unexpected underflow");

        // Store reserves[n+1] = reserves[n] - reduceAmount
        totalReserves = totalReservesNew;

        // invoke doTransferOut(reduceAmount, admin)
        err = doTransferOut(admin, reduceAmount);
        // we revert on the failure of this command
        require(err == Error.NO_ERROR, "reduce reserves transfer out failed");

        emit ReservesReduced(admin, reduceAmount, totalReservesNew);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @notice accrues interest and updates the interest rate model using _setInterestRateModelFresh
     * @dev Admin function to accrue interest and update the interest rate model
     * @param newInterestRateModel the new interest rate model to use
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _setInterestRateModel(InterestRateModel newInterestRateModel) public returns (uint) {
        uint error = accrueInterest();
        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but on top of that we want to log the fact that an attempted change of interest rate model failed
            return fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_ACCRUE_INTEREST_FAILED);
        }
        // _setInterestRateModelFresh emits interest-rate-model-update-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to.
        return _setInterestRateModelFresh(newInterestRateModel);
    }

    /**
     * @notice updates the interest rate model (*requires fresh interest accrual)
     * @dev Admin function to update the interest rate model
     * @param newInterestRateModel the new interest rate model to use
     * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
     */
    function _setInterestRateModelFresh(InterestRateModel newInterestRateModel) internal returns (uint) {

        // Used to store old model for use in the event that is emitted on success
        InterestRateModel oldInterestRateModel;

        // Check caller is admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        // We fail gracefully unless market's block number equals current block number
        if (accrualBlockNumber != getBlockNumber()) {
            // TODO: static_assert + no error code?
            return fail(Error.MARKET_NOT_FRESH, FailureInfo.SET_INTEREST_RATE_MODEL_FRESH_CHECK);
        }

        // Track the market's current interest rate model
        oldInterestRateModel = interestRateModel;

        // Ensure invoke newInterestRateModel.isInterestRateModel() returns true
        require(newInterestRateModel.isInterestRateModel(), "marker method returned false");

        // Set the interest rate model to newInterestRateModel
        interestRateModel = newInterestRateModel;

        // Emit NewMarketInterestRateModel(oldInterestRateModel, newInterestRateModel)
        emit NewMarketInterestRateModel(oldInterestRateModel, newInterestRateModel);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /*** Safe Token ***/

    /**
     * @notice Gets balance of this contract in terms of the underlying
     * @dev This excludes the value of the current message, if any
     * @return The quantity of underlying owned by this contract
     */
    function getCashPrior() internal view returns (uint);

    /**
     * @dev Checks whether or not there is sufficient allowance for this contract to move amount from `from` and
     *      whether or not `from` has a balance of at least `amount`. Does NOT do a transfer.
     */
    function checkTransferIn(address from, uint amount) internal view returns (Error);

    /**
     * @dev Performs a transfer in, ideally returning an explanatory error code upon failure rather than reverting.
     *  If caller has not called `checkTransferIn`, this may revert due to insufficient balance or insufficient allowance.
     *  If caller has called `checkTransferIn` successfully, this should not revert in normal conditions.
     */
    function doTransferIn(address from, uint amount) internal returns (Error);

    /**
     * @dev Performs a transfer out, ideally returning an explanatory error code upon failure tather than reverting.
     *  If caller has not called checked protocol's balance, may revert due to insufficient cash held in the contract.
     *  If caller has checked protocol's balance, and verified it is >= amount, this should not revert in normal conditions.
     */
    function doTransferOut(address payable to, uint amount) internal returns (Error);
}

// File: contracts/PriceOracle.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;


interface PriceOracle {
    /**
     * @notice Indicator that this is a PriceOracle contract (for inspection)
     */
    function isPriceOracle() external pure returns (bool);

    /**
      * @notice Get the underlying price of a cToken asset
      * @param cToken The cToken to get the underlying price of
      * @return The underlying asset price mantissa (scaled by 1e18).
      *  Zero means the price is unavailable.
      */
    function getUnderlyingPrice(CToken cToken) external view returns (uint);
}

// File: contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;



contract UnitrollerAdminStorage {
    /**
    * @notice Administrator for this contract
    */
    address public admin;

    /**
    * @notice Pending administrator for this contract
    */
    address public pendingAdmin;

    /**
    * @notice Active brains of Unitroller
    */
    address public comptrollerImplementation;

    /**
    * @notice Pending brains of Unitroller
    */
    address public pendingComptrollerImplementation;
}

contract ComptrollerV1Storage is UnitrollerAdminStorage {

    /**
     * @notice Oracle which gives the price of any given asset
     */
    PriceOracle public oracle;

    /**
     * @notice Multiplier used to calculate the maximum repayAmount when liquidating a borrow
     */
    uint public closeFactorMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Multiplier representing the discount on collateral that a liquidator receives
     */
    uint public liquidationIncentiveMantissa;

    /**
     * @notice Max number of assets a single account can participate in (borrow or use as collateral)
     */
    uint public maxAssets;

    /**
     * @notice Per-account mapping of "assets you are in", capped by maxAssets
     */
    mapping(address => CToken[]) public accountAssets;

}

// File: contracts/Unitroller.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.8;


/**
 * @title ComptrollerCore
 * @dev storage for the comptroller will be at this address, and
 * cTokens should reference this contract rather than a deployed implementation if
 *
 */
contract Unitroller is UnitrollerAdminStorage, ComptrollerErrorReporter {

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingComptrollerImplementation is changed
      */
    event NewPendingImplementation(address oldPendingImplementation, address newPendingImplementation);

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingComptrollerImplementation is accepted, which means comptroller implementation is updated
      */
    event NewImplementation(address oldImplementation, address newImplementation);

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingAdmin is changed
      */
    event NewPendingAdmin(address oldPendingAdmin, address newPendingAdmin);

    /**
      * @notice Emitted when pendingAdmin is accepted, which means admin is updated
      */
    event NewAdmin(address oldAdmin, address newAdmin);

    constructor() public {
        // Set admin to caller
        admin = msg.sender;
    }

    /*** Admin Functions ***/
    function _setPendingImplementation(address newPendingImplementation) public returns (uint) {

        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        address oldPendingImplementation = pendingComptrollerImplementation;

        pendingComptrollerImplementation = newPendingImplementation;

        emit NewPendingImplementation(oldPendingImplementation, pendingComptrollerImplementation);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
    * @notice Accepts new implementation of comptroller. msg.sender must be pendingImplementation
    * @dev Admin function for new implementation to accept it's role as implementation
    * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
    */
    function _acceptImplementation() public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is pendingImplementation and pendingImplementation ≠ address(0)
        if (msg.sender != pendingComptrollerImplementation || pendingComptrollerImplementation == address(0)) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.ACCEPT_PENDING_IMPLEMENTATION_ADDRESS_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current values for inclusion in log
        address oldImplementation = comptrollerImplementation;
        address oldPendingImplementation = pendingComptrollerImplementation;

        comptrollerImplementation = pendingComptrollerImplementation;

        pendingComptrollerImplementation = address(0);

        emit NewImplementation(oldImplementation, comptrollerImplementation);
        emit NewPendingImplementation(oldPendingImplementation, pendingComptrollerImplementation);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }


    /**
      * @notice Begins transfer of admin rights. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @dev Admin function to begin change of admin. The newPendingAdmin must call `_acceptAdmin` to finalize the transfer.
      * @param newPendingAdmin New pending admin.
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      *
      * TODO: Should we add a second arg to verify, like a checksum of `newAdmin` address?
      */
    function _setPendingAdmin(address newPendingAdmin) public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller = admin
        if (msg.sender != admin) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.SET_PENDING_ADMIN_OWNER_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current value, if any, for inclusion in log
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store pendingAdmin with value newPendingAdmin
        pendingAdmin = newPendingAdmin;

        // Emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin)
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, newPendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
      * @notice Accepts transfer of admin rights. msg.sender must be pendingAdmin
      * @dev Admin function for pending admin to accept role and update admin
      * @return uint 0=success, otherwise a failure (see ErrorReporter.sol for details)
      */
    function _acceptAdmin() public returns (uint) {
        // Check caller is pendingAdmin and pendingAdmin ≠ address(0)
        if (msg.sender != pendingAdmin || msg.sender == address(0)) {
            return fail(Error.UNAUTHORIZED, FailureInfo.ACCEPT_ADMIN_PENDING_ADMIN_CHECK);
        }

        // Save current values for inclusion in log
        address oldAdmin = admin;
        address oldPendingAdmin = pendingAdmin;

        // Store admin with value pendingAdmin
        admin = pendingAdmin;

        // Clear the pending value
        pendingAdmin = address(0);

        emit NewAdmin(oldAdmin, admin);
        emit NewPendingAdmin(oldPendingAdmin, pendingAdmin);

        return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Delegates execution to an implementation contract.
     * It returns to the external caller whatever the implementation returns
     * or forwards reverts.
     */
    function () payable external {
        // delegate all other functions to current implementation
        (bool success, ) = comptrollerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data);

        // solium-disable-next-line security/no-inline-assembly
        assembly {
              let free_mem_ptr := mload(0x40)
              returndatacopy(free_mem_ptr, 0, returndatasize)

              switch success
              case 0 { revert(free_mem_ptr, returndatasize) }
              default { return(free_mem_ptr, returndatasize) }
        }
    }
}

Public-data disclaimer

Solidity scans are triage based on slither + semgrep static analysis. Output is not a certification, audit attestation or financial advice. Findings can include false positives and may miss patterns the configured detectors do not cover.